

VOLUME XXVII

NUMBER 4

October 1932

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# CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

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*A Quarterly Journal* devoted to re-  
search in the Languages, Literatures,  
History, and Life of Classical Antiquity

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THE UNIVERSITY of CHICAGO PRESS  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.

# CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

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**Classical Philology** is published quarterly in the months of January, April, July, and October, by the University of Chicago at the University of Chicago Press, 5760 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. The subscription price is \$4.00 per year; the price of single copies is \$1.25. Orders for service of less than a half-year will be charged at the single-copy rate. Postage is prepaid by the publishers on all orders from the United States, Mexico, Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama Canal Zone, Republic of Panama, Dominican Republic, Canary Islands, El Salvador, Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Hayti, Uruguay, Paraguay, Hawaiian Islands, Philippine Islands, Guam, Samoan Islands, Balearic Islands, Spain, and Venezuela. Postage is charged extra as follows: For Canada and Newfoundland, 15 cents on annual subscriptions (total \$4.15), on single copies, 4 cents (total \$1.29); for all other countries in the Postal Union 25 cents on annual subscriptions (total \$4.25), on single copies, 6 cents (total \$1.31). Patrons are requested to make all remittances payable to the University of Chicago Press in postal or express money orders or bank drafts.

### The following are authorized agents:

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For Japan: THE MARUZEN COMPANY, LTD., Tokyo.

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Business correspondence should be addressed to The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. Communications for the editors and manuscripts, which must be typewritten, should be addressed to the Editor of *Classical Philology*, The University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

The articles in this journal are indexed in the International Index to Periodicals, New York, N.Y.

Applications for permission to quote from this journal should be addressed to The University of Chicago Press, and will be freely granted.

Entered as second-class matter July 5, 1906, at the post-office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of August 24, 1912. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on June 6, 1918.

PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.

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# CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

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Number 4

## HUMOR AT THE EXPENSE OF THE RULER CULT

By KENNETH SCOTT

THE emperor Napoleon a few hours after his coronation remarked with irony: "No, Deerrès, I have come into the world too late. There is nothing great left for me to do. I do not deny that I have had a fine career, but what a difference between me and the heroes of antiquity. Look at Alexander, for instance. After he has conquered Asia, he declares himself to be the son of Jupiter, and the whole East believes him, save only his mother and Aristotle and a handful of Athenian pedants. But if I, nowadays, were to declare myself the son of the Father Eternal, every fishwife would laugh in my face. There is nothing great left for me to do."<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon was referring to the ancient ruler cult which for centuries formed a serious element in the politics and religion of the Hellenistic kingdoms and of the Roman Empire, and which has left its impress upon their literature and art. We know that there were devoted adherents to this cult as well as some who formally professed or promoted it for reasons of policy. There were, however, those who, like Plutarch,<sup>2</sup> disapproved and wrote in a serious and philosophical vein against it. Finally comes the class with which this study is concerned, namely, those who, like Napoleon's fisherwomen, took the cult as a huge joke, and often enough the persons to whom it appeared most ridiculous were the very rulers who were deified.<sup>3</sup> It happens that

<sup>1</sup> E. Ludwig, *Napoleon*, trans. E. and C. Paul (London, 1927), p. 229.

<sup>2</sup> See Scott, "Plutarch and the Ruler Cult," *TAPA*, LX (1929), 117-35.

<sup>3</sup> Of course many who scoffed at the ruler cult may have found it expedient to make a pretense of observing it.

sufficient evidence is at hand to prove the existence of an undercurrent of jesting at the expense of the ruler cult almost from its first appearance among the Greeks down to the time of the emperor Julian. Much of the material to be adduced consists of anecdotes of little or no historical foundation, yet, even so, *se non sono vere, sono ben trovate*, and in them is revealed the opinion of those ancients who refused to take the cult seriously.

The Greeks may perhaps have first gained many ideas of ruler worship through contact with Persia, and it is interesting that one of the earliest-recorded *bons mots* about ruler worship is attributed to Mithropaustes, cousin of the Persian king. Demaratus, the Spartan exile, had been hospitably received by the Great King of whom he asked permission "to ride through Sardis wearing the Persian headdress just like the kings." Thereupon Mithropaustes touched the tiara of Demaratus and said, "This headdress has no brains to cover. Nor will you be Zeus if you grasp the thunderbolt."<sup>1</sup> This was an object lesson which should have been taken to heart by the kings and emperors who rejoiced in being represented with the attributes of the gods.

One of the first Greeks to receive divine honors was the Spartan admiral, Lysander, who brought to a close the war with Athens and liberated the dependent states of the Athenian confederacy. The Samians out of gratitude for their liberation made of him a veritable god.<sup>2</sup> What this hard-headed general must have thought of his divinity we do not know, but we may perhaps form some idea if the following saying is really his: Once when he was "blamed by people for carrying out most things by deception, as was unworthy of Hercules, and by craft, not accomplishing his undertakings openly, he said with a laugh, 'Where the lion's skin does not reach, it must be pieced with the fox's.'"<sup>3</sup> At least Lysander could see humor in his supposed descent from Hercules.

Somewhat later another Spartan, King Agesilaus the Great, is accredited with looking with such disfavor upon divine honors for himself or anyone else that, when the Greeks of Asia Minor voted him statues, he forbade them to have any image of himself "painted, cast

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Themistocles* xxxix. 5.

<sup>2</sup> See Kahrstedt, art. "Lysandros," *P.-W.*, XIII (1927), 2505.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 229B.

or engraved."<sup>1</sup> And at one time the Thasians, whose benefactor he had been,

honored him with temples and apotheosis and sent an embassy to him to inform him about this matter. When he had read the honors which the ambassadors had brought him, he asked whether their country could make men gods. When they affirmed this, he said, "Go then, and make yourselves gods first; and if you do this, then I shall believe that you can make me a god too."<sup>2</sup>

Again:

The physician Menecrates was successful in certain cases that had been despaired of, and because of this had been surnamed "Zeus." This surname he had the bad taste to employ and indeed dared to write thus to Agesilaus: "Menecrates Zeus to king Agesilaus, Greetings." The king read no further but wrote in reply: "King Agesilaus to Menecrates wishes a soundness of mind."<sup>3</sup>

It is with Alexander the Great that the ruler cult became a really widespread institution for the Greeks, and with its new importance as a policy of state it stirred up a storm of opposition from those who were not accustomed to pay divine honors to anyone but the gods. That many found the whole affair laughable may be seen from the jests at the expense of Alexander's alleged divinity. When Olympias, the mother of Alexander, heard the story that her son claimed to be begotten by Zeus Ammon, she is reported to have exclaimed, "Will not Alexander cease slandering me to Hera?"<sup>4</sup> So, too, the Macedonian officers, who realized that it was the army that had exalted the king by subjecting to him the Persian Empire, must have found it difficult to stomach the flattery of ruler worship. Their attitude is very likely exemplified by the story told of Philotas, the distinguished cavalry commander, who is said to have boastfully remarked to his mistress Antigona, "What was Philip without Parmenio? And what is Alexander without Philotas? What would become of Ammon and the serpents if we should not be well disposed?"<sup>5</sup>

It appears that the Macedonian party in some of the Greek cities wished to have divine honors decreed to Alexander, and perhaps their desire was that he should be officially recognized as the son of Zeus.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* 210D.

<sup>2</sup> *Id. Mor.* 213A and *Agesilaus* xxi. 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Id. Mor.* 339F.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Id. Alex.* iii. 2.

<sup>6</sup> A. D. Nock ("Notes on the Ruler-Cult, I-IV," *JHS*, XLVIII [1928], 21 ff.) gives an excellent discussion of this problem.

At Athens, Demades urged the voting of divinity and was stoutly opposed by Pytheas, Demosthenes, and Lysurgus, who jeered at the proposition. During the debate Demosthenes finally made a joke of the matter by saying that "Alexander might be the son of both Zeus and Poseidon if he wished."<sup>1</sup> When Pytheas was taken to task by someone for declaiming against the voting of divine honors and was asked how he, being so youthful, dared to speak on such great matters, he replied, "And yet Alexander, whom you decree to be a god, is younger than I am."<sup>2</sup> Lysurgus evinced the same spirit of ridicule, for he is reported to have inquired ironically, "What sort of a god will he be, on departing from whose temple people will have to purify themselves?"<sup>3</sup>

One story—absolutely without historical foundation, but indicative of popular feeling—is to the effect that, when the Athenians voted that Alexander was Dionysus, the Cynic philosopher Diogenes exclaimed, "Also make me Sarapis!"<sup>4</sup>

Demades, who was putting to the vote the question of divine honors for Alexander, surely had no more belief in the godhead of Alexander than had Demosthenes, but he did have an eye for expediency when he tartly remarked to his opponents at Athens that "he feared for them, lest in begrudging Alexander heaven they be removed from earth by him."<sup>5</sup>

At Sparta there would seem to have been, characteristically enough, less debate than at Athens. Letters came to the Spartan Damis from Alexander in which it was insinuated that Damis propose that the king be voted a god. To Damis is ascribed this reply, earmarked with Lacedaemonian curttness and dry humor: "We are content that Alexander, if he will, be *called* a god."<sup>6</sup>

It is no surprise to find that humorous remarks on the ruler cult are assigned to philosophers, who were notorious scoffers at things divine.

<sup>1</sup> Hyperides *Contra Demosthenem* xxxi, 10. Nock (*loc. cit.*) points out that "the sons of Poseidon were proverbially bad and blustering and the sons of Zeus good."

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 804B and 187E.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 842D.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. Laert. vi. 63.

<sup>5</sup> *Gnomol. Vatic.* 236, ed. Sternbach, in "Wiener Studien," X (1888), 221; cf. Valerius Maximus vii. 2. ext. 13: "videte, inquit, ne dum caelum custoditis terram amittatis."

<sup>6</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 219E; cf. Aelian *Hist. var.* ii. 19.



On one occasion, we are told, Alexander and his friends were frightened by a clap of thunder. Thereupon the sophist Anaxarchus, who was present, mockingly inquired, "Did you, Alexander, the son of Zeus, do this?" To which the King is said to have laughingly replied: "No, for I do not wish to be terrifying as you teach me to be by bidding me have the heads of satraps and kings served as I am dining."<sup>1</sup> And again the same Anaxarchus, when pelted with apples by Alexander during dinner, is said to have risen and recited, no doubt with malicious humor, the following line from the *Orestes* of Euripides, "Some one of the gods shall be wounded by mortal hand,"<sup>2</sup> as a gentle hint that he was about to retaliate in kind to the apple-throwing.

Even Alexander himself was represented as making light, at least among his friends, of the divinity ascribed to him by his flatterers, for we find it stated that when he was once wounded by an arrow he said with a smile, "This stream is blood and no immortal ichor—'Such as flows from the veins of the blessed gods.'"<sup>3</sup> The same remark about "ichor" is given in a different version where the words are put in the mouth of the Athenian Dioxippus.<sup>4</sup> Of similar character is the story of the parasite Nicesias, who, when he saw the King writhing under the influence of a medicine he had taken, remarked, "O King, what must *we* do, when even you gods undergo such suffering?" Whereupon Alexander is reported to have scarcely looked up and said, "What sort of gods? I fear such as are hateful to the gods."<sup>5</sup>

In general the Hellenistic kings promoted their own worship and that of their ancestors, but Antigonos the One-eyed proved to be a decided exception. When the poet Hermodotus in one of his poems referred to Antigonos as the "Son of the Sun," the blunt monarch coarsely replied: "He who takes charge of my stool is cognizant of no such thing."<sup>6</sup> And even a king who sought worship for himself could not always escape ridicule, for the Seleucid ruler Antiochus,

<sup>1</sup> Satyrus *Ap. Athenaeus* vi. 250 f.; cf. *Plut. Alex.* xxviii. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Id. Mor.* 737A.

<sup>3</sup> *Id. Alex.* xxviii. 2; *Mor.* 180E and 341B. Seneca (*Ep. morales* lix. 2) gives an account which is somewhat different, for he makes Alexander say, "All men swear that I am the son of Jupiter, but this wound cries out that I am a man."

<sup>4</sup> Aristobulus *Ap. Athenaeus* vi. 251A.

<sup>5</sup> Phylarchus *Ap. Athenaeus* vi. 251C.

<sup>6</sup> *Plut. Mor.* 182C.

who assumed the divine title 'Επιφανής,<sup>1</sup> was promptly nicknamed 'Επιμανής, the "Mad."

The Romans were quite as skeptical as some of the Greeks had been; Julius Caesar's pretensions to divinity<sup>2</sup> were too much for Cicero with his penchant for sharp sayings and his dislike for Caesar. It is therefore no wonder that the erection in the temple of Quirinus of a statue of Julius with the inscription *Deo Invicto* elicited from Cicero the bitter remark: "I prefer to have Caesar the σύνναος of Quirinus than of Salus,"<sup>3</sup> and that he elsewhere writes to Atticus, who had a home on the Quirinal near the temple of Quirinus, "I see that your house will be worth more with Caesar for a neighbor."<sup>4</sup> And again he jeeringly refers to Caesar as *Quirini contubernalis*.<sup>5</sup>

Mark Antony, like his patron Caesar, was patterning his religious policy after that of the Hellenistic monarchs. When he encouraged his identification with Dionysus, the Athenians, falling in with his desires, saluted him as Dionysus. So far all would have been well, but when, in order to flatter him still further, they proposed that he marry their virgin goddess Athena, he made a grim jest of the offer. He accepted the hand of the goddess, but at the same time demanded a dowry of one thousand talents from the unfortunate citizens. Whereupon one Greekling impudently remarked to Antony, "O Lord, Zeus married your mother Semele without any dowry." Antony ignored the remark but mercilessly exacted the money, a procedure which brought upon him various insults. Thus at the time when he had to wife both Octavia and Cleopatra, the Athenians took their revenge by writing beneath Antony's statue the following formula of divorce: "Ὅκταουία καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ Ἀντωνίῳ 'res tuas tibi habe.'"<sup>6</sup>

Antony's entry into Ephesus was another occasion on which he was hailed by the people as Dionysus, and at that time they greeted him as Dionysus Χαριδότης, "Giver of Joy," and Μειλίχιος, "Gracious." Plutarch has recorded a bitter jibe of either the Ephesians or the followers of Octavian to the following effect: "And such he was to

<sup>1</sup> Athenaeus v. 193D.

<sup>2</sup> See G. Herzog-Hauser, art. "Kaiserkult," *P.-W.*, Suppl., IV (1924), 816-20.

<sup>3</sup> *Ad Att.* xii. 45. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* xiii. 28. 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 47. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Seneca *Suas.* i. 1. 5-6.

some, but to the majority he was Dionysus 'Ωμηστής, 'the Savage,' and 'Αγριώνιος 'the Fierce.'"<sup>1</sup>

About Octavian a somewhat similar account is found. Suetonius mentions a rumor spread in Rome that Octavian and his friends, in a time of famine in the city, held a mock *lectisternium* at which the guests appeared as gods and goddesses, Octavian playing the part of Apollo. Then the following day people said "that the gods had devoured all the grain and that Caesar was clearly Apollo, but Apollo *Tortor* 'the Tormentor.'"<sup>2</sup>

It is true that in a sense Octavian established the Roman cult of the emperors as a policy of state, but that astute statesman could see through the flattery paid him as a god, and the following anecdote is probably genuine: In Spain, at Tarraco, there was an altar to Augustus; an embassy was once sent from that city to report to the emperor that a palm shoot had miraculously sprung up on his altar. His reply, typical of his ready wit as we find it preserved in frequent citations in the ancient authors, was merely this: "That shows how often you burn incense to me."<sup>3</sup>

Under Tiberius we find several jests at the expense of emperor worship. In the time of his predecessor it had become customary to compare or identify the two closest heirs to the throne, two brothers by blood or adoption, with the twin gods Castor and Pollux, whose concord was so necessary for the welfare of the empire. The conception of the princes as Dioscuri under the protection of Concordia became firmly rooted in the minds of the Romans of the Empire.<sup>4</sup> It was at least partly because of this conception that people derisively "nicknamed the younger Drusus 'Castor,' because he had struck a distinguished Roman knight,"<sup>5</sup> who can hardly have been other than Sejanus. The bestowal of this nickname was ironical, for the brother-princes were identified with Castor and Pollux, the patron gods of the knights, and so it was a most unseemly act for Drusus to beat a distinguished member of the order which, in the light of his identification with one of the Dioscuri, he was supposed to protect.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ant.* xxiv. 3-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Aug.* 70.

<sup>3</sup> Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* vi. 3. 77.

<sup>4</sup> Scott, "The Dioscuri and the Imperial Cult," *CP*, XX (1930), 379-80.

<sup>5</sup> Dio lvii. 14. 9.

<sup>6</sup> See Scott, "Drusus Nicknamed 'Castor,'" *CP*, XX (1930), 155-61.

From the time of Demetrius Poliorcetes it had become a more or less common practice in the Hellenistic cities of Asia Minor to confer upon a ruler the divine honor of a month named after him. The Romans took over this method of conferring divine honor, and Quintilis and Sextilis received the names Iulius and Augustus, respectively.<sup>1</sup> Tiberius, however, scorned divine honors, for himself at least, and took pains to make it clear that he was merely a man.<sup>2</sup> When, therefore, the Senate urged him to permit his birth month, November, to be named Tiberius, he quashed the proposal with this disconcerting query: "And what will you do if there be thirteen Caesars?"<sup>3</sup>

Since he had expressed himself after this fashion about one aspect of the ruler cult, it is no wonder that Tiberius could forgive another for a similar offense, particularly when committed against his deceased mother, Livia, whose deification he had forbidden. In Tacitus we read that Cotta Messalinus was accused of having remarked, among the priests at a feast on the birthday of Augusta, that it was a *novendialis* banquet,<sup>4</sup> the point of the jest being that "a feast on the birthday of a dead person who had never been deified was only a funeral feast [a *novendialis cena*] under another name."<sup>5</sup> The charge against Messalinus was dismissed because of a letter from Tiberius in which he set forth the many services of the accused and demanded that "there be not construed as criminal either words which had been viciously distorted or the frankness of convivial conversations."

Tiberius' successor, Gaius, was as eager for adulation as Tiberius had been opposed to it. It is related that he got himself up in the guise of various divinities, a procedure which doubtless produced considerable mirth, though such mirth would have to be discreetly repressed, at least in the imperial presence. A certain Gaul, however, was evidently lacking in the circumspection of the courtiers, for when he beheld Gaius seated on a raised platform, arrayed like Jupiter and handing out money, he burst out laughing. When the Emperor sum-

<sup>1</sup> See Scott, "The Honorific Months in Greek and Roman Calendars," *Yale Classical Studies*, II (1931), 201-78.

<sup>2</sup> See Rostovtzeff, "L'Empereur Tibère et le culte impérial," *Rev. hist.*, CLXIII (1930), 1-26, and Taylor, "Tiberius' Refusals of Divine Honors," *TAPA*, LX (1929), 87-101.

<sup>3</sup> Dio lvi. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ann.* vi. 5. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Furneaux, *ad loc.*



moned him and asked "What do I seem to you to be?" the blunt foreigner responded, "A big absurdity [παράληρημα]."<sup>1</sup>

Gaius was also accustomed, we are told, to claim that he had intercourse with the moon.<sup>2</sup> So on one occasion he remarked to Vitellius that he was conversing with the moon-goddess and asked him if he saw her. The ready wit of Vitellius saved him from this pitfall, for he is said to have replied, "It is possible for you gods alone, O Lord, to see one another."<sup>3</sup> Whether the incident occurred or not, such a story must have set all Rome to laughing.

The next emperor, Claudius, was unfortunate enough to encounter an extraordinary amount of ridicule because of the apotheosis voted after his death; it was popularly believed that his death was the result of his having eaten poisoned mushrooms served to him through the connivance of Agrippina and Nero. The latter, after his accession to the throne, happened to be present at a banquet where mushrooms were served. When someone voiced the opinion that mushrooms were food of the gods, Nero is said to have exclaimed, "True! for my father was made a god by eating a mushroom."<sup>4</sup>

Dio, speaking of the hypocritical conduct of Agrippina and Nero, writes that they "feigned grief for the man whom they had killed, and raised to heaven him whom they had carried out from the banquet on a litter." After this statement he proceeds to relate an amusing jest of Junius Gallio, the brother of Seneca the philosopher. "Gallio," he writes, "is credited with saying much in one very short remark; for since the public executioners were accustomed to drag the bodies of those executed in the prison to the Forum with certain large hooks and from there draw them to the river, he said that Claudius had been 'raised to heaven with a hook.'"<sup>5</sup>

But by far the most elaborate fooling about the deification of Claudius is the essay of Seneca himself, commonly entitled the *Apocolocyntosis*, "the Pumpkinification," of the deified Claudius. The whole piece is a satire on deification, in which Seneca ridicules the oath taken by the keeper of the Appian Way to the effect that he had seen a *divus* or *diva* going up to heaven. In the mock senatorial debate of

<sup>1</sup> Dio lix. 26. 8-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 27. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Petr. Patr. (*Exc. Vat.* 44); cf. Dio *Epit.* lxi. 35. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Dio *op. cit.* lxi. 35. 2-4.

the gods concerning the bestowal of divinity upon Claudius, Janus is represented as remarking: "Once it was a great thing to be made one of the gods; now you have made the glory a farce," and proposing a decree to prevent further deification of mortals. Diespiter, in moving the apotheosis of Claudius, says: "I move that the deified Claudius from this day on be a god with all the rights and privileges of anyone who was made a god before him, and that this business shall be added to the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid." And the comments of the deified Augustus are equally disparaging of official deification: "Who will worship a god like Claudius? Who will believe in him? As long as you make such gods, no one will believe that you are gods." Seneca clearly had no more admiration for the ruler cult than he had for Claudius who had banished him to Corsica, and the satire, coming from the pen of so distinguished a personage, must have caused a sensation among court circles at Rome. Can we suppose that Seneca's opinions varied greatly from those of the reading public of the day?

Only a few years later the Emperor Vespasian on his deathbed expressed his disdain for the ruler cult. As he felt the approach of death he uttered the mocking words: "*Vae! Puto deus fio.*"<sup>1</sup>

Lucian, in his *Dialogues of the Dead*, followed the example of Seneca by ridiculing in literary form the deification of rulers. The third dialogue jests at the cult of heroes like Trophonius; the twelfth, thirteenth, and fifteenth hold up to scorn the pretended divinity of Alexander the Great; in the sixteenth Diogenes asks Heracles how a son of Jupiter can die, and then follows a satire on the making of demigods. The same subject is likewise ridiculed in the *Ecclesia* and the *Decree*, essays which evince a striking similarity to the spirit and form of Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis*, though the ruler cult is not specifically satirized in them.

The custom of voting apotheosis for a ruler after his death gave rise to two stories from the time of the Severi. It is related that an Ethiopian soldier, who was a famous buffoon and jester, carrying a garland of cypress boughs, once met Septimius Severus. When the Emperor, angry at the omen of the soldier's color and that of the garland, ordered him out of his sight, the Ethiopian cried, "You have been all, conquered all; now, O victor, be a god [*deus*]."<sup>2</sup> If there is

<sup>1</sup> Suet. *Vesp.* xxiii. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Scr. Hist. Aug. *Severus* xxii. 5.

any doubt about the grim jest in this use of *deus*, there can be none in the similar employment of the word *divus* by Severus' son, Caracalla. The latter slew his brother Geta, and, when he was told that he might mitigate the crime by having the deceased consecrated as the *divus*, remarked, "*Sit divus, dum non sit vivus.*"<sup>1</sup>

The emperor Julian, like Seneca and Lucian, poked fun at emperor worship. In A.D. 361 he wrote the *Symposium* or *Kronia*, about a banquet of gods and emperors, a theme which at once calls to mind the *Apocolocyntosis*. Nero's silly imitation of Apollo is derided (310C), Silenus mockingly calls Alexander the Great "You immortal" (331A), and designates Augustus as "image-maker" (*κοροπλάθος*) because "just as they fashion nymphs" Augustus had "fashioned gods for us, of whom the first and foremost Caesar here" (332D). Silenus likewise tries to embarrass Marcus Aurelius, by alluding to what appeared "improper and foolish" in that Emperor's conduct, namely, "his having enrolled his wife among the deified." To this Marcus replies that he did not introduce the custom of giving divine honors to one's wife, and, though admitting that the introduction of the practice is not sensible (*οὐκ ἔστιν εὐλογον*), he contends that it would have been practically an injustice to deprive one's own of what had been done for so many (334B-D).

It is not surprising that the ruler cult readily lent itself to caricature.<sup>2</sup> The story of the flight from Troy of Aeneas with Anchises and Ascanius was one which took on importance in Roman art in the time of Augustus, for the theme was that of the divine descent of the Julian family.<sup>3</sup> In the museum at Naples is a wall painting from Pompeii which is described as follows:

A monkey with a long tail, Roman breastplate, military boots, and red *paludamentum* (Aeneas) carries on his left shoulder another monkey holding a small red box in his lap (Anchises), and with his right hand leads a little mon-

<sup>1</sup> *Ser. Hist. Aug. Geta* 2; cf. Bickermann, "Die römische Kaiserapotheose," *Archiv für Religionswiss.*, XXVII (1929), 3.

<sup>2</sup> The suggestion of Milne (*Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, I [1914], 99), that we have on a jar from Abydos a satirical sketch of Antony-Dionysus with Cleopatra, is possibly a correct interpretation of the scene, though this is far from certain.

<sup>3</sup> See M. Camaggio, *Le statue di Enea e di Romolo nel Foro di Augusto* (Napoli, 1928); J. Gagé, "Romulus-Augustus," *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, XLVII (1930), 141 ff.; Scott, "The Identification of Augustus with Romulus Quirinus," *TAPA*, LVI (1925), 104.

key wearing a Phrygian cap and with the *pedum* in its right hand (Ascanius). The monkey with the breastplate has an exaggerated *membrum virile*, as is also true of the monkey with the *pedum*.<sup>1</sup>

A representation of the same scene from Herculaneum, now in the Museo Nazionale di Napoli, differs only in that three dogs replace the monkeys of the painting just described.<sup>2</sup>

The material which has just been studied would indicate that the Greeks and Romans relished jests at the expense of the ruler cult, both when they were really made by the persons to whom they are attributed and also when they were simply "good stories" of unknown origin. The tendency to ridicule apotheosis finds a place in a type of literary satire in Roman times, as we see from the compositions of Seneca the philosopher, Lucian, and Julian. Our evidence seems to point to the existence of a reading public which had no genuine religious faith in the ruler cult, and we can hardly be mistaken in thinking that the most cultivated Greeks and Romans had as much belief in the apotheosis of a ruler as the same educated class would have today. That some of these same people doubtless observed or officially encouraged the worship of the ruler as an act of political allegiance is quite another matter. True religious belief in the divinity of the king or emperor is to be sought among the more ignorant lower classes, especially among barbarian peoples and in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire.

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<sup>1</sup> Ruesch, *Guida illustrata del Museo Nazionale di Napoli* (Napoli, 1908), p. 291, No. 1265; cf. Helbig, *Wandgemälde* (1868), No. 1380. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor A. W. Van Buren, who called my attention to this caricature.

<sup>2</sup> Paribeni, "Virgilio e l'arte antica figurata," in the special "Virgilio" volume of the *Illustrazione italiana*, p. 46. I suspect that only one painting exists.



THE SPEAKERS IN THE CASE OF  
*CHRYSIPPUS v. PHORMIO*<sup>1</sup>

BY J. O. LOFBERG

ANY discussion of the points at issue seems to demand a brief summary of the circumstances of the suit. Chrysippus sued Phormio, a merchant engaged in foreign trade, for non-payment of a mercantile loan. In his defense Phormio contended that he had paid the money due, in a foreign port, to the sea captain Lampis, a representative of Chrysippus. In support of this he offered the testimony of Lampis. The latter's behavior in this matter was clearly open to suspicion. Immediately after his return to Athens from abroad he was interviewed by Chrysippus and at that time reported that Phormio had paid him nothing. Later, however, when Phormio also returned and Chrysippus threatened him with suit and the case came before an arbitrator, Lampis swore to the truth of Phormio's defense. He accounted for the glaring discrepancy between his two reports by saying that he was obviously "out of his head"<sup>2</sup> when he made his first statement. There was doubtless collusion between Phormio and Lampis. The latter had suffered shipwreck on his return trip to Athens and had barely escaped with his life. This fortuitous circumstance offered them the opportunity of alleging that Phormio had actually paid the money to Lampis, but that due to the loss of everything on board he arrived in Athens with empty hands. Curiously enough they had no witness to the transaction. The arbitrator found it impossible to decide the matter and eventually the case came into the courts. The speech with which we are concerned was delivered in court by the plaintiff.

With the single exception of Blass, editors, commentators, and translators are, so far as I know, unanimous in assuming that the plaintiff, Chrysippus, had the assistance of a business partner, who, as *συνήγορος*, delivered a part of the speech. Such assistance was not unusual. The entire speech in favor of the banker Phormio,<sup>3</sup> whose

<sup>1</sup> Dem. 34.

<sup>2</sup> οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὧν αὐτοῦ (secs. 20, 35).

<sup>3</sup> Not to be confused with the Phormio of the present case.

obvious inability to speak in public had been demonstrated (Dem. 36. 1), was delivered by a "friend" (*ἐπιτήδειος*), and the speech in the case versus Neaera ([Dem.] 59) was in reality spoken by Apollodorus as *συνήγορος*, after a brief introduction (1-15) by the nominal prosecutor. To have such assistance from a "friend" it was but necessary to ask for and receive the permission of the court.<sup>1</sup> In the case of *Chrysippus v. Phormio*, however, no such request is made.<sup>2</sup> It is therefore difficult for commentators to decide what part was spoken by Chrysippus and what part by his partner. One who is not familiar with the speech may well wonder what the grounds are on which rests the assumption that one partner relieved the other in its delivery. There are both external and internal grounds, though I am inclined to believe that modern scholars have been unduly influenced by the external in their interpretation of the internal peculiarities.

The external evidence is that of the grammarian Libanius,<sup>3</sup> who concludes his hypothesis to the speech with the following paragraph:

The same peculiarity is observed here as in the speech against Neaera, viz., that it is not spoken by one party only; but whereas there the division is plain, here it is confused and obscure. It appears to me however that the second speaker begins at *ἀκούσας τοίνυν ἡμῶν κτλ.*<sup>4</sup> In any case it is clear that they are partners who bring this action against Phormio.<sup>5</sup>

My own feeling is that, unless the internal grounds are convincing, the remark of Libanius should have no more weight than the conclusions of any other editor.

The internal evidence is to be found in certain perplexing uses of the demonstrative pronouns *οὗτος* and *δὲ*, which refer indubitably to Chrysippus and therefore seem to have been used of him by a second speaker.

It is agreed, I believe, by all who have commented on the speech, that the first seventeen sections were delivered by Chrysippus. It

<sup>1</sup> Lipsius is doubtless right (*Das attische Recht*, p. 908) in saying that permission was probably never refused, but there are indications in the later orators (e.g., Lysurgus c. *Leocr.* 138) that the innocent character of this "friendly assistance" was under suspicion. See the author's *Sycophancy in Athens*, p. 58, for discussion.

<sup>2</sup> Such a request does appear in the last sentence of the speech, as a preliminary to a *συνήγορία* that we do not have. Its presence makes it all the more likely that a similar request would have been used to introduce a previous *συνήγορος*.

<sup>3</sup> *Floruit* A.D. ca. 350.

<sup>4</sup> I.e., sec. 21.

<sup>5</sup> The translation is largely that of Paley and Sandys in their notes *ad loc.*

should also be obvious, and is generally admitted, at least by those who have studied it carefully, that the latter part of the speech, sections 33-52, was delivered by the same man. Differences of opinion exist, however, with regard to the disposition of sections 18-32. The reason for this is the difficulty caused by the troublesome demonstratives which appear in sections 20-32. Arnold Schaefer<sup>1</sup> assigns these sections to a second speaker. Thalheim<sup>2</sup> agrees in the main with Schaefer, but transposes the last section of 32 to the middle of 29 and allows the first speaker to begin again with 30.<sup>3</sup> Nitsche<sup>4</sup> gives the second speaker sections 18-29 and 32-33. The nervous antistrophe arrangement of Nitsche could hardly have been tolerated in an Athenian courtroom. It can also be refuted on other grounds.<sup>5</sup>

General considerations would seem to discredit even the arrangement suggested by A. Schaefer. In the first place there is, as mentioned earlier, the absence of any request for the jury's consent to such division of labor.<sup>6</sup> Also, from the practice in other cases one is justified in assuming that a *συνήγορος* is permitted by the court on the theory that he is better able to handle the case than the nominal prosecutor. This can hardly be the assumption if the *συνήγορος* delivers only one-fourth of the speech. Some such division of labor would seem more reasonable if the sections (18-32) in question corresponded to some definite division of the speech. This is not the case. The *διήγησις* that begins with section 6 does not end with 17. It continues through 21. It is hardly credible that the "first" speaker could not have carried on for three more sections. Similar objections can be brought against a "division of labor" at the end of 32. Scholars have not been blind to these theoretical objections, but the difficulties created by the

<sup>1</sup> *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, III, II, 304-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Comment. zu Ehren von M. Hertz*, pp. 58 ff.

<sup>3</sup> G. H. Schaefer (in his commentaries) like Libanius assumes that once the second speaker has begun he continues to the end. He puts the division at sec. 22.

<sup>4</sup> *Dissert. de traiciendis partibus in Dem. or.*, Thesis 4.

<sup>5</sup> See Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit* (2d Auflage), III, I, 581, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Attempts have been made to show that such a request was granted before the "first" speaker began, by interpreting *ἐν τῷ μέρει λεγόντων* (sec. 1) to mean, "taking our turns in addressing you." For this *ἐν μέρει*, without the article, would be correct as Blass (*op. cit.*, p. 578) and others (e.g., Paley and Sandys, notes *ad loc.*) have pointed out. The phrase surely has reference to the preceding speech of Phormio, who had spoken first since this was an instance of *παραγραφή*, and means, "as we in our turn speak," i.e., as "we reply."

troublesome demonstratives were real, and so they were forced to despair of solution, as did Hermann,<sup>1</sup> or to resort to the division-of-labor theory for which they had already been prejudiced by Libanius.

The solution of Blass is quite different.<sup>2</sup> With commendable intrepidity he brushes away the arguments for two speakers with the ingenious suggestion that the speech was *originally* composed for the use of a *συνήγορος*; later Chrysippus decided that he could handle the case alone. Revisions were then required but not carefully executed: a few instances of *οὗτος* survive where *ἐγώ* should have been introduced, an instance of *οἷδε* instead of *ἡμεῖς*.

This does not impress me as a plausible solution; neither does it hold up well under examination. The validity of the theory can be tested, in part, by going through the speech and substituting for the personal pronouns, *ἐγώ*, *ἡμᾶς*, etc., the proper demonstratives of the "original" version. The result is a bit confusing throughout, but especially so in section 46. Such substitution in that section results in ambiguities that even variety in the use of demonstratives and effective delivery could hardly remove. A more serious objection appears also in connection with the same section. *ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ἔχω τί χροῶμαι τοῖς τοῦτον μάρτυσιν*, the natural outburst of the man who feels keenly his own personal bewilderment, if "restored" to the impersonal third-personal form, becomes a weak, meaningless phrase, if in fact it can be used at all without unpardonable violation of idiom and syntax. However, the *Umarbeitung* theory, once accepted, may be carried to any extreme and may be used to remove any difficulties, and therefore makes any refutation on the basis of style extremely difficult. In spite of this I believe that a careful study of the speech will convince one that the whole narrative is so vivid and personal that it could not have been prepared originally in the third person and subsequently adapted to its present form without a more complete *Umarbeitung* than Blass seems to have in mind. In fact, one would be compelled to assume re-writing rather than revision.

In view of this it seems to me that a solution to be tenable must explain the presence of the demonstratives as due to design rather than to the accident of careless proofreading. Such a solution is possible, I believe, without recourse to the discredited two-speaker theory.

<sup>1</sup> *Program. Erfurt* (1853), pp. 12 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 581.



My suggestion is that we have here the colloquial, but effective trick of speech in which a speaker uses the demonstrative pronoun to refer dramatically to *himself*. This is as old as Homer,<sup>1</sup> and is especially frequent in the dialogue of the drama. In tragedy the pronoun so used is regularly *ὅδε*;<sup>2</sup> in comedy *οὗτος* in this sense is not unusual.<sup>3</sup> This use of *οὗτος* is also found in a passage in the orator Antiphon that has caused the editors considerable trouble: *αἰτιῶνται δὲ οὗτοι . . . ὡς οὗτος ἐκέλευσε πιεῖν τὸν παῖδα τὸ φάρμακον*, where *οὗτος* is used by the defendant who is addressing the jury to refer to himself.<sup>4</sup>

Let us consider first the occurrence of *τούτω* in section 26. Phormio had borrowed money, not only from Chrysippus, but also from two other investors who accompanied him abroad and never ceased dunning him for payment. In his argument from probability, advanced to show how improbable it was that Phormio had really paid any money to Lampis, Chrysippus shows how incredible it was that Phormio should be so reluctant to settle with these creditors who were dogging his heels, but so exceedingly ready to make full payment, through a mere agent, to himself, the creditor in distant Athens: *καὶ τοῖς μὲν . . . δανείσασι μόλις τάρχαϊον ἀποδέδωκας, οἱ συνέπλευσαν σοι καὶ προσήδρευον· τούτῳ δὲ τῷ μὴ παρόντι οὐ μόνον τάρχαϊα καὶ τοὺς τόκους ἀπέδιδους, ἀλλὰ καὶ κτλ.* The contrast between *τοῖς δανείσασι*, the creditors

<sup>1</sup> *Od.* ii. 40–41. *οὐχ ἐκὰς οὗτος ἀνὴρ, . . . δὲ λαὸν ἤγειρα.* Cf. also *ibid.* i. 359, *τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ.*

<sup>2</sup> Examples of this are hardly needed, but the following instances are typical: *Soph. Tr.* 305, *τῇσδὲ γε ζώσης = ἐμοῦ ζώντος*, and *ibid.* 1013, *ἐπὶ τῷδε νοσοῦντι = ἐμοί.* The use is not limited to drama. Cf. Antiphon vi. 9, *οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγα ἐξελέγξει ἀδικοῦντα τόνδε τὸν ἄνδρα.*

<sup>3</sup> Aristoph. *Ach.* 129, *οὗτος ἴ πάρα*, "Here am I"; *ibid.* 367, *ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ ὁ λέγων οὗτος.* See also *Clouds* 141, *Knights* 1098, *Lysistrata* 1087, *Plutus* 868, where both the personal and the demonstrative pronouns appear.

It does not escape me that there are theoretical distinctions between the uses of *ὅδε* and *οὗτος*, and that according to one of these the former becomes the "pronoun of the first person," and the latter, "the pronoun of the second." It may be however that often accident rather than real distinction decides the choice of pronoun. In fact, investigation has made it at least reasonable that the greater frequency of *ὅδε* in tragedy as compared with *οὗτος* may be due to the greater ease with which some of its oblique cases fit into verse (Charles W. Bain, *The Demonstrative Pronoun in Sophocles*, "Studies in Philology" [University of North Carolina, 1913], p. 24). In his study of the style of Isaeus, Wyse finds no consistency in the distribution of *οὗτος* and *ὅδε* (note on iv. 3). If this is true of general distinctions, it is not impossible that particular shades of meaning were not faithfully observed. The readiness to use the demonstrative in this sense is doubtless in part responsible for the relatively frequent use of *hic* in a similar way in Roman versions of Greek comedy. See, e.g., Plaut. *Trin.* 1115; Ter. *Heaut.* 356. Cf. also Horace *Satires* i. 9, 47.

<sup>4</sup> Ant. vi. 17.

who followed their debtor, and *τούτῳ τῷ μὴ παρόντι*, "your humble servant, the present speaker" who stayed in Athens is exceedingly neat. Even neater is the balance in section 27 between *ἐκείνους*, the afore-said persistent creditors, and *τούτου*, "the gentleman now addressing the jury": *καὶ ἐκείνους μὲν οὐκ ἐδεδίεις . . . τούτου δὲ φῆς φροντίζειν*. These speeches were after all written for delivery and for delivery by men who used gestures freely. Any ambiguity that may arise from the printed page would easily be corrected by the appropriate gesture.<sup>1</sup>

The earliest instance of this dramatic use of *οὗτος* occurs in section 20. It will be remembered that Lampis had originally reported to Chrysippus that Phormio had paid him no money on account, but later, before the arbitrator, changed his story. Chrysippus, justifiably enraged over this duplicity, took him immediately to task with the following result: *ὠμολόγει μὲν εἰρηκέναι ταῦτα πρὸς τοῦτον*. *πρὸς τοῦτον* has been variously explained. It has been construed with *ὠμολόγει* (in spite of its position) and taken to refer to the arbitrator.<sup>2</sup> It has been construed with *εἰρηκέναι* and taken to refer to Phormio.<sup>3</sup> This is hardly possible. Phormio was apparently not present when Chrysippus first interviewed Lampis. In any case the statement was made to *Chrysippus*. It has even been taken to refer to the "second" speaker, who is soon to begin and to whom Chrysippus is supposed to point and say, "Lampis admitted he told my partner here." Apparently it is regarded as of no importance at all that nothing in the preceding narrative can possibly be taken to indicate that a partner assisted Chrysippus in his dealings with Lampis. *τοῦτον* must obviously refer to Chrysippus.<sup>4</sup> The general sense demands this and the language of a later passage furnishes corroboration.<sup>5</sup> According to my theory Chrysippus beats his breast in indignation as he recalls the effrontery of Lampis and says, "He admitted that he had made this statement to this man now addressing you."

<sup>1</sup> See the remark of Wyse quoted on p. 333, n. 3 above, and also the comments of Paley and Sandys on the ambiguous demonstratives in their notes on *Dem.* 36. 12, 20, 22, 42.

<sup>2</sup> So G. H. Schaefer and Kennedy, in his translation.

<sup>3</sup> Suggested by Paley and Sandys in their notes *ad loc.*

<sup>4</sup> Those who assume that the partner is now addressing the jury have no difficulty in interpreting it so.

<sup>5</sup> *καὶ ὁ Λάμπις, ὅσα μὲν εἶπε πρὸς ἐμέ . . . οὐκ ἐντὸς ὧν αὐτοῦ φησιν εἰπεῖν* (35), where *εἶπε πρὸς ἐμέ* corresponds to the *εἰρηκέναι πρὸς τοῦτον* of the present passage.

The other dramatic uses of the pronouns may be justified by similar arguments. *οὗτος* in 23 has had much to do with the persistence of the second-speaker theory. It has been regarded as convincing evidence that the partner was certainly speaking at this point. This, however, is discredited by *τοῖς ἐμοῖς χρήμασιν* three lines above. Whoever delivered 23 also certainly delivered 22. This must be Chrysippus. A "second" speaker should in all conscience have said *τοῖς ἡμετέροις χρήμασιν*. In 29-30 occurs the phrase *τὸν παῖδα τὸν τούτου*. This is the third reference to this slave of Chrysippus. The first occurs early in the speech (8); the second, *τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἡμέτερον*, in 28. There is no possible change of speakers between 28 and 29-30. A "second" speaker, if a partner, might very well use *ἡμέτερον* of a slave belonging to the firm, but nothing can justify his referring ten lines later to the same slave as *τὸν παῖδα τὸν τούτου*. There is, however, some justification for such a use by Chrysippus. He is at this point working up to a climax in describing what precautions Phormio should have taken to have witnesses to his alleged payment of the loan: "And yet, O earth and heaven, if you paid so much money . . . you should have made it common knowledge on 'Change and called in everybody to witness, but first of all the slave and the partner of your present opponent (*τούτου*)."

The last instance of *οὗτος*, and the single instance of *οἶδε*, are found in the passage (32) where the speaker expresses ironically his surprise at the defendant's failure to attach sufficient importance to the contract, of which there were two copies: *καὶ οἶδε μὲν πρὸς σέ δύο συγγραφὰς ἐποίησαντο, . . . σὺ δὲ . . . φῆς δοῦναι τῷ ναυκλήρῳ τὸ χρυσίον, εἰδὼς κατὰ σοῦ κειμένην Ἀθήνησι συγγραφὴν πρὸς τούτου*. When the speaker said *οἶδε*, he probably pointed to his partner<sup>1</sup> and himself; when he said *πρὸς τούτου*, he pointed to himself.<sup>2</sup> In my opinion the speaker was Chrysippus.

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<sup>1</sup> The existence of a partner may be assumed from the occasional plural used by the speaker and from *ἐγὼ τε καὶ ἀδελφός* (39).

<sup>2</sup> This passage is itself an evidence of the fact that the orator did not distinguish carefully between *δδε* and *οὗτος*. It is also to be noted that those who assume that a second speaker is here addressing the jury must admit that *οἶδε* = *ἡμεῖς*.

## THE BATTLE OF THE ASSINARUS

By B. D. MERITT

WHEN the Athenian army in Sicily in the year 413 B.C. had suffered its final defeat, the fate of the prisoners was decided by the Syracusan assembly according to a decree proposed by the popular leader Eurykles. Plutarch (*Nicias*, 28) records as the first provision of this decree the establishment of a public festival, to be called As(s)inaria, because the battle in which Nicias and his army had been captured was fought at the As(s)inarus River. This day, according to Plutarch, was the fourth day from the end of the month Karneios, which the Athenians call Metageitnion.

Several attempts have been made to determine the date of this battle in terms of the Julian calendar. Every such attempt begins with the known date of the lunar eclipse on the evening of August 27, which prevented the Athenians from carrying out their original plan for departure from Syracuse (Thuc. vii. 50. 4). It is possible to determine from the text of Thucydides the sequence of events between the eclipse and the battle of the Assinarus, though not in every case the exact number of days involved. The evidence is as follows:

TABLE I

1. Eclipse of the moon (August 27) [vii. 50. 4]
2. Manning of ships by the Syracusans and maneuvering for as many days as they deemed sufficient [vii. 51. 2]
3. Two days of battle [vii. 51. 2; 52-55]
4. Patrolling of the harbor by the Syracusans [vii. 56. 1], closing of the mouth of the harbor, and making other preparations for battle [vii. 59. 3]. Council of war by the Athenians [vii. 60. 2], desertion of the upper ramparts, and fortification of a smaller land fort [vii. 60. 2-3]
5. One day of battle in the harbor [vii. 61-72]
6. Delay of one day between the battle and the beginning of the retreat [vii. 73-74]
7. Retreat of eight days, ending with the battle at the Assinarus River [vii. 75-85]

If one assumes that the month Karneios ended on the day before the new moon of September 12, the events listed in Table I will have

to be dated between August 28 and September 8 (τετράς φθινορτος) inclusive. This period of twelve days is completely occupied by the first battles on land and sea, and by the second battle in the harbor and subsequent retreat. There is no possibility of making allowance for the events listed under items 2 and 4 in Table I.

One possible way of avoiding this embarrassment is to assume that the Syracusan month Karneios was not in true accord with the lunar cycle, but rather that the initial day of the civil month fell several days later than the time of astronomical new moon. In this way the battle of the Assinarus might be dated several days later than September 8, perhaps on or near September 11.<sup>1</sup> There would be also a few days of available time, according to this hypothesis, for the events recorded under items 2 and 4 in Table I. This implies, of course, that the eclipse of August 27 took place during the month of Karneios.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, it is possible to suppose that the eclipse took place during the month preceding Karneios. If this is true, we may date the initial day of Karneios on September 12, without assuming any maladjustment between the true lunar cycle and the civil month. A period of one month is thus made available for the events listed under items 2 and 4 of Table I. The battle of the Assinarus must now be dated on October 8 instead of September 8.<sup>3</sup>

Some scholars have argued that the date mentioned by Plutarch is not necessarily the date of the battle of the Assinarus.<sup>4</sup> They make no attempt, therefore, to date the battle on the fourth day from the end of Karneios. Arbitrary estimates are proposed for the time required for the events listed under items 2 and 4 in Table I, and in this way the date of the battle is determined without reference to the evidence of Plutarch. W. A. Lamberton, in his edition of the sixth and seventh books of Thucydides, suggests that the intervals of time necessary for items 2 and 4 "can hardly have made less than from ten to fourteen days." He thus determines a date for the battle of the As-

<sup>1</sup> This is the interpretation of the evidence offered by Dinsmoor, *The Archons of Athens*, p. 343.

<sup>2</sup> This was assumed also by Meritt, "The Spartan Gymnopaedia," *Class. Phil.*, XXVI (1931), 83.

<sup>3</sup> This solution of the problem has been advocated by Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 2, 240-41. Cf. also Nissen, *Rh. Mus.*, XL (1885), 369.

<sup>4</sup> This suggestion is made by Beloch, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

sinarus between September 18 and September 22.<sup>1</sup> W. S. Ferguson, writing in the *Cambridge Ancient History* (V, 310), suggests that the final disaster occurred about September 20.

To the present writer it seems impossible to cast aside thus the evidence of Plutarch. The text reads as follows:

Ἐκκλησίας δὲ πανδήμου Συρακοσίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων γενομένης, Εὐρακλῆς ὁ δημαγωγὸς ἔγραψε πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν ἐν ᾗ τὸν Νικίαν ἔλαβον ἱερὸν ἔχειν θύοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἔργων, Ἀσιναρίαν τὴν ἑορτὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ καλοῦντας· ἡμέρα δ' ἦν τετρὰς φθίνοντος τοῦ Καρνείου μηνός, ὃν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεταγειτνῶνα προσαγορεύουσι· τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων τοὺς μὲν οἰκέτας ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συμμάχους, αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Σικελίας φρουρεῖν ἐμβαλόντας εἰς τὰς λατομίας πλὴν τῶν στρατηγῶν, ἐκείνους δ' ἀποκτεῖναι.

In recording the terms of the decree passed by the Syracusan assembly, Plutarch has added a parenthetical sentence defining the date of the battle as τετρὰς φθίνοντος τοῦ Καρνείου μηνός. The definition is hardly susceptible of any other interpretation; to assume that he is defining the date of meeting of the assembly rather than the date of the battle is to attribute to the text a meaning which quite obviously it does not convey. If the battle of the Assinarus did not take place on the fourth day from the end of Karneios, then Plutarch was guilty of an inexcusable blunder either in fact or in mode of expression.

But there is no need to assume a blunder on the part of Plutarch if the battle is dated on or near September 8, according to one theory, or on October 8, as Beloch has contended. The decision between these possible dates in September and October depends on the amount of time required for the events narrated by Thucydides which occurred between the eclipse of August 27 and the first battle near the harbor, and between the first battle in the harbor and the final naval engagement (vii. 51. 2; 57-69). If these events can be assigned to a few days only, it is possible that the battle of the Assinarus occurred not long after September 8 (Dinsmoor); if a longer time must be assumed, then we are constrained to date the battle of the Assinarus on October 8 (Beloch) in order to avoid an incredible maladjustment between the Syracusan civil calendar and the true lunar cycle.

<sup>1</sup> *The Sixth and Seventh Books of Thucydides* (American Book Co., 1885), p. 312.



The evidence upon which a decision must be reached is contained largely in the history of Thucydides, but at one significant point Diodorus (xiii. 14. 2) gives some help. He reports that three days were required by the Syracusans to close the mouth of the harbor during the interval between the two naval engagements. Thucydides records the fearlessness of the Syracusans after the first encounter in the harbor (vii. 56. 1) and mentions their plan for blocking the entrance which was later put into effect (vii. 59. 3). Thucydides tells of other preparations which were planned on a large scale (vii. 59. 3: *καὶ τὰλλα, ἣν ἔτι ναυμαχεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τολμήσωσι, παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ ὀλίγον οὐδὲν ἐς οὐδὲν ἐπενδύον*). Meanwhile, the Athenians held a council of war to consider how they might circumvent the Syracusans. They decided to desert their upper fortifications and to protect with a cross-wall a small strip of shore near the ships (vii. 60. 2: *ἐβουλεύσαντο τὰ μὲν τείχη τὰ ἄνω ἐκλιπεῖν, πρὸς δ' αὐταῖς ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀπολαβόντες διατειχίσματι ὅσον οἶόν τε ἐλάχιστον τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενούσιν ἱκανὸν γενέσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν φρουρεῖν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἄλλου πεζοῦ τὰς ναῦς . . . πληρώσαι*). This plan they actually put into effect (vii. 60. 3: *καὶ οἱ μὲν, ὥς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ ἐποίησαν· ἕκ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄνω τειχῶν ὑποκατέβησαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρωσαν πάσας*). The fact that the Athenians had to descend slowly and with some secrecy to the harbor and that they had to build a suitable wall of fortification for their reduced camp means that the interval of three days between the two naval battles allotted by Diodorus must be taken as an irreducible minimum. The interval was probably more than three days; Diodorus mentions this length of time only when describing the blocking of the harbor. Thucydides says that the Syracusans made other preparations on an elaborate scale, and, in particular, he mentions the fact that the Syracusans covered the prows and decks of their ships with hides as protection against the iron claws to be used in the Athenian attack (vii. 65).

The time which elapsed between the first and second naval engagements in the harbor was probably as much as a week or ten days, but even if we are to assume that the interval was only three days, the Syracusan month must have been lagging three days behind the lunar cycle if the eclipse of August 27 and the battle of the Assinarus are to be dated in the same month. The maladjustment in the calendar must

have been even greater than this, for no allowance has as yet been made for the interim between the eclipse and the first skirmish near the harbor.

Thucydides reports that after the Syracusans learned of the Athenian plans for departure, and of the fear inspired in their camp by the eclipse, they decided to force the issue of supremacy in a naval battle. They manned their own ships and maneuvered with them in practice for as many days as seemed sufficient before making their attack (vii. 51. 2: *τὰς οὖν ναῦς ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο ἡμέρας ὅσαι αὐτοῖς ἐδόκουν ἱκαναὶ εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καιρὸς ἦν, . . . πρὸς τὰ τεῖχη . . . προσέβαλλον . . .*).

The number of days thus devoted to practice is not mentioned by Thucydides, but even though the Syracusans had been making preparations for battle ever since the arrival of Gylippus (vii. 50. 3), the text of the author compels us to assume that at least several days of this preparation intervened between the night of the eclipse and the first actual encounter. It is thus apparent that the battle of the Assinarus could not have been fought earlier than September 15, even when minimum estimates of time are given to the events immediately preceding and following the first battle in the harbor. If we insist, further, that the day of the battle and the day of the eclipse both belonged to the month Karneios, the discrepancy between the calendar month and the lunar cycle is so great (seven days) that it proves our interpretation to be incorrect. The anomaly is almost as serious as though we had discounted the evidence of Plutarch altogether.

There remains only Beloch's solution of the problem, namely, that Karneios began on September 12, and that approximately a month elapsed between the eclipse and the final naval engagement. With this interpretation, furthermore, there is no necessity for assuming maladjustment in the Syracusan calendar. If ten days elapsed between the two naval engagements, then a period of eighteen days remains for the interval between the eclipse and the attack by land on the Athenian fort. This time was occupied by the Syracusans in perfecting their skill in the handling of ships, and by the Athenians in useless delay. The further fact that Thucydides describes the interval in question as *ἡ μὲν* (vii. 50. 4) accords well with our present suggestion as to the length of the period.

The Syracusans made preparations after the arrival of Gylippus to attack the Athenians both on land and on sea. The Athenians realized that their safest course was to depart for home, and plans were made as secretly as possible to break camp when the signal should be given. Then came the eclipse of the moon:

καὶ μελλόντων αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἐτοῖμα ἦν, ἀποπλεῖν ἢ σελήνη ἐκλείπει· ἐτύγχανε γὰρ πασσέληνος οὖσα. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἳ τε πλείους ἐπισχεῖν ἐκέλευον τοὺς στρατηγούς ἐνθύμιον ποιούμενοι, καὶ ὁ Νικίας (ἦν γὰρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκείμενος) οὐδ' ἂν διαβουλευσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη πρὶν, ὥς οἱ μάντις ἐξηγοῦντο, τρὶς ἑννέα ἡμέρας μέναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινηθείη. καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις μελλήσασι διὰ τοῦτο ἢ μονὴ ἐγεγένητο (vii. 50. 4).

The last sentence of this passage has been almost universally misinterpreted. Classen<sup>1</sup> renders the Greek as follows: "da einmal aus diesem Grunde eine Verzögerung eingetreten war" (Aorist.), "so kam es zu längerem Verweilen." His translation is substantially the same as that given by Dale,<sup>2</sup> Bloomfield,<sup>3</sup> Jowett,<sup>4</sup> and C. F. Smith.<sup>5</sup> But the rhythmic structure of the sentence demands rather that the words διὰ τοῦτο be construed with ἐγεγένητο. The participle μελλήσασι retains its primary meaning and must be read with the phrase μελλόντων αὐτῶν . . . ἀποπλεῖν, a few lines above, still in mind. The translation is as follows: "The Athenians, though just about to depart, were delayed on this account." This supplementary idea of ἀποπλεῖν is easily associated with μελλήσασι if the paragraph is read consecutively, and the meaning here given to the verb is the same as that which belongs to μελλήσαντες in iii. 92. 2 and v. 116, 1, to ἐμέλλησαν in i. 134. 4, and to ἐμέλλησεν in viii. 23. 5.

There is one passage in Thucydides where the aorist form of the verb ἐμέλλησαν is used without complementary infinitive and with much the same meaning as here. In iv. 123. 2 occurs the phrase ὥς

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides, erklärt von J. Classen (Berlin, 1877).

<sup>2</sup> Henry Dale, *The History of the Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides* (London, 1853). A new and literal version.

<sup>3</sup> S. T. Bloomfield, *The History of Thucydides, Newly Translated into English* (London, 1829).

<sup>4</sup> B. Jowett, *Thucydides, Translated into English* (Oxford, 1881). See note on vii. 50. 4 in II, 435.

<sup>5</sup> Thucydides, with an English translation, "Loeb Classical Library Series" (London and New York, 1923).

τότε ἐμέλλησαν οὐκέτι ἀνέντων, which T. R. Mills<sup>1</sup> renders as follows: "never desisting after they had formed the design already mentioned." The passage here under discussion might well be translated: "The Athenians, although they had formed their design, were delayed on this account." But even this rendering does not give the full essence of the Greek, for the use of the pluperfect ἐγεγένητο implies the irretrievable nature of the mistake they were making: "The delay of the Athenians, although they had been on the point of departure, had now become on this account a settled fact."

For the present argument it is important to note that the Athenians were involved in a considerable delay even after the eclipse, and that serious chronological difficulties can be avoided only by assuming that the Syracusan month Karneios began with the new moon of September 12. I have written elsewhere<sup>2</sup> on the problems of calendar correspondence between Athens and Sparta. If we may assume that the pan-Doric month Karneios was scheduled to coincide with the same lunar cycle in Syracuse and in Sparta, the accompanying revision of my earlier table of correspondences must be made (see Table II).

TABLE II

Calendar Year	Spartan Intercalation	Attic Intercalation	Karneios 1: Number of New Moon after Solstice	Karneios 1: Date of New Moon after Solstice
424/3.....	(I) Karneios = Metageitnion	O	Second	Aug. 15
423/2.....	O Karneios = Boedromion	O	Third	Sept. 3
422/1.....	O Karneios = Boedromion	I	Second	Aug. 23
421/0.....	(I) Karneios = Metageitnion	O	Second	Aug. 12
420/19.....	(O) Karneios = Boedromion	O	Third	Aug. 31
419/8.....	(I) Karneios = Boedromion	I	Second	Aug. 20
418/7.....	(O) Karneios = Boedromion	O	Third	Sept. 8
417/6.....	(O) Karneios = Boedromion	I	Third	Aug. 27
416/5.....	(I) Karneios = Metageitnion	I	Second	Aug. 17
415/4.....	(O) Karneios = Metageitnion	O	Third	Sept. 5
414/3.....	(I) Karneios = Metageitnion	I	Second	Aug. 25
413/2.....	(O) Karneios = Metageitnion	O	Third	Sept. 12

It is apparent that in 413 B.C. the Syracusan Karneios did actually correspond to the Attic Metageitnion, as stated by Plutarch. But Plutarch's statement represents a general rule, and cannot be used as evidence in the determination of correspondences for any one particular year.

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<sup>1</sup> *Thucydides*, "Histories," Book IV (Oxford, 1909).

<sup>2</sup> "The Spartan Gymnopaedia," *Class. Phil.*, XXVI (1931), 70-84.

# STUDIES IN GREEK NOUN-FORMATION<sup>1</sup>

## DENTAL TERMINATIONS VI. 2

### WORDS IN -*das* AND -*δης*

BY DOROTHEA CLINTON WOODWORTH

THE *a*-stem words in -*δης* or -*das* thus far collected reach a total of 3,073, of which only 154 are common nouns and adjectives. Of the more than 2,900 proper names the large majority were found in Pape's *Eigennamen* and in the indexes of the *Inscriptiones Graecae*; further additions will probably be found in each new epigraphical collection. This enumeration counts all dialectic variations separately, except that no distinction has been made between the terminations -*δης* and -*das*. More than 2,000 names end in -*ιδης* (*ιδας*), a little over 600 in -*αδης* (*-αδας*), 116 in -*νδης*; of the remaining group, about 95 are names in -*ηδης*, -*υδης*, and -*ωδης*, showing first-declension forms alternating with forms from *σ*-stems; there are also scattering words in -*βδης*, -*γδης*, -*δδης*, -*εδης*, -*οδης*, -*ρδης*, and -*σδης*. While some of these latter are place-names (mainly foreign), the great mass of names in -*δης* and -*das* belongs to the class of patronymics, which may be taken to include a few similar words like names of tribes and ethnica. No discussion of the proper names will be attempted in this paper, except in so far as is necessary to explain the common nouns and adjectives.

I. This termination shows a very different distribution from that of -*δος* -*δον* and -*δα* -*δη*; it is mainly a suffix of Greek origin. The following groups may be segregated from those containing the suffix.

a) Words showing the -*δ-* in the root comprise thirty-one adjectival compounds of -*ποδης*, many of them alternating with equivalent compounds of -*πους* or -*ποδος*; two adjectives derived from *οἰδέω* (*ὠμοῖδης* 'with swollen shoulders' and *χελυνοῖδης* 'with swollen lips'); *λακκοσκαπέρδης*, a variant for -*δος* (see *Class. Phil.*, XXVII, 257, n. 2); and *ῥδης* 'poet,' which Boisacq (*s.v.* *ῥδεῖν*) refers, with *αἰδῆ* and the like, to the base \**αῖδ-*.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Introductory Note, *Class. Phil.*, V, 323 ff.

b) Words of certain or probable foreign origin include Pers. σαγγάδης or σαγγάνδης 'messenger' and ἀστάνδης 'courier', Celt. δρνίδης, Egypt. σάγδας (-δās) or ψάγδας 'an unguent', Pont. σαπέρδης 'a kind of fish,' Paphlag. γόνδης (v.l. for ἰόνδης) 'salsamentum suillum,' and a few others of less definable source: λάδας 'young stag,' ἄβδης 'a scourge,' ἄνδας 'Boreas,' ὀρίνδης 'a kind of bread' or 'rice': δρυζα.

c) Words in which this termination is a doubtful reading or a dialectic variant are: καιάδας (also κεάδας *nullo auctore* in L.-S., 8th ed.) 'the pit at Sparta into which state prisoners or their corpses were thrown,' which alternates with καιάττας or καιέτας, and is referred by Boisacq to an IE \*qaiyrt, with comparison of Ved. *kēvatas* 'ditch'; μαργαρίδης, Ionic for -ίτης 'pearl'; ὠίδας in Hesychius, defined as οὐδός, and plausibly emended to ὠδός, since it is out of alphabetical order as it stands.

II. a) The class largely represented in the -δος -δον and -δα -δη words, in which the -δ- appears to be a root-determinant, is almost entirely lacking in this list. Two nouns of doubtful etymology may perhaps be thus explained: βαλλαχράδαι, cited by Plutarch as a nickname for boys at Argos, may possibly mean 'pear-throwers': ἀχράς 'wild pear' (cf. ἄχερδος, *Class. Phil.*, XXVII, 258); χλήδης 'eunuch' is explained by Boisacq (*s.v.* χλιδή) as probably a contamination of χλιδ- (from IE \*ghelēi) with χληδ- (see *ibid.*, p. 262). Hesychius defines χληδάω by χλιδάω.

b) With the exception of a few doubtful cases, all the rest of these words, an even hundred in number, show the -δης -δας patronymic suffix. The history of this suffix has been much discussed.<sup>1</sup> Authorities agree in referring its origin to the corresponding feminine patronymic in -ιδ-, -αδ-, which, as shown by numerous common nouns, must earlier have had a more general significance, being specialized to the feminine in personal names as a corollary to the spread of the masculine type. Brugmann-Thumb (*Gr. Gr.*<sup>4</sup>, p. 240) say that collectives in -δᾱ- seem to have been the starting point for the group of masculine names. There is apparently no accepted explanation of the -δ- in the feminine form; Hirt (*Hdb.*<sup>2</sup>, p. 380) says that the *d* appears "z.T. ohne wesent-

<sup>1</sup> Brugmann-Thumb, *Griechische Grammatik*, IV (1913), 240, and authorities there cited; Debrunner, *Griechische Wortbildungslehre* (1917), pp. 189-93; Hirt, *Handbuch der griechischen Laut- und Formenlehre*<sup>2</sup> (1912), pp. 380 ff.; Smyth, *Greek Grammar for Colleges* (1920), pp. 233-34.



liche Veränderung der Bedeutung"; Debrunner (*Gr. Wortbildung*, p. 189), after discussing the *-δ-* in a few special groups, says, "Im Uebrigen scheint allerdings *-δ-* meist eine für uns bedeutungslose Erweiterung zu sein."

The development of the suffix from the simple *-δᾱ-* seems to have been due to successive abstractions of different terminations: a form like *Βορέᾱ-δης* would generate a suffix *-αδης*; this in turn, added to stems in *-ιο-* (with loss of *ο*), gives *Θεστυ-αδης*, which produces an *-ιαδης*, subsequently added to certain consonants, as in *Φερητ-ιαδης*, *Πηλη(φ)-ιαδης*. Similarly *-ιδ-*, originally an *ι*-stem + *δ*, produces an *-ιδης*, which from Homer on we find freely added to *ο*-stems, with loss of *ο*, and to consonant stems. (In Boeotian and some of the Northwest Greek dialects, *-δας* is added directly to *ν*-stems: *Κλεώνδας* as against Attic, etc., *Κλεωνίδης*.) Often the choice between the suffixes, as thus multiplied, seems to be determined on metrical or merely euphonic grounds. The extension of usage whereby the name in *-δης* came to be generally given arbitrarily, without reference to the actual father's name, was an early and natural development.

The use of the suffix *-δης -δας* in common nouns and adjectives developed out of its use as a patronymic. This will appear from a consideration of the several types of formation.

1. A few of the words are compounds of proper names with this suffix: *φιλοθουκνίδης*, *φιλαριστείδης*, *φιλευριπίδης* (the last the name of a comedy by Axionicus), and *πανουργιπαρχίδης* 'knave-Hipparchides,' used as a comic appellative by Aristophanes.

2. A larger group consists of nouns in *-ιδης* formed from common nouns, mainly consonant and *ο*-stems, on the model of the ordinary patronymics in *-δης*. Some of these might be regarded as proper names with transferred meaning: *ἄρχωνίδας* 'oak tree,' cited from Plato Comicus, would seem to be a humorous application of a person's name. I am inclined to think that *ἱπποκλείδης*, used by Aristophanes for 'pudendum muliebre,' is a similar adaptation of a personal name, perhaps with punning reference to *ἱππος*, which Hesychius says was used in the same sense, and which Aelian uses to mean 'a lewd woman.' To this group probably belong two words which Hesychius cites as Laconian: *τρομφωνίδαι*· *εἶδος κροκωτοῦ* and *ἀβρανίδας*· *κροκωτοῦς*. The

former is explained by Meineke<sup>1</sup> as a word for effeminate garments, derived from *Τρύφων*, a name given to Ptolemy Euergetes from his luxurious habits. The use of the patronymic form in a word for garment is paralleled by the feminine *Ίφικρατίδες* 'a kind of shoes' and others. Schmidt (*Philol.*, XIII, 217) adopts a similar explanation for *ἄβρανίδας*, which he would change to *ἄβραν-* or *ἄβρων-*, and ascribe to an otherwise-unknown Habron, nicknamed, like Ptolemy, from his effeminacy.

On the borderline between common and proper noun is *κενταυρίδης*, used by Lucan as an epithet or appositive with *ἵππος* to mean 'a Thesalian horse.' A few other common nouns distinctly show the patronymic meaning, as *βασιλείδης* 'a prince.' *πατρόθεν πορδικίδαι*, which words Meineke<sup>2</sup> thinks are from some satyr drama, Hesychius somewhat obscurely glosses with *ὅτι πατέρων εἰσιν ὄνων ἡμίονοι*—which perhaps means that the *ἡμίονοι* were called *πορδικίδαι* because their fathers, the *ὄνοι*, were called *\*πόρδακες*.<sup>3</sup> Other words in which the patronymic idea may not be entirely extinct are *ἄκμονίδης*: *ἄκμων* 'thunderbolt'; *βοαγίδης*, epithet of Heracles: *βοαγός* 'herdsman'; *κυνηγίδης*: *κυνηγός* 'leader of hounds, hunter.' *ἐγγχείδαι*, defined by Hesychius as *τηρηταὶ δανείων*, belongs to this group if from *ἐγγχος*, but the semantic connection is not apparent. *βοίδης* 'like an ox' (Menander) is a contamination, perhaps deliberate for comic effect, of the patronymic suffix with the common adjectival type in *-ειδης* meaning 'like.'

With further attenuation of the suffix we find a group of words similarly formed but apparently identical in meaning with their simplex nouns. These are: *ἡγεμονίδης* 'leader': *ἡγεμών*, *κοιρανίδης* 'ruler': *κοίρανος*, *πενθερίδης* 'father-in-law': *πενθερός*, *γραμμα-* or *γραμματοδιδασκαλίδης* 'schoolmaster': *γραμματοδιδάσκαλος*, *δραπετίδης* (-δας) 'run-away': *δραπέτης*, *κλεπτίδης* 'thief': *κλέπτης*, *κλωπίδης* 'thief': *κλώψ*. Some of these may convey an expression of contempt. Most of them, being used in poetry, can perhaps be explained as due to metrical exigencies. In support of the history of the suffix as given above, one may note that several of these words have feminine forms in *-is* (e.g., *δραπέτις*

<sup>1</sup> *Philol.*, XII, 622. He emends to *τρύφωνίδαι*.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII, 550, emending cod. *ποδικίδαι* to *πορδικίδαι*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Brugmann, *Grundriss*<sup>2</sup>, II, 1, 490, on suffix *-āk-*: "Benennung von Lebewesen die, wie *víaξ*, den Begriff des Verächtlichen haben." *\*πόρδαξ*: *πορδή*; cf. also *ὀνόπορον* 'cotton-thistle.'

and κλέπτis), which would seem to have influenced the masculine formations in -ιδης, for otherwise we should expect -αδης from the *a*-stem masculines cited.

3. Common nouns in -αδης are generally derived from feminine nouns either in -α or in -ας (-αδος); sometimes both feminines occur.

ληϊάδης = αἰχμάλωτος 'captive': ληϊή, Ionic for λεία 'booty': ληϊάς poetic fem. of ληϊδῖος 'captive'

ἀλιάδης 'seaman': ἀλιάς 'belonging to the sea': ἀλία 'salt-cellar'

σκιάδαι<sup>1</sup> 'shady branches': σκιάς 'shelter': σκιά 'shade'

θαλαμηϊάδης 'son of the den'—comic name for the tunny: θαλάμη<sup>2</sup>

ῥηχιάδης (ῥηχάδης) 'one who threw convicts into the sea': ῥαχία

(Ion. ῥηχίη) 'the sea breaking on the shore' (Boisacq, s.v. ῥάσσω)

γεννάδας 'noble, generous': γέννα poetic for γένος

ἐμβάδας 'cobbler': ἐμβάς 'shoe' (cf. ἐμβάδος, ἐμβαδόν)

μαγάδης 'a foreign musical instrument,' variant for μάγαdis: μαγάς (-άδος) 'the bridge of the cithara'

(Though these words are probably Asiatic, they are pertinent because the variant μαγάδης was probably formed on the analogy of other pairs in which -ας and -αδης were felt to be related.)

μερμνάδης, a word of obscure meaning in *OP* 1802. 3. 46, glossed μερμνάδαι· οἱ τριόρχοι, is perhaps to be derived from μερμνός 'a sort of hawk'; τριόρχης also means 'a sort of hawk or buzzard' in addition to its meaning 'very lecherous.' As a proper noun, this word is the name of the Lydian royal family from Candaules to Croesus. It is, therefore, perhaps similar in origin to some of the examples under (2) above, and may be intended as a sort of pun. We should of course expect \*μερμνίδης from μερμνός, but, even apart from the influence of the proper name, such variations are not surprising after the suffix comes to be regarded as -αδης instead of -δης.

4. The following group is like the two preceding, except that the words are derived from adjectives instead of nouns. Senantically they are in general adjectives indistinguishable from their simplex forms, but some of them have become appellatives used substantively.

From consonant-stem adjectives: εὐφρονίδης 'son of Night (Εὐφρόνη)'

<sup>1</sup> See *Class. Phil.*, XXVII, 264, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> This is perhaps an imitation of the metonymies which appear occasionally among the proper names; cf. esp. Εὐρωπηϊάδης. ληϊάδης has the same formation.

belongs in form to *εὐφρων*, but as to meaning cf. note on *θαλαμιάδης* above.

*πολυχαρείδης* (-*χαρίδας*) = *χαριέστατος*: *πολυχαρής*

*δυσμενίδης* 'hostile': *δυσμενής*

*εὐγενίδας* 'well-born': *εὐγενής* (*metri gratia*)

*εὐπατρίδης* 'of noble sire': *εὐπατρης*

*κακοπατρίδης* 'of a mean sire': *κακόπατρης*

Similar formations by analogy with the *σ*-stems in *-ης* are made from *α*-stem adjectives:

*θυμιτίδης* 'flavored with thyme': *θυμίτης*

*σπουδαρχήδης* 'son of a placeman': *σπουδάρχης* 'eager for office'

From *ο*-stem adjectives:

*ήμερίδης* 'mellow' (of wine or of Bacchus): *ήμερος* 'tame, cultivated';

cf. *ήμερίς* 'cultivated vine'

*έντομίδης* 'having the corpse cut for burial': *έντομος* 'cut up'; cf.

*έντομής* 'incision,' esp. as made in corpses

*ήσυχίδας* 'at ease': *ήσυχος*

*φιλαρχίδης* 'fond of rule': *φίλαρχος*

*συκοτραγίδης* 'fig-nibbler': *συκοτράγος* 'fig-eating'

*προσαγωγίδης*<sup>1</sup> 'tale-bearers' (Sicilian spies): *προσαγωγός* 'bringing up'

Perhaps also *έ(μ)μορίδαι* (Hesychius)· *μέτοικοι*: *έμμορος* 'partaking in' (but Herwerden considers this a corrupt reading, referring to *έμπορίσαι*· *μέτοικοι* and *έμπόριος*· *μέτοικος*).

Following the analogy of proper names in *-ιος*, *δέξιος* forms *δεξιάδης*. We also find, irregularly, *γαυσάδας* 'false' from *γαυσός* 'twisted'; this is a parallel to the supposed formation of *μερμνάδης* from *μερμνός* above.

*κίβδης* 'rascal, handicraftsman,' i.e., 'a clipper of coins,' is exceptionally-formed with no vowel, ultimately from *κίβος* 'dumb,' but more directly influenced by *κίβδος* 'dross or alloy of gold' and *κίβδηλος* 'adulterated, spurious.'

5. Only two words in *-δης* appear to be related to the adverbs in *-δον*, *-δην* (see *Class. Phil.*, XXVII, 265). These are: *βάδης* (*βάδδης*) 'a

<sup>1</sup> This word may be an error for the feminine form; cf. *Arist. Pol.* 5. 11. 7, where these spies are called *αἱ προαγωγίδες*.

press': βάδην 'by walking' and ἀριστίνδας 'a title at Sparta': ἀριστίνδην 'according to merit.'

6. A group comprising more than thirty words has the patronymic suffix added to a combination of stems or in combination with another suffix. Such words have already been mentioned, especially under the fourth heading; but I have somewhat arbitrarily distinguished cases in which -ιδης or -αδης was added to an existing compound word, as γραμματοδιδάσκαλος 'teacher' (under 2 above), or δυσμενής, σπουδάρχης, συκοτράγος, etc. (under 4 above), from the following cases in which the compound words do not appear in the lexicons without the -δης suffix. Many of the similar words already cited are of early usage in a derogatory sense, as κακοπατρίδας (Alcaeus), συκοτραγίδης (Archilochus, Hipponax), and σπουδαρχίδης (Aristophanes); hence it seems evident that the following group was built up by extension of the foregoing, especially by the comic and epigrammatic poets; we find a number of such innovations, with distinctly comic intention, used by Aristophanes. The types of formation show considerable variety.

From combinations of two or more nouns we have: λοπαδαρχίδης: λοπάς, ἀρχή, and μισθαρχίδης 'hereditary candidate for paid office'; these are clearly formed after σπουδαρχίδης. ῥεθομαλίδης (Schol. II.) 'with cheeks like apples': ῥέθος 'face,' μήλον 'apple' and εἰδομαλίδας,<sup>1</sup> given in the new L.-S. as "fair-cheeked(?)," which is more probably, I think, formed like the preceding from εἶδος in the sense of 'complexion' (cf. Hp. Aër. 5, εἶδεα εὐχροά τε καὶ ἀνθηρά). A triple-stemmed noun compound of obviously comic function is σαλπιγγολογχυπηνάδαι 'lance-whiskered trumpeters.'

In the following words the second stem is perhaps nominal, though of verbal force: ζοφοδορπίδας 'supping in the dark': ζόφος, δόρπον (δορπέω); σταφυλοκλοπίδης 'grape-stealer': κλώψ; λοπαδαρπαγίδης 'dish-snatcher': ἄρπαξ (ἀρπάζω).

Words which add the suffix to a compound of noun and verb are: βουλοκοπίδης, a word formed on the analogy of δημόκοπος 'demagogue'; ἔρμωκοπίδης 'Hermes-mutilator'; χρεωκοπίδης 'one who cancels his debts' (cf. χρεωκοπέω)—all from κόπτω. ὀφρυνασπασίδης 'one who

<sup>1</sup> Hesychius' εἰδομαλίδαι: οἱ τὰς ὄψεις κοσμούμενοι is accordingly, I think, an error in meaning, as according to Schmidt it should be in form εἰδομαλίδαι.

raises the eyebrows in scorn': ἀνασπάω. φθειροκομίδης 'full of lice': κομέω. (In accord with the comic force of all these words, I think this means 'son of a louse-tender,' from a hypothetical \*φθειροκόμος analogous to ἵπποκόμος 'groom'; cf. Ar. Pax 74 ἵπποκομῆν κἀνθαρὸν 'to groom a beetle.' This interpretation makes unnecessary Blaydes' emendation [Herw. App.] to φθειρογομίδης.)

γενειοσυλλεκτάδης 'beard-gatherer,' λογοσυλλεκτάδης 'plagiarist,' στωμιοσυλλεκτάδης 'gossip-gleaner,' also ῥακιοσυρραπτάδης 'rag-stitcher,' and ἀρχογλυπτάδης 'place-hunter,' all show a formation from the stem of the verbal in -τος. The α is perhaps due to the existence of such α-stems as ῥάπτης 'cobbler,' or may be simply in the abstracted suffix as already seen in δεξιιάδης, etc.

Compounds with a verbal element first are rare and late. In *Anth. P.* we find φιλογαστρορίδης 'glutton' and ζηταρησιιάδης 'virtue-seeker' (which also shows an extra suffixed element); and in a fragment of Cercidas (OP 1082.1 [II, 7]) τεθνακοχαλκίδας 'hoarder of dead wealth'—on which Hunt (*ibid.*, VIII, 52) comments that it is "perhaps not impossible for such a bold coiner of words as Cercidas."

A group of words containing irregular or double suffixes, like ζηταρησιιάδης above, perhaps shows a continuation of the abstracting process by which successively longer suffixes were formed. ἱππαλίδης is used by Theocritus for ἱππεύς, perhaps influenced by the late poetic adjective ἱππαλέος, but quite probably after the analogy of the frequent proper names like Τανταλίδης, Ὀταλίδης, Δαιδαλίδης, etc. Similarly another innovation of Cercidas, πενητυλίδας, may come from an unattested \*πενήτυλος, but could have been independently formed after Μειδυλίδης, etc. (My list of proper names includes about twenty in -υλίδης exclusive of -βουλίδης.) The most far-reaching extension of the suffix is -ωνίδης, which is naturally very frequent in proper names because of the numerous descriptive personal names in -ων. In Aristophanes we have στρατωνίδης (L.-S. 'son of a gun') from στρατός without any intermediate \*στράτων. A curious result is that Plautus, in forming Graeco-Latin hybrids for comic effect, nearly always uses -onides (twice short o, four times long o) in such barbarisms as uirginesuendonides 'seller of maidens' and pulliphagōnides 'pulse-eater'.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plautus also uses numerous comic proper names, such as *Cluinistardysarchides* (*Mil. Gl.* i. 1.14), and at least one other common noun, *plagipatidae* (*Most.* 356) 'able to stand blows.'



Isolated words of unusual formation, both of which seem to emphasize comic effect, are: ἀμφιεῖδαι (Menander) 'stupid persons': ἀμφιερεῖ 'year by year,' and ἀμμαμηθάδης (Hesychius) 'hash,' which may possibly be explained as a contamination of ἄμμος and ἄμαθος, both meaning 'sand' (except that in the antepenult we should expect α rather than η).

7. The remaining words are a miscellaneous group of late formation, doubtful authenticity, or uncertain source. Two are late transfers to the -δης type: ἀνεψιάδης 'first cousin's son,' from -δοῦς, -δόος (cf. ἀνεψιάδος, "Words in -δη etc."); and ὄνοκίνδης 'donkey-driver' for ὄνοκίνδιος.

-]ναύαδην is a truncated word without context in a fragment of Sappho (OP 1231. 12. 5), noted by Grenfell and Hunt merely as "an obscure form."

εὐελίδης· αὐθάδης· καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐν Κύπρῳ is explained by Hoffman (*ap. Herwerden*) as ὕ-ελίδης = ἐπιβουλίδης. The suffix will then be attenuated and meaningless, as often.

ὑαλκάδαι· χορὸς παιδῶν. Λάκωνες—Herwerden would emend to εὐαλκίδαι; this, as from εὐαλκής 'stout,' would belong to group 4 above.

ἰβδης 'a plug in the bottom of a ship' belongs with ἰβάνη 'water-bucket' and εἰβω 'pour' to a root given by Boisacq (*s.v.* εἰβω) as \**seig*<sup>1</sup>. The curious thing about this word is that it apparently stands alone in employing -δης as a primary suffix. Possibly it could come through an adverbial formation from the weak grade of εἰβω; compare ὄβδην from οπ-.

The last four words, all from Hesychius, are very uncertain. γηγυρίδαι· οἰκτροί is possibly a late derivative of a lost onomatopoetic word; the nearest approach to it that I have found is a group of evidently imitative nouns—γαγύλη or γαγίλα 'magpie' (St.) and γηγῆ-λιξ, γήλιγρος 'fieldmouse' (Hesych.).

ἀνασίνδης· ἀναπήδησις is probably a false reading, as it is difficult to see how a word with this suffix could be defined by an abstract noun; furthermore, the word in Hesychius is out of its alphabetical order, being followed by ἀνασιλ- and ἀνασιμ-. σιομαλίδαι (or σιομαχίδαι)· διαμάχαι (διμάχαι)· καὶ τὸ πηδᾶν apparently refers to the Boeotian

<sup>1</sup> Walde-Pokorny question this and two other proposed reconstructions of the root, without giving any acceptable alternative.

cavalry, who could also fight on foot. The connection of *πηδᾶν* with *ἀναπήδησις* suggests a possible connection of *σιω* with *-σι-* in *ἀνασίνδης*, but no satisfactory explanation is at hand.

*σανᾶδαι· σαῦλοι. Ἀμερίας τοὺς σειλήνους οὕτω καλεῖσθαι φησιν ὑπὸ Μακεδόνων.*—This may be etymologically connected with *σαῦλοι*, but is probably not Greek in origin.

The semantic development of this suffix outside of proper names may be summarized, from the examples given, somewhat as follows. With the patronymic idea as a starting-point, we have first a contemptuous or derogatory implication; compare "son of a gun" and other similar expressions in colloquial English. From this meaning follows a twofold development. First, since many of the words to which the suffix was added already had a derogatory sense, the *-δης* word and its simplex were often synonymous, as *κλεπτίδης* (Pherecrates) and *κλέπτης*; the suffix thus became attenuated and sometimes meaningless, being used often merely for metrical convenience, as *κοιρανίδης* (Sophocles) and many of the adjectives in group 4. Second, from Aristophanes on, the comic writers and epigrammatists felt at liberty to coin compounds in *-δης* for comic effect, most if not all of which retain the implication of contempt. This tendency reaches its extreme in the hybrid compounds of Plautus, who was very probably reproducing a feature which he found prominently used in the New Comedy.

The enormous productivity of the suffix in personal names offers an interesting field for future study.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA  
AT LOS ANGELES

AESCHYLUS *CHOEPHORI* 770-74  
WITH A CONSIDERATION OF ΤΗΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ<sup>1</sup>

BY MALCOLM MACLAREN, JR.

A SHORT passage in the *Choephoroi* of Aeschylus, verses 770-74, has caused scholars much trouble. Codex M gives these verses in the following form:<sup>2</sup>

—μὴ νῦν σὺ ταῦτ' ἄγγελε δεσπότου στύγει·  
ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν, ὥς ἀδειμάντωσ κλύῃσι  
ἄνωχθ' ὅσον τάχιστ' ἀγαθούση φρενί·  
ἐν ἀγγέλῳ γὰρ κρυπτοσ ὀρθύουση φρενί·  
—ἀλλ' ἢ φρονεῖς εὖ τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγελμένοις

In 770 στύγει has been changed to στυγεῖ by a second hand, known as m.

There follows a list of the significant testimonia and emendations: 770 νυν editors, ἄγγελλε Robortello, στέγει J. Wiel; 771 ἀδειμάντων Hartung; 772 τάχιστα γαθούση φρενί Turnebus, τάχιστα γηθούση Pauw, Paley (1889) deletes this verse; 773 ἐν ἀγγέλῳ γὰρ κυπτὸς ὀρθοῦται λόγος Schol. Ven. B on Homer *Il.* xv. 207,<sup>3</sup> κρυπτὸς ὀρθοῦται λόγος Schol. Townl. on Homer *Il.* xv. 207,<sup>3</sup> Eustath. on Homer *Il.* xv. 207,<sup>3</sup> κυρτὸς Weil, ἐν ἀγγέλῳ γὰρ κρυπτὸς ὀρθώσει φρένα Heath, Verrall deletes this verse; 774 τοῖσιν ἐντεταλμένοις Wecklein.

Although the manuscript tradition for this passage is very faulty, textual corruption cannot be regarded as the main source of the diffi-

<sup>1</sup> In writing this paper I have had the benefit of much advice and assistance from Professor Edward Capps. I wish to express my thanks to him for his help.

<sup>2</sup> The *Choephoroi* is found in only two of the manuscripts considered worth mentioning by recent editors: the Mediceus (M) and the Guelferbytanus (G). Of all the manuscripts of Aeschylus, M is the oldest and much the most important. As far as the *Choephoroi* is concerned, G resembles M very closely. Haupt (*ap.* Hermann, *Aeschylus*, pp. vi-vii) and Tucker (*The Choephoroi of Aeschylus*, p. lxxix) believe G to be a direct copy of M, at least throughout the *Oresteia*; Hoernle (*Notes on the Text of Aeschylus*, p. 73) supposes M and G to be careful copies of one manuscript not now extant. Whatever attitude we take toward this question, the fact remains that modern editors concede no authority to G. Wellauer reports G as reading ἀγαθούση in 772. He and Hermann quote ἀλλ' ἢ as the reading of G in 774. No other differences between M and G in this passage are cited by these editors.

<sup>3</sup> Here the verse is assigned to Euripides.

culties in these verses, for the true readings have been recovered and the corruptions in the manuscripts have been explained. In these five verses there are no less than nine words or phrases which are apparently ambiguous in reference or meaning. We must realize that this passage comes at a crisis in the action of the play, and that instructions of vital importance are being given to one of the characters. Consequently we can hardly suppose that Aeschylus intended any ambiguity when he wrote these words. It is my belief that a more careful study of the passage than has heretofore been accorded it will lead to a definite and satisfactory interpretation. There are at least three reasons why such an interpretation has not yet been given. First, the traditional punctuation has led to a misunderstanding of the sentence structure. Second, a certain presupposition which is altogether without foundation has frequently been permitted to go unchallenged.<sup>1</sup> Third, no one has given due consideration to the acting (*ὑπόκρισις*) which must have accompanied the delivery of these verses. If we remind ourselves constantly that this passage exemplifies the *ὑποκριτικὴ λέξις*, that is, the style particularly suited to acting, we shall be greatly assisted in our attempts to find the correct interpretation.

The subsequent discussion will be divided into three sections. In Section I the text will be considered; in Section II, the interpretation; in Section III, a particular problem, namely, the relation of this passage to Homer *Il.* xv. 206-7 and to Pindar *Pyth.* iv. 277-79.

Concerning matters of both text and interpretation there are great differences of opinion among the editors. There is neither a text nor an exegesis which by virtue of general acceptance may properly be considered a vulgate. For a starting-point, Smyth's recent edition will serve as well as any.

First, however, it is in place to review briefly the dramatic situation. Orestes, representing himself as a stranger from Phocis, has given to Clytaemnestra<sup>2</sup> a false report, announcing his own death. She has issued orders that Aegisthus be told to come with a bodyguard to hear the news directly from the supposed stranger. Orestes' old nurse, deceived and saddened by the report, is on her way to carry out this order. It is essential to the success of Orestes' plans for vengeance that

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 359, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> For the spelling cf. Verrall, *The Agamemnon of Aeschylus*, Introd., p. xv, n. 1.

Aegisthus come unattended. Accordingly the Chorus intercepts the Nurse and orders her to tell him to come by himself, without a bodyguard.<sup>1</sup> The Chorus realizes that specific instructions to come without a bodyguard will be likely to arouse the distrust of Aegisthus, and that therefore the Nurse must in some way make this message seem plausible to him. It would be most natural and least likely to awaken suspicion if she were to avoid all mention of a bodyguard, one way or the other. The Chorus, however, cannot risk silence on this point. The bodyguard must be eliminated, and still Aegisthus must suspect no foul play.

## I

Verses 770-74 are the subject of this discussion; verses 734-43, 764-69, and 775-82 are also quoted here in order to give the exact context. These verses are given in Smyth's edition as follows:

- ΤΡΟΦΟΣ    Αἴγισθον ἡ κρατοῦσα τοῖς ξένους καλεῖν    734  
              ὅπως τάχιστ' ἀνωγεν, ὡς σαφέστερον  
              ἀνὴρ ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς τὴν νεάγγελτον φάτιν  
              ἐλθὼν πύθεται τήνδε, πρὸς μὲν οἰκέτας  
              θετοσκυθρωπῶν ἐντὸς ὁμμάτων γέλων  
              κέουσ' ἐπ' ἔργοις διαπεπραγμένοις καλῶς  
              κείνη, δόμοις δὲ τοῖσδε παγκάκως ἔχειν,    740  
              φήμης ὕφ' ἧς ἡγγειλαν οἱ ξένοι τορῶς.  
              ἦ δὴ κλύων ἐκείνος εὐφρανεῖ νόον,  
              εὐτ' ἂν πύθεται μῦθον. . . . .  
              . . . . .  
              στείχω δ' ἐπ' ἄνδρα τῶνδε λυμαντήριον    764  
              οἴκων, θέλων δὲ τόνδε πείσεται λόγον.
- ΧΟΡΟΣ    πῶς οὖν κελεύει νιν μολεῖν ἐσταλμένον ;  
              TP.    ἡ πῶς ; λέγ' αὖθις, ὡς μάθω σαφέστερον.  
              XO.    εἰ ξὺν λοχίταις εἴτε καὶ μονοστιβῇ  
              TP.    ἄγειν κελεύει δορυφόρους ὁπάοντας.  
              XO.    μή νυν σὺ ταῦτ' ἄγγελλε δεσπότου στύγει·    770  
              ἄλλ' αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν, ὡς ἀδειμάντως κλύη,  
              ἀνωχθ' ὅσον τάχιστα γηθούσῃ φρενί.  
              ἐν ἀγγέλω γὰρ κυπτὸς ὀρθοῦται λόγος.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. εἰ ξὺν λοχίταις, εἴτε καὶ μονοστιβῇ (768) and ἄλλ' αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν (771); here αὐτὸν implies μόνον as in Ar. Ach. 504, Thesm. 472, and often.

TP. ἀλλ' ἡ φρονεῖς εὖ τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγεγμένους ;

XO. ἀλλ' εἰ τροπαίαν Ζεὺς κακῶν θήσει ποτέ. 775

TP. καὶ πῶς ; Ὁρέσσης ἐλπὶς οἴχεται δόμων.

XO. οὐπω· κακὸς γε μάντις ἂν γνοίη τάδε.

TP. τί φῆς ; ἔχεις τι τῶν λελεγμένων δίχα ;

XO. ἄγγελλ' ἰούσα, πρᾶσσε τὰπεσταλμένα.  
μέλει θεοῖσιν ὦνπερ ἂν μέλη πέρι. 780

TP. ἀλλ' εἶμι καὶ σοῖς ταῦτα πείσομαι λόγους.  
γένοιτο δ' ὥς ἄριστα σὺν θεῶν δόσει.

Smyth gives the following translation:

NURSE: My mistress bids me summon Aegisthus for the strangers with all speed, that he may come and learn more clearly, as man from man, these tidings that have just arrived. Before the servants, indeed, behind eyes that made sham gloom she hid her laughter over what hath befallen happily for her—but for this house, the news so plainly told by the strangers spells utter ruin. He, I warrant, on hearing it, will rejoice in heart when he hears the story. . . . But I am on my way to fetch the man who wrought the ruin of the house, and glad enough will he be to hear these tidings.

CHORUS: How then arrayed does she bid him come?

N.: How—arrayed? Say it again that I may catch thy meaning better.

C.: With his guards or, maybe, unattended.

N.: She bids him come with his retinue of spearmen.

C.: Nay, do not thou give this message to our hated master; but with all speed and with a cheerful heart bid him come himself, alone, that he may be told without alarm. For in the mouth of a messenger a crooked message is made straight.

N.: What! Art thou glad of heart at the present news?

C.: Why not, if Zeus at last may cause our ill wind to change?

N.: Nay, how can that be? Orestes, the hope of the house, is gone.

C.: Not yet; he were a poor prophet that would interpret thus.

N.: What sayest thou? Dost thou know ought beyond what has been told?

C.: Go, give thy message! Do what is bidden thee! The gods have care for that whereof they care.

N.: Well, I will go and do thy bidding. With the gods' blessing may all turn out for the best!

The first question pertaining to the text is raised by νῦν M, in 770. This should be changed to νυν, in accordance with a rule of "some of the old Grammarians," who "distinguished νῦν from νυν, νν, confining



the former to the strict sense of Time, and the latter to that of Sequence or Inference, = δῆ or οὖν. And this rule has been followed by later editors of the Trag. and Ar., with or without the authority of the Mss" (Liddell and Scott<sup>3</sup>, s.v. νῦν).

Robortello's correction to ἄγγελλε (770) is obvious for metrical reasons. Furthermore, the second aorist ἤγγελον is a rare and late form. An ἄγγελ' of M, in 779, has been similarly corrected by the same scholar.

τάχιστ' ἀγαθούση φρενὶ (772) raises a question. Nothing can be made of this jumble as it stands. There is a choice between τάχιστα γαθούση φρενὶ (Turnebus) and τάχιστα γηθούση φρενὶ (Pauw). We need have no hesitation in choosing γαθούση, the reading nearer to that of M; for there is no lack of forms showing ᾱ instead of η in the iambic trimeters of Aeschylus.<sup>1</sup> Examples (cf. W. Aly, *De Aeschyli copia verborum capita selecta*, pp. 3 ff.) are: 'Αθάνα Sept. 487, *Eum.* 235, 443, 892, βαλός *Cho.* 571, γαμόςος *Suppl.* 613, *Eum.* 890, γάπεδον *Prom.* 829 γάποτος *Pers.* 621, *Cho.* 97, 164, γατόμος frag. 196, 3 (Sidgwick), δάϊος *Prom.* 354, δαρός *Suppl.* 516, *Prom.* 648, 940, ἔκατι *Pers.* 337, *Ag.* 874, *Cho.* 214, 701, 996, *Eum.* 71, 759, εὐνατήριον *Pers.* 160 (in a trochaic tetrameter), ικεταδόκος *Suppl.* 713, νάϊος *Pers.* 279, 336, παράορος *Prom.* 365. In view of these examples we accept γαθούση, which is nearer to the reading of M, in preference to γηθούση.

The impossible ὀρθούση φρενὶ (773) of M is explained by the similar ending of 772, γαθούση φρενὶ. As Musgrave saw, the true reading ὀρθοῦται λόγος is preserved in notes on Hom. *Il.* xv. 207 by a scholiast and by Eustathius, who quote 773 and assign the verse to Euripides. The note of Eustathius looks like an expansion of the scholion, and should not be regarded as an independent piece of evidence.

Although the ancient authority for κυπτός (773) is not strong, this reading is much to be preferred. It is found only in certain manuscripts of Homeric scholia.<sup>2</sup> Every other source of the text gives

<sup>1</sup> Whether these forms are "Old Attic" (cf. Ridgeway, *Origin of Tragedy*, p. 3) or Doric is a question with which we are not concerned.

<sup>2</sup> I have not been able to determine how many of the manuscripts of the scholia give κυπτός. Dindorf (*Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*, IV, 85) reports κυπτός as the reading of Ven. B. This he corrects to κρυπτός in his text. For his corrections he makes use of five other manuscripts (*ibid.*, III, *praef.*, ix), the most important of which, the Townleyanus, reads κρυπτός, according to Maass, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem Townleyana*, II, 119. This editor (*ibid.*, I, *praef.*, xviii) criticizes Dindorf for emphasizing the importance of Ven. B over that of Townl.

*κρυπτός*. However, the extreme rarity of the word *κρυπτός* is an argument in its favor. An original *κρυπτός* might have become *κρυπτός* either through accident or through design, whereas only an accident could have turned an original *κρυπτός* into *κρυπτός*. Furthermore, the verb *ὀρθοῦται* strongly suggests *κρυπτός*, for the metaphor then is very neat. A "crooked" (*κρυπτός*) story more properly than a "hidden" one (*κρυπτός*) is spoken of as being "made straight" (*ὀρθοῦται*). For this meaning of *ὀρθόω* cf. *Ag.* 1475, *νῦν δ' ὤρθωσας στόματος γνώμην*, "Yes, now you have made straight the judgment of your lips"; *Thuc.* viii. 64. 4, *ξυνέβη οὖν αὐτοῖς μάλιστα ἃ ἐβούλοντο, τὴν πόλιν τε ἀκινδύνως ὀρθοῦσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐναντιωσόμενον δῆμον καταλελίσθαι*, "What they particularly desired, then, had come to pass; the city was set straight with no danger to them, and the democracy that would have opposed them had been destroyed." For purposes of translation, if *κρυπτός* is read, a mixed metaphor can be avoided by understanding *ὀρθοῦται* in a derived sense, "succeeds," a frequent meaning of *ὀρθόω* in the passive; cf. *Thuc.* iii. 37. 4, *ὀρθοῦνται τὰ πλείω*, "They succeed for the most part." The context, however, makes it difficult to read *κρυπτός ὀρθοῦται λόγος* in the sense, given by many editors, "A secret message meets with success" (cf. p. 377). And no matter how we translate *ὀρθοῦται*, the fact remains that the verb has a definite physical connotation in the Greek which makes *κρυπτός*, with its definite physical connotation, much more suitable than *κρυπτός*. A gloss of Hesychius, *κρυπτόν· ταπεινουμένον*, is evidence for the existence of the word *κρυπτός*. His source was not the present passage, as the form of the lemma shows. His *ταπεινουμένον*, "lowered," "humbled," is to be regarded as a metaphorical rendering appropriate to the context in which he found *κρυπτόν*. Apparently the word means "stooping," "crooked," cf. *κύπτω*, "bend forward." Alberti's proposed emendation of Hesychius' *κρυπτόν* (cf. Schmidt, *Hesychius, ad loc.*) to *κύπτον* (present participle of *κύπτω*) seems unwarranted. The basis for this change is the supposition that *Bar.* 2:18, *κύπτον καὶ ἀσθενοῦν*, is the source of the gloss. Most editors read *κρυπτός* in 774, but *κρυπτός* is preferred in the editions of Blomfield, Boissonade, Scholefield, DaPonte, Peile, Conington, Verrall who, however, suspects the genuineness of the verse), Tucker, Proctor-Kenyon, and Smyth.

As far as text is concerned, Smyth's version is accepted with two

reservations: first, *γαθούση* should be read instead of *γηθούση*; second, several important changes of punctuation must be made. These will be discussed later.<sup>1</sup>

## II

With regard to interpretation it will not be advantageous to discuss successively the views of the passage as a whole held by various editors. So many differences of opinion as to details are found that it will be better to build the treatment around the points that have occasioned these differences. These points may be put in the form of a series of nine questions.

1. What is the meaning of *δεσπότου στύγει* (770)?
2. Does *ἀδειμάντως* (771) mean "fearlessly" (i.e., "without feeling fear") or "without inspiring fear"?
3. Is it the false news from Phocis or the Nurse's summons to Aegisthus that is to be understood as the object of *κλύη* (771)?
4. Does *ὅσον τάχιστα* (772) refer to the Nurse or to Aegisthus?
5. Does *γαθούση φρενί* (772) refer to the Nurse or to Aegisthus?<sup>2</sup>
6. Is *ἀγγέλῳ* (773) the Nurse or the stranger from Phocis?
7. Is *λόγος* (773) the Nurse's summons to Aegisthus as emended by the Chorus, or Clytaemnestra's original message, or the false news from Phocis?
8. Does *φρονεῖς εὖ* (774) mean "Are you sane?" or "Are you happy?" or "Are you right-minded?" or "Are you wise?"
9. Is *τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγελμένοις* (774) the Nurse's revised summons to Aegisthus, or Clytaemnestra's original message, or the false news from Phocis?

All these ambiguities of the written word lead us to the conclusion that Aeschylus here relied largely on the skill of the actors (i.e., *ὑπόκρισις*) to convey his meaning to the audience. The supposition that this passage by virtue of its ambiguities is an example of the *ὑποκρι-*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 364-66.

<sup>2</sup> The possibility that question 4 may not have the same answer as question 5 seems to have occurred to very few editors. Conington's note, "It is not clear whether *γηθούση φρενί* refers to Aegisthus or to the Nurse. . . . A further question about reference of *ὅσον τάχιστα* is of comparatively little importance, and, indeed depends upon the answer given to that just raised," is a good illustration of this tendency to answer questions 4 and 5 in the same way. This has been no small factor in obscuring the meaning of the passage. Pauw in his edition and Warr and Campbell in their translations are not misled by this tendency. They give the correct answer to questions 4 and 5.

τική λέξις (i.e., the style especially suited to acting) is supported by Aristotle, cf. *Rh.* 1414a, "But where there is most ὑπόκρισις there is least exactness."<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, it must be remarked, is here discussing ὑπόκρισις as applied to the orator. He realizes, however, that the orator's art is akin to the actor's art, cf. *Rh.* 1403b, "It [i.e., ὑπόκρισις] came late into tragedy and rhapsody; for the poets themselves acted their tragedies at first. And so there is evidently in oratory likewise something of this same sort [i.e., something like ὑπόκρισις] as there is in poetry." Therefore, although Aristotle's observation regarding ὑπόκρισις and exactness is made with reference to oratory, it is applicable to the drama also. Our passage with its nine ambiguities is surely deficient enough in ἀκρίβεια to afford full scope to ὑπόκρισις. We shall have occasion to say more on this point later.

We are now ready to take up the nine problems of interpretation. First, what is the meaning of δεσπότου στύγει? A scholiast proposes as an answer τῷ μισουμένῳ ὑπ' Ἀγαμέμνονος, "to him whom Agamemnon hates," i.e., Aegisthus. This interpretation is properly rejected by almost everyone. The scholiast is correct in supposing that the whole phrase signifies Aegisthus, but it is hopelessly forced and unnatural to refer δεσπότου to Agamemnon. Most editors understand the phrase to mean "to our hated master." This seems entirely satisfactory. For the periphrasis cf. Αἰγίσθου βία (*Cho.* 893), μητρὸς ἐμῆς σέβας (*Prom.* 1091), also *Sept.* 448, 569, 571, 577, 620, 641, 1080. J. Wiel<sup>2</sup> objects for the reason that on this understanding of δεσπότου στύγει the genitive is objective, whereas, according to him, in every example of this sort of periphrasis the genitive is subjective. This last statement of his is erroneous, for in one of the examples just cited, μητρὸς ἐμῆς σέβας (*Prom.* 1091), the genitive is objective. Wiel's objection is therefore overruled, and his proposed change from στύγει to στέγει is rejected as an unnecessary and unjustified emendation. Another possibility, suggested but not approved by Wiel, is to take the dative στύγει in a causal sense, thus, "ne tu vero hoc nunties prae odio in dominum." H. Weil well describes this as "louche et déplacé."<sup>3</sup> Paley, in his fourth edition, translates, "Now don't you tell this with any show of dislike

<sup>1</sup> ἄλλ' ὅπου μάλιστα ὑποκρίσεως, ἐνταῦθα ἥκιστα ἀκρίβεια ἐνί.

<sup>2</sup> In *Observationes in locos aliquot Aeschylus*, pp. 48 ff.

<sup>3</sup> In *Rev. de phil.*, V (1881), 76.

towards your master," but in his sixth edition he offers the better and more usual interpretation, "that odious master of ours."

The second question is concerned with the meaning of *ἀδειμάντως*. Verrall, Tucker, and Mazon, following Klausen, see in the words *ὡς ἀδειμάντως κλήη* an attempt to prevent Aegisthus from becoming suspicious at being told to come alone. They answer questions 2 and 3 by taking *ἀδειμάντως* in the sense "without inspiring fear," and by regarding the false news from Phocis as the object of *κλήη*. They understand the Chorus to mean something like this, "Tell him to come by himself in order that he may hear the news *without alarming* [*ἀδειμάντως*] the messenger, i.e., Orestes. Aegisthus is supposed to reason that if he should arrive with an armed guard, the messenger, becoming overawed, might find himself unable to deliver his message correctly.<sup>1</sup> It is very hard to believe that the adverb *ἀδειμάντως* will bear this interpretation. In a note Tucker translates *ὡς ἀδειμάντως κλήη* "so that he may hear the news fearlessly told," adding by way of support a reference to his note on *Cho.* 433 where the phrase *τὸ πᾶν ἀτίμως* is explained as follows:

The Greek adverb not unfrequently represents a condensation of thought, by which it comes to refer not to the manner of the action but to its result upon the object of it. Thus *Ag.* 1242 φόβος μ' ἔχει | κλῖοντ' ἀληθῶς οὐδὲν ἐξηκασμένα (i.e. οὕτως κλῖοντα ὥστε ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἃ κλῖω), *ibid.* 792 κάρτ' ἀπομούσως ἦσθα γεγραμμένος (= ὥστε ἀπόμουσος εἶναι), *inf.* 976 ξυνώμοσάν μοι (sic) θάνατον ἀθλίως<sup>2</sup> πατρί (i.e. ὥστε ἀθλιον αὐτὸν γενέσθαι), 492 αἰσχροῦς τε βουλευτοῖσιν ἐν καλύμμασιν (i.e. ὥστε αἰσchrὰ εἶναι). *Eur. Andr.* 1053 σαφῶς ἤκουσας ('you have heard the truth'). So here the sense is *τὸ πᾶν ἔλεξας ὥστε ἀτιμον αὐτὸ φαίνεσθαι*: 'what you say means utter dishonour.'

Let us meet Tucker on his own ground. If *κλῖοντ' ἀληθῶς* is equivalent to *οὕτως κλῖοντα ὥστε ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἃ κλῖω*, then presumably *ἀδειμάντως*

<sup>1</sup> Curiously enough there is an Indian proverb to the opposite effect; cf. *Hitopadesa*, Book III, fable 4, "Even when weapons are raised a messenger speaks not falsely; always because of his inviolability he is surely a speaker of the truth." The text in the second verse is uncertain, but the general meaning is clear from the first verse.

<sup>2</sup> Many editors consider this *ἀθλίως* impossible, and change to *ἀθλίῳ*. We need not view the resulting *ἀθλίῳ πατρί* (or for that matter the original *ἀθλίως πατρί*) with suspicion on account of the *ἀθλίῳ πατρί* at the end of 981, three verses below. Many examples of similar repetitions (usually involving only one word, however) are given by Herrmannowski, *De Homocoteleutis quibusdam tragicorum et consonantiis repetitione eiusdem vocabuli ab Aeschylis effectis*, e.g., τὰ πρόσφορα (*Cho.* 711, 714), αἰθαλίαν (*Prom.* 1034, 1037). The change to *ἀθλίῳ*, however, seems unnecessary in view of the other examples in Tucker's list of adverbs, to which may be added πῶς ταῦτα τοῖσι οὐκ ἐναντίως λέγεις: "Is not your plea [ταῦτα λέγεις] belied [ἐναντίως] by this fact [τοῖσι]?" (*Eum.* 642.)

κλή (771) is to be thought of as equivalent to οὕτως κλή ὥστε ἀδειμάντα εἶναι ἃ κλύει. Now it is not the *things told* that are "fearless," but rather the *teller*. That is, in order to accept Tucker's explanation of ἀδειμάντως we must suppose that here, obscured in an adverbial phrase, is a transferred epithet, transferred from the teller to the things told with the added difficulty that neither the teller nor the things told are expressed, and with the still further complication that the adverbial phrase has an obvious and entirely different meaning (i.e., "so that he may hear without alarm"). This situation is intolerable. No such state of affairs is found in any of the other examples cited by Tucker. Consequently, these adverbs cannot be regarded as parallels for ἀδειμάντως as taken in Tucker's sense. We are accordingly led to the conclusion that it is not possible to interpret ἀδειμάντως in the sense given by Klausen and Tucker.

But those who wish to understand ὥς ἀδειμάντως κλή in Klausen's sense have other resources. Hartung emends ἀδειμάντως to ἀδειμάντων, i.e., "from untterrified messengers." This change is accepted by Blass. Verrall, while retaining ἀδειμάντως in his text, writes a lame and unenthusiastic defense of the adverb, and is not unfavorably disposed toward the emendation:

This correction, . . . , shows a right view of the sense, and is perhaps necessary to the expression of it. . . . It may, however, be questioned whether ὥς ἀδειμάντως κλή *that he may hear without alarm* is not used loosely in the sense *that he may hear without alarming*. I do not think this impossible by any means, especially when we consider the speaker and the style of the scene.

Wilamowitz, understanding ὥς ἀδειμάντως κλή in Klausen's sense, offers in his edition of 1896 the brief explanation "ἀδειμάντως activisch." This is far from satisfactory. Apparently Wilamowitz himself has not been satisfied by it, for in his edition of 1914 he abandons the adverb and accepts Hartung's ἀδειμάντων. This emendation is not warranted in the slightest degree. It is based on an arbitrary view of the sense which Klausen, Verrall, Tucker, Blass, and Wilamowitz choose to consider the right one. ἀδειμάντως does not fit this view of the sense, therefore ἀδειμάντως is changed. Such a procedure would be justified only if ἀδειμάντως, the reading of the manuscripts, should cause insurmountable difficulties with the context. No such difficulties will arise. If ὥς ἀδειμάντως κλή is given its natural, proper mean-



ing, "so that he may hear without alarm," a perfectly reasonable interpretation of the whole passage will result. Consequently it is idle either to try to find justification for a forced rendering of ἀδειμάντως or to set about emending the text.

Our answer has now been given to the second of the nine questions. We must next consider the third, whether the news from Phocis or the Nurse's summons to Aegisthus should be understood as the object of κλύη. Paley answers this question in the first way: "In order that he may hear the news fearlessly, bid him come alone," i.e., assure him that he has no need of bodyguards, in order to disarm his suspicions."<sup>1</sup> This interpretation is not satisfactory, for it fails to meet the objection that the "assurance" that a bodyguard is needless may tend to arouse rather than to disarm suspicion. The possibility of answering the present question in this way, however, does not stand or fall with Paley's specific interpretation. While we are considering this question, we should keep several facts in mind. ὡς ἀδειμάντως κλύη is not to be taken in Klausen's sense as giving the point to αὐτόν; the phrase is not a part of the message that the Nurse will give to Aegisthus; it is rather a part of the instructions given by the Chorus to the Nurse which will enable her to deliver the message in such a way that Aegisthus will suspect no treachery. Now the manner in which Aegisthus receives the news when interviewing Orestes<sup>2</sup> is of no vital consequence, whereas the whole situation turns on his receiving without suspicion the Nurse's bidding to come unattended.<sup>3</sup> We should, therefore, agreeing with Wecklein, regard the Nurse's summons as the understood object of κλύη.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This note is in Paley's fourth edition (1879). In his sixth edition (1889) he supplies "the message" as the object of κλύη. By this Paley seems to mean the Phocian's message, not the Nurse's summons.

<sup>2</sup> As a matter of fact, Orestes has no intention of delivering his message to Aegisthus; cf. 571-76: "But if once I shall pass the outermost threshold of the gate and shall find that man sitting on my father's throne, or if thereafter coming face to face with me he shall—mark well!—life and cast down his eyes ere ever he can say 'Of what land is the stranger?'" with my swift sword I'll spit him and lay him dead" (Smyth). In spite of the fact that the leader of the Chorus knows this, she would reasonably be expected to keep up in 771 the pretense that the message from Phocis is actually to be delivered to Aegisthus.

<sup>3</sup> This point is well emphasized by F. W. Schmidt, *Krit. Stud. zu d. gr. Dram.*, I, 79.

<sup>4</sup> This κλύη means "hear" in the somewhat extended sense of "hearken," "give ear," "comply"; cf. Liddell and Scott, *s.v.* κλύω, II. Professor A. M. Harmon has kindly called my attention to this point.

Smyth's punctuation consists of a colon after *στύγει* and a comma after *ἐλθεῖν*. This may properly be denoted the vulgate. It is not good. Let us begin with the second matter, the comma after *ἐλθεῖν*. We have seen that *ὥς ἀδειμάντως κλήη* is not a part of the Nurse's message to Aegisthus, but rather a hint from the Chorus to the Nurse regarding the way in which this message is to be delivered. Thus the phrase interrupts after *ἐλθεῖν* the message enjoined upon the Nurse by the Chorus. This break in the continuity of the thought should be indicated, not by a comma after *ἐλθεῖν*, but by a period. There is no such break in the thought after *στύγει* (770). Consequently the colon here should be replaced by a comma. The passage, thus pointed, will read as follows:

μή νυν σὺ ταῦτ' ἄγγελλε δεσπότης στύγει,  
ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν. ὥς ἀδειμάντως κλήη,  
ἄνωχθ'. . . . .

In addition to the foregoing considerations we may remark that the traditional punctuation, by surrounding *ὥς ἀδειμάντως κλήη* with commas, puts the phrase virtually in the form of a parenthesis. This is most unfortunate, since these words are the keynote of the whole situation. *Aegisthus must have no suspicions*. The present punctuation, which sets *ὥς ἀδειμάντως κλήη* at the beginning of the sentence, gives the phrase a suitably emphatic position.<sup>1</sup> For other examples of this order in which a command is preceded by the reason for the command<sup>2</sup> cf. *Sept.* 237-38, ἀλλ' ὥς πολίτας μὴ κακοσπλάγχχνους τιθῆς, | εὐκηλος ἴσθι . . . , and *Suppl.* 930-32, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν εἰδῶς ἐννέπω σαφέστερον . . . πῶς φῶ . . . .

A change in the structure of the sentence brought about by this punctuation must be observed. With the traditional punctuation *ἐλθεῖν* depends on *ἄνωχθ'*; with the revised punctuation this infinitive must be taken with *ἄγγελλε*. For the construction cf. *Il.* xxiv. 145-46, ἄγγελον Πριάμῳ . . . λύσασθαι . . . νῖον; *Od.* xvi. 350, κείνοις ἀγγείλωσι . . . νέεσθαι; *Eur. Hec.* 727-28, ἡγγεῖλε . . . μὴ θιγγάνειν . . . μηδέν<sup>3</sup> Ἀργείων; frag. 215 N., πᾶσι δ' ἄγγελλω βροτοῖς | ἐσθλῶν ἀπ'

<sup>1</sup> Leconte de Lisle gives a translation which seems to have been based on this punctuation: "Garde-toi de dire cela à ce maître que tu hais, mais qu'il vienne seul. Et, pour qu'il t'écoute sans crainte, parle-lui d'un air joyeux, afin qu'il se hâte."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Naumann, *De ΩΣ particulae apud Aeschylum vi et usu*, p. 33.

<sup>3</sup> The context shows that this is *μηδέν*, an indirect object of *ἡγγεῖλε*, and not *μηδέν*, a subject of *θιγγάνειν*. Accordingly we have here a case in point.

ἀλόχων εὐγενῇ σπείρειν τέκνα. Besides this change in the structure of the sentence, the punctuation which I have proposed produces a most noteworthy asyndeton in 771.<sup>1</sup>

Aeschylus affords many examples of asyndeton in commands;<sup>2</sup> cf. *Sept.* 262, σίγησον, ὦ τάλαινα, μὴ φίλους φόβει; *Prom.* 195-98, πάντ' ἐκκάλυψον καὶ γέγων' ἡμῖν λόγον, | ποίω λαβὼν σε Ζεὺς ἐπ' αἰτιάματι, | οὕτως ἀτίμως καὶ πικρῶς αἰκίζεται· | δίδαξον ἡμᾶς; *Ag.* 1267-68, ἴτ' ἐς φθόρον· πεσόντα θ' ὧδ' ἀμείψομαι. | ἄλλην τιν' ἄτης ἀντ' ἐμοῦ πλουτίζετε; *Eum.* 438-42, ἔπειτα τόνδ' ἀμυναθοῦ ψόγον· | εἴπερ πεποιθὼς τῇ δίκῃ βρέτας τόδε | ἦσαι φυλάσσω ἐστίας ἀμῆς πέλας | σεμνὸς προσίκτωρ ἐν τρόποις Ἰξίονος· | τοῦτοις ἀμείβου πᾶσιν εὐμαθὲς τί μοι; *Eum.* 586-87, ἔπος δ' ἀμείβου πρὸς ἔπος ἐν μέρει τιθεῖς. | τὴν μητέρ' εἶπε πρῶτον εἰ κατέκτονas. Furthermore, we can find for the asyndeton in 771 other support which is fully as striking as the evidence just cited. Earlier in this paper it was pointed out that this passage is an example of the ὑποκριτικὴ λέξις, the style peculiarly adapted to acting. It will be remembered that this conclusion, based on the indefiniteness and ambiguity of the passage, found confirmation in *Arist. Rh.* 1414a.<sup>3</sup> In Aristotle and in the pseudo-Demetrius<sup>4</sup> we find evidence that asyndeton is a characteristic of the ὑποκριτικὴ λέξις; cf. *Arist. Rh.* 1413b, "For instance *asyndeta*, and the reiteration of the same word in the written, *graphic* style . . . are rightly disapproved; whereas in debating the orators *do* employ them, because they are proper for acting" (Cope);<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, "And similarly in the case of asyndeton, 'I came, I met, I besought,' for there is need of ὑπόκρισις, and the thing must not be spoken as though it were a unit, all in the same manner and tone of voice";<sup>6</sup> also the pseudo-Demetrius *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, 193-94:

Perhaps more adapted to debating is the asyndetic style, which is also described as suited for acting, since acting is promoted by asyndeton. But the style suited for writing is more easily read; and this is connected and so to

<sup>1</sup> Asyndeton is thus defined in Kühner-Gerth, *Ausführliche grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, § 546, 2: "Ein wirkliches Asyndeton kann nur da angenommen werden, wo Sätze, die sowohl in grammatischer als in logischer Hinsicht in gleichem Verhältnisse zu einander stehen und somit einander beigeordnet, nicht untergeordnet sind, ohne Konjunktion aneinandergereiht sind."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Gollwitzer in *Acta seminarii philologici Erlangensis*, II (1881), 394-95.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. pp. 359-60.

<sup>4</sup> According to Christ-Schmid-Stälin, *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur*, II<sup>6</sup>, 78, the *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* cannot have been written by Demetrius.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. p. 360.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. p. 360.

speak fortified by the conjunctions. Consequently Menander, whose style is for the most part asyndetic, is acted, but Philemon is read. To show that the asyndetic style is suited for acting, let this example be cited, "I received<sup>1</sup> the child, I bore it, I am rearing it, my friend." Thus the disconnected style will force one to act even in spite of oneself, on account of the asyndeta. But if you should say, using connectives, "I received the child and I bore it and I reared it" you would certainly make it very unemotional by your conjunctions; and all absence of emotion is unsuited for acting.

Thus our changed punctuation in 771 with its resulting asyndeton is supported. An additional asyndeton occurs in 779, which does not surprise us.

We come now to the fourth problem, the question whether *ῥάχιστα* refers to the Nurse or to Aegisthus. The editors are not unanimous on this point. Verrall construes the phrase with *ἄνωχθ'*, referring it to the Nurse. He remarks, "Haste is important; for if there were any more delay, Clytaemnestra might despatch a second and less corruptible messenger." Furthermore, the Nurse's haste in delivering the message can perhaps be counted on to impress Aegisthus with the urgency of the summons, so that he will come quickly, unthinkingly, and alone. On logical grounds no very serious objections can be made to this interpretation. Nevertheless, it seems better to accept the second alternative and to refer *ῥάχιστα* to Aegisthus. In this case these words become a part of the Nurse's message. This summons will seem natural, guileless, and urgent to him; he will be likely to obey it automatically without stopping to think; indeed, if he does stop to think, *ῥάχιστα* may readily suggest to him that he should not take the time to assemble a bodyguard. According to the usual punctuation consisting of a comma after *ἐλθεῖν* (771), the phrase *ῥάχιστα*, if referred to Aegisthus, is taken with *ἐλθεῖν*. Our punctuation, by putting *ἐλθεῖν* back in the preceding sentence, makes this impossible.<sup>2</sup> Therefore we should regard *ῥάχιστα* as an anticipation on the part of the Chorus of the exact words to be used by the Nurse in her message,<sup>3</sup> as follows: "In order that he may hear<sup>4</sup> your summons without alarm, urge him thus, 'Come as quickly as you

<sup>1</sup> Kock emends to *ὑπεδεξάμην*, "I conceived."

<sup>2</sup> In this case *ἄνωχθ'* is used absolutely, as in Homer *Il.* vi. 439, xxiv. 140; *Od.* xvii. 502, xviii. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Plumptre so regards *ῥάχιστα* in his translation.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. p. 363, n. 4.

can!"<sup>1</sup> We may point out two considerations which give some slight indication that *δσον τάχιστα* is better referred to Aegisthus than to the Nurse. First, it is necessary that Aegisthus shall not be frightened into coming with a bodyguard; this desired result will be accomplished, if *he* is told outright to come quickly, with more likelihood than if merely *the Nurse's* speed in delivering the summons is relied on to

<sup>1</sup> The leader of the Chorus could easily make it clear to the audience that *δσον τάχιστα* is not a phrase modifying *ἀνωθ'*, but rather an anticipatory quotation of the Nurse's message to Aegisthus. He could make this plain by pausing before and after *δσον τάχιστα*, and by speaking these words in a different tone of voice—in a tone, perhaps, that imitates or suggests the Nurse's intonation. Euripides, in *IT* 769-79, puts in the mouth of one of his actors an anticipatory quotation of precisely the same kind. Iphigenia gives to the supposed stranger, Pylades, a letter to be delivered to Orestes, at home, as she imagines, in Argos. Fearing that the letter may be lost on the way, she tells Pylades its contents, to insure the delivery of her message. She quotes directly, in anticipation, the actual words that are to be spoken to Orestes by Pylades. The actor taking her part must make clear to the audience the distinction between the words of Pylades' future message and the intermingled current speech of Iphigenia. The passage runs as follows:

- ΙΦ. ἀγγελλ' Ὀρέστη, παιδὶ τὰγαμέμνονος·  
 "ἡ 'ν Αὐλίδι σφαγείσ' ἐπιστέλλει τάδε 770  
 ζῶσ' Ἰφιγένεια, τοῖς ἐκεῖ δ' οὐ ζῶσ' ἔτι."  
 ΟΡ. ποῦ δ' ἔστ' ἐκείνη; κατθανοῦσ' ἦκει πάλιν;  
 ΙΦ. ἥδ' ἦν ὁρᾶς σὺ· μὴ λόγους ἐκπλησέ με.  
 "κόμισαί μ' ἐς Ἄργος, ὡ σὺναιμε, πρὶν θανεῖν,  
 ἐκ βαρβάρου γῆς καὶ μετάστησον θεᾶς 775  
 σφαγίων, ἐφ' οἷσι ξενόφόνους τιμὰς ἔχω."  
 ΟΡ. Πυλάδῃ, τί λέξω; ποῦ ποτ' ὄνθ' ἠὲρ ἤμεθα;  
 ΙΦ. "ἡ σοῖς ἀραῖα δώμασιν γενήσομαι,  
 Ὀρέσθ', " ἔν' αὖθις ὄνομα δὲς κλύων μᾶθης.

Way translates:

- IPH.: Say to Orestes, Agamemnon's son—  
 "This Iphigenia, slain in Aulis, sends,  
 Who liveth, yet for those at home lives not—"  
 OR.: Where is she? Hath she risen from the dead?  
 IPH.: She whom thou seest—confuse me not with speech:—  
 "Bear me to Argos, brother, ere I die:  
 From this wild land, these sacrifices, save,  
 Wherein mine office is to slay the stranger;"—  
 OR.: What shall I say?—Now dream we, Pylades?  
 IPH.: "Else to thine house will I become a curse,  
 Orestes"—so, twice heard, hold fast the name.

This passage, which seems to be in the manner of the *ὑποκριτικῇ* λέξις, has an asyndeton in 773.

Probably another example of an anticipatory quotation is *ὅπως τάχιστ'* (*Cho.* 735; cf. p. 375).

make him suppose that he must hasten. Second, granting that haste is important from the point of view of the Chorus, we cannot help remarking that while an ultimate result of the Nurse's haste may be that Aegisthus will hear her message without suspicion (no other news having had time to reach him), nevertheless, if *δσον τάχιστα* is understood as emphasizing this point, the phrase does not have quite as definite and immediate a connection with the context (*ὡς ἀδειμάντως κλύη*) as it has if understood as referring to Aegisthus. Besides this, there is a third and much more compelling consideration in favor of referring *δσον τάχιστα* to Aegisthus. If *δσον τάχιστα* is understood, in the way we have indicated, as a direct quotation of the very words the Nurse will speak, the whole passage becomes much more vivid and dramatic, and much more difficult for the actor to deliver. Inasmuch as we have already seen that these verses are an example of the *ὑποκριτικὴ λέξις*, this interpretation which enhances their dramatic quality is strongly to be recommended. To conclude the matter we may state that on logical grounds it is slightly better to refer *δσον τάχιστα* to Aegisthus, and on dramatic grounds it is very much better to do so.

The passage, as far as it has been considered, may now be translated. The translation, of course, will be more expanded than the original Greek, for we must make clear with words what the actor could convey by *ὑπόκρισις*. Translate as follows: "Let not *that* be your message to our hated lord, but tell him to come by himself. In order that he may hear<sup>1</sup> your summons without alarm, urge him thus, 'Come as quickly as you can.'"

Question 5, regarding the reference of *γαθούση φρενί*, next engages our attention. As it happens, this question is closely involved with all those that follow. Therefore our procedure must be to assume one of the two answers to this question, to consider the answers which can be given to the remaining questions on this basis,<sup>2</sup> and then to do the same thing with the fifth question answered in the other way.<sup>3</sup>

The meaning of the phrase *γαθούση φρενί* calls for comment. It has been shown by Shorey<sup>4</sup> that in tragedy the instrumental or modal dative *φρενί* with an adjective becomes almost a formula, and simply

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 363, n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. pp. 369-84, 387.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. pp. 384-89.

<sup>4</sup> In *Class. Phil.*, V (1910), 83 ff.

the equivalent of an adverb. Many other datives such as  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ ,  $\nu\acute{o}\omega$ ,  $\gamma\acute{\nu}\omega\mu\eta$ ,  $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\iota\alpha$ , etc., illustrate the usage.  $\phi\rho\epsilon\nu\acute{\iota}$  is of particular interest as being an analogue of the instrumental ablative *mente*, which coupled with an adjective is the origin of the romance adverb. A few of Shorey's examples may be quoted here for reference:

In Aesch. *Choeph.* 772:  $\gamma\eta\theta\acute{o}\sigma\eta\ \phi\rho\epsilon\nu\acute{\iota}$  . . . is virtually *laeta mente* or *lietamente*. In *Choeph.* 303:  $\tau\rho\acute{o}\iota\alpha\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\acute{\eta}\rho\alpha\varsigma\ \epsilon\upsilon\delta\acute{o}\xi\omega\ \phi\rho\epsilon\nu\acute{\iota}$ , the dative phrase means simply *gloriosa mente*, *glorieusement*. . . . In Aesch. *Persae* 374:  $\pi\epsilon\upsilon\theta\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omega\ \phi\rho\epsilon\nu\acute{\iota}$   $\times$   $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omega\varsigma$  is *oboedienter*, Italian *ubbidientemente*. . . . In Aesch. *Suppl.* 775:  $\epsilon\gamma\lambda\acute{o}\sigma\sigma\omega\ \phi\rho\epsilon\nu\acute{\iota}$  is Italian *facondamente*; in *Choeph.* 565:  $\phi\alpha\iota\delta\rho\acute{\eta}\ \phi\rho\epsilon\nu\acute{\iota}$  is *giocondamente* or *allegramente*.

$\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\sigma\eta\ \phi\rho\epsilon\nu\acute{\iota}$  (772) accordingly may be rendered "with rejoicing."

Suppose, then, that  $\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\sigma\eta\ \phi\rho\epsilon\nu\acute{\iota}$  refers to the Nurse. This is the understanding to which I believe we must ultimately come. The Chorus tells the Nurse to deliver the message with a show of gladness<sup>1</sup> in order to convince Aegisthus that her intentions are not treacherous. Wecklein so interprets the phrase. In other words, the Nurse is told to indulge in a little  $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\acute{o}\kappa\rho\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$  on her own account. Verrall<sup>2</sup> objects on the ground that "it is difficult to see how the feeling or pretense of gladness on the part of the nurse could lend credit to her fictitious message if Aegisthus had conceived any suspicion of it. It would be more likely to confirm his suspicion." We must consider this objection most seriously. What, we may ask, is the likelihood that Aegisthus will conceive any suspicions of the false message? The words  $\delta\sigma\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\chi\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$  have a bearing on this point; the Chorus counts on the urgency of this command to carry Aegisthus off his feet and to hurry him along before he has time to collect his thoughts or to conceive any suspicions. Also, we must make due allowance for the powers of  $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\acute{o}\kappa\rho\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$  to persuade and deceive, powers to which Longinus pays tribute in the following terms; cf. *Ars rhet.* ap. Spengel-Hammer, *Rhetores Graeci*, I, 194-96:

$\acute{\upsilon}\pi\acute{o}\kappa\rho\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$  is an imitation of the real character and feelings pertaining to the individual, and a regulation of the body and the manner of speaking ap-

<sup>1</sup> The possibility that the Chorus may be intending to give the Nurse merely a gratuitous hint to rejoice, with no thought of any influence on Aegisthus, will be considered later. As a matter of fact, the Nurse so interprets (or rather misinterprets)  $\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\sigma\eta\ \phi\rho\epsilon\nu\acute{\iota}$ . That this is not the intention of the Chorus is clear from the context (cf. pp. 374, 377-78, 380-81, 382, n. 5).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *The Choephoroi of Aeschylus*, App. I, § 21.



propriate to the matters at hand. It has very great powers of persuasion, and knows how to influence the listener by schemes and subtleties, by devices and deceits. Now proof and demonstration convince indeed by necessity, but *ὑπόκρισις* deceives through trickery, and influences the mind of the judge in accordance with the will of the speaker. . . . And you will be able to learn from tragic and comic actors, the best of them, that is, to what extent their use or lack of use of *ὑπόκρισις* produces favor or disfavor.

We may cite Plut. *Dem.* xi. 3, οὕτως ᾤετο [i.e., Demosthenes] μέγα πρὸς πίστιν εἶναι τὸν τόνον καὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν τῶν λεγόντων. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς ὑποκρινόμενος ἤρεσκε θαυμαστῶς. Furthermore, Diodorus I, 76 mentions τὴν τῆς ὑποκρίσεως γοητείαν as a corrupting influence in courts of law in Egypt. If Aegisthus has no preconceived suspicions of the Nurse's loyalty, these considerations may be relied on to make the success of the deception reasonably sure. Verrall's objection, however, still confronts us. What if Aegisthus has suspicions of her?<sup>1</sup> If he supposes that it is Orestes' devoted old nurse announcing her master's death<sup>2</sup> with smiles of joy, will this not seem anomalous and highly suspicious? In reply to this we may point out the improbability of his identifying the servant summoning him as Orestes' nurse of fifteen or twenty years ago. All those tender offices that the Nurse so feelingly recalls in 749-62 were performed long before Aegisthus became established in the palace. At the time of the *Choephoroi* he can scarcely have such an intimate acquaintance with the great domestic

<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, Aegisthus is living in such complacency that he does not suspect the arch-conspirators, namely, the Chorus. This is indicated by the scene 838-54 (where Aegisthus appears on the stage and we learn that the Nurse's deception has succeeded), especially by the question addressed to the Chorus in 847, τί τῶνδ' ἐν εἰποῖς ὥστε δηλῶσαι φρονί;

<sup>2</sup> Another point is raised by this scene (838-54). Here it is brought out clearly that the Nurse included in her summons to Aegisthus an account of Orestes' death. Why does Aeschylus make the Nurse anticipate the Phocians in telling the false news? Surely Aegisthus would have obeyed the Nurse's summons, given in the name of Clytaemnestra, merely to come and interview the strangers. Why should the Nurse give the message which is so soon to be repeated by Orestes? A reason seems very obvious. Except for the scene 838-54, Aegisthus does not appear in the *Choephoroi* at all. Here his knowledge of the death of Orestes makes it possible for Aeschylus to put in his mouth a specious and insincere lament: "'Tis startling tidings that, as I hear, are told by certain strangers who have come, tidings far from welcome—that Orestes is dead. To lay this too upon the house would prove a fearful burthen when it is still festering and galled by the wound inflicted by a former murder" (Smyth). And so, just before the death of Aegisthus, we are given a glimpse of the deceitfulness and insincerity of his character. In the absence of this touch of characterization, the Aegisthus of the *Choephoroi* would be a mere figurehead.

retinue of the palace as to realize just what functions were performed by any individual servant fifteen or twenty years before.

More will be said about Verrall's objection later.<sup>1</sup> It is now time to consider some positive evidence in favor of Wecklein's interpretation of *γαθούση φρενί*. There are many similar instances in the drama where characters hide their true feelings and assume a false mien in order to deceive. See especially Soph. *El.* 1296-1300: "And look that our mother read not thy secret [i.e., that Orestes, far from being dead, has come to avenge his father] in thy radiant face, when we twain have advanced into the house, but make lament, as for the feigned disaster; for when we have prospered, then there will be leisure to rejoice and exult in freedom" (Jebb).<sup>2</sup> These words are spoken to Electra by Orestes, who has recently made himself known to her. As far as development of plot is concerned, this passage corresponds to *Cho.* 770 ff., the situation in each case being that Orestes has disclosed his identity to Electra, plans are being laid for the execution of his vengeance, and the first of the two murders is imminent. In *El.* 1296-1300, Orestes, to avoid the mischance of arousing suspicions, warns Electra against appearing with a happy face before Clytaemnestra. Thus we see that Sophocles has no scruples about causing Clytaemnestra to be deceived by the feigned sorrow of Electra, whose sympathies, we may add, are all in the opposite direction from her mother's. The fact that this passage from *Electra* occurs at a situation in the plot corresponding to *Cho.* 770 ff. is of great significance. No one would object to the general proposition that Sophocles in his *Electra* made use of the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus. When we investigate this question, we find so many instances of correspondence in matters of small detail, occurring generally in the same context, that we are compelled to suppose that Sophocles frequently wrote with definite words of Aeschylus in mind. For example:<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 373-74.

<sup>2</sup> οὕτω δ' ὅπως μήτηρ σε μὴ 'πιγνώσεται  
φαιδρῶ προσώπῳ νῶν ἐπελθόντων δόμους·  
ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἀτῇ τῇ μάτῃν λελεγμένη  
στίνασ'· ὅταν γὰρ εὐτυχῆσωμεν, τότε  
χαίρειν παρέσται καὶ γελᾶν ἐλευθέρως.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Flessa, *Die Prioritätsfrage der sophokleischen und euripideischen Elektra*, and Miss L. Kohn, *De vestigiis Aeschyli apud Sophoclem Euripidem Aristophanem*. The majority of the illustrations here cited will be found in these works. Cf. also O. Navarre in *Rev. des études anc.*, XI (1909), 101-28.

a) The uncommon word ἀγλάϊσμα is used of the lock left by Orestes (as yet unrecognized by Electra) on Agamemnon's tomb (*Cho.* 193 and *El.* 908).

b) Mention is made in both plays of a bronze urn, allegedly containing the ashes of Orestes; cf. *Cho.* 686, λέβητος χαλκίου πλευρώματα, and *El.* 54, τύπωμα χαλκόπλευρον, also 757-59, 1113-14, 1158-59.

c) In *Cho.* 941 the Chorus describes Orestes as θεόθεν εὖ φραδαῖσιν ὠρμημένος; cf. *El.* 70 where Orestes speaks of himself as πρὸς θεῶν ὠρμημένος.

d) Regarding Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigenia we find: *Ag.* 224-25, ἔτλα δ' οὖν θυτὴρ γενέσθαι θυγατρός; 1417-18, ἔθυσεν αὐτοῦ παῖδα, φιλτάτην ἐμοὶ ὠδῖν'; and *El.* 531-33, τὴν σὴν δμαιοῖ μόνος Ἑλλήνων ἔτλη | θῦσαι θεοῖσιν, οὐκ ἴσον καμῶν ἐμοὶ | λύπης, ὅτ' ἔσπειρ', ὥσπερ ἡ τίκτουσ' ἐγώ.

e) *Ag.* 1343-45, ὦμοι πέπληγμαι . . . ὦμοι μάλ' αὔθις; *El.* 1415-16, ὦμοι πέπληγμαι . . . ὦμοι μάλ' αὔθις.

f) Two similar phrases occur in connection with Clytaemnestra's fears arising from her dream: *Cho.* 524, νυκτιπλάγκτων δειμάτων; and *El.* 410, δειμάτων του νυκτέρου.

g) In the *kommos* of Sophocles' *Electra* the rare word ἐμασχαλίσθη (445) is used to describe the mutilation of Agamemnon's body; in the *kommos* of the *Choephoroi* (which may have been the very thing that gave Sophocles the idea of putting a *kommos* in his *Electra*), the same word appears in the same connection; cf. ἐμασχαλίσθη (439).

h) Just after Orestes has gone indoors to commit his murders, the Chorus in each of the plays delivers a short ode, in conclusion bespeaking the aid of Hermes; cf. *Cho.* 726 ff.; *El.* 1395 ff.

i) *Electra* is described by Orestes, before the recognition, in *Cho.* 17-18 as πένθει λυγρῷ | πρέπουσαν; in *El.* 1187 as πολλοῖς ἐμπρέπουσαν ἄλγεσιν.

Any one of these instances might be explained as a chance coincidence or as an unconscious adoption of a phrase remembered from the stage presentation, and some of them might be regarded as standard features which had long since been incorporated into the legend, but when, taking into account so much verbal correspondence, we consider their cumulative effect, it becomes impossible to escape the conclusion that Sophocles was in the practice of using Aeschylus in matters of detail.

We have, then, this situation: Sophocles warns Electra against appearing before her mother *φαιδρῷ προσώπῳ*, in order that Clytaemnestra may not receive any impression that danger is threatening; Aeschylus, at a corresponding point in his plot, tells somebody to do something (either the Nurse to bring Aegisthus, or Aegisthus to come and interview the Phocians) *γαθούσῃ φρενί*. If *γαθούσῃ φρενί* is made to refer to Aegisthus, there is no similarity between the two passages at all. If we accept Wecklein's interpretation of *γαθούσῃ φρενί*, the two passages offer remarkably similar examples of *ὑπόκρισις*. In each case a character is told to act in a certain manner (cf. *γαθούσῃ φρενί* and *φαιδρῷ προσώπῳ*) with reference to another character for purposes of deception. Sophocles' tendency to make use of material found in Aeschylus creates a strong presumption in favor of the interpretation of *γαθούσῃ φρενί* that brings the two passages together. The least that can be said is that *El.* 1296-1300 makes Wecklein's interpretation of *γαθούσῃ φρενί* a natural one. In view of Sophocles' borrowing practices it seems justifiable, going a step further, to hold that the *ὑπόκρισις* of Sophocles points to an *ὑπόκρισις* of Aeschylus, or, putting the matter the other way around, that Sophocles has here taken over material from Aeschylus, as he often does. There is an additional similarity between these two passages which we cannot make clear until later.<sup>1</sup>

When we compare these two examples of *ὑπόκρισις* we notice one very striking difference. Electra's feigned sorrow is in accord with what her mother, presumably not suspecting that Orestes is alive, will suppose to be her true feelings. The Nurse's feigned joy, however, is contrary to what Aegisthus would suppose to be her true feelings, *if* he should happen to be cognizant of her sympathy for Orestes. The likelihood that Aegisthus will be aware of the Nurse's loyalty to Orestes is not great, as we have seen (cf. p. 370). As far as Aegisthus is concerned, the Nurse is probably just an ordinary servant. He would have no reason to know that she had been Orestes' nurse many years before. However, it must be admitted that the deception perpetrated by the Nurse would not seem plausible to anyone who should suppose Aegisthus to have this knowledge of her past history. It looks very much as though Sophocles has considered this to be a weakness in the *Choephoroi*, and has remedied matters by making Electra act in a way

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 381-82.

that *must* seem to Clytaemnestra to be perfectly natural. It is not surprising that an imperfection of this kind should be found in the *Choephoroi*. This is the earliest example, at least in extant tragedy, of such an attempt at deception.<sup>1</sup> We may reasonably suppose that Aeschylus was not used to writing scenes of this sort, and that the Athenian audience was not, as yet, hypercritical in regard to such matters.

It will be well to call attention to an additional reason for taking *γαθούση φρενί* in Wecklein's sense. Any other understanding of the phrase leads to very serious difficulties in the interpretation of the passage. There seem to be three possible ways of taking *γαθούση φρενί*: (1) as bidding the Nurse rejoice in order to deceive Aegisthus, (2) merely as bidding the Nurse rejoice, with no thought of any effect on Aegisthus, (3) as referring to Aegisthus, and not to the Nurse. The first of these alternatives we have just been considering. With regard to the second, we must remember that the Nurse needs instructions that will enable her to deliver her message to Aegisthus without arousing his suspicions. If *γαθούση φρενί* is understood as a command to the Nurse simply to rejoice, with no bearing on Aegisthus, she then gets no help beyond a hint from *ὅσον τάχιστα* that she tell him to come with all speed. This is not adequate. If it were possible for *ὡς ἀδειμάντως κλήη* to mean "without inspiring fear," the Nurse could offer Aegisthus this pretext for his coming alone, and our objections to the second of these three interpretations of *γαθούση φρενί* would then be removed. *ὡς ἀδειμάντως κλήη*, however, cannot be understood in this way, as we have seen; and the emendation *ἀδειμάντων*, which gives an equivalent meaning, is not justified. Consequently, our objection to this interpretation of *γαθούση φρενί* still stands. Regarding the third of these alternatives, that of referring *γαθούση φρενί* to Aegisthus, all we can say now is that this interpretation produces great difficulties with 773 and 774. These difficulties will be pointed out below (cf. pp. 384-89).

In support of Wecklein's interpretation of *γαθούση φρενί*, we may add further examples of a similar sort of *ὑπόκρισις*. Consider *Cho.* 737-40, where Clytaemnestra is reported as having assumed an ex-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Haigh, *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, p. 118.

pression of sorrow on being told of Orestes' death: "Before the servants, indeed, behind eyes that made sham gloom she hid her laughter over what hath befallen happily for her—but for this house, the news so plainly told by the strangers spells utter ruin" (Smyth).<sup>1</sup> This is a particularly interesting example, coming, as it does, at the beginning of the scene we are studying. Is it stretching probability to suggest that the picture of Clytaemnestra hiding her joy from the servants behind a face of sorrow (737 ff.) has given to the Chorus the idea of telling the Nurse to conceal her sorrow from Aegisthus by assuming an expression of gladness (772-73)? Certainly in one other instance the Chorus has caught up and turned to its own use a part of the Nurse's introductory speech: there can be no doubt that *ὅσον τάχιστα* (772) is an echo of *ὅπως τάχιστ'* (735). Since *ὅσον τάχιστα* (772) is best referred, as we have seen, to Aegisthus, it is not improbable that *ὅπως τάχιστ'* (735) likewise should be referred to him. According to the usual interpretation the phrase is referred to the Nurse. We can regard *ὅπως τάχιστ'* (735), like *ὅσον τάχιστα* (772), as an anticipation of the words actually to be used in the delivery of the message. The translation will be, "The mistress gave orders to call Aegisthus for the strangers: 'Come as fast as you can.' "

Another example of a similar sort of *ὑπόκρισις* is Clytaemnestra's long and speciously joyful greeting of Agamemnon on his return from Troy (cf. *Ag.* 855 ff., 1227 ff.). Still another illustration is the pretended grief of Clytaemnestra on hearing the false news of Orestes' death, in *Cho.* 691-99. Professor Capps points out an example in *Men. Epitrep.* 294 ff. In this scene Habrotonon is planning to deceive Charisius by impersonating the unknown girl he has violated (cf. 309-12):

HABROTONON: And I'll be coy and use commonplaces in my talk, like this, so as not to make a slip: "How shameless you were, and how bold!"

ONESIMUS: Magnificent!

<sup>1</sup> For Smyth's text cf. p. 355. *θεοσκυθρωπῶν* (738), Conington's conjecture for *θεοσκυθρωπῶν* M, is by no means certain. It may be that we should punctuate and read as follows, with Weil, *ap. Verrall ad loc.*, and some other editors: *πίθηται. τὴν δὲ πρὸς μὲν οἰκτρας θεοσκυθρωπῶν*, i.e., "this [the news] she pretended to her household to be gloomy news." Be this as it may, *ἐντὸς δμμάτων γέλων κείθουσ'* (738-39) shows that Clytaemnestra assumed an expression of face not in accord with her true feelings, and this is all that concerns us here.

HABROTONON: "And how roughly you threw me down, and oh, dear, what a lovely dress I ruined."<sup>1</sup>

In this connection we must consider *Ag.* 788–98:

Many there be of mortal men who put appearance before truth and thereby transgress the right. Every one is prompt to heave a sigh over the unfortunate, albeit no sting of true sorrow reaches to the heart; and in seeming sympathy they join in others' joy, forcing their faces into smiles. But whoso is a discerning shepherd of his flock cannot be deceived by men's eyes which, while they feign loyalty of heart, only fawn upon him with watery affection [Smyth].

This broad generalization cannot, of course, be used as a sacred text to controvert the evidence of the foregoing passages and to prove that Aegisthus would not be deceived by the Nurse's feigned gladness. There is no reason to suppose Aegisthus a more "discerning shepherd of his flock," and so less susceptible to guile than such objects of successful deception as Clytaemnestra and Agamemnon in the passages just cited.

We now come to question 6. Is ἀγγέλω (773) the Nurse or the "stranger" from Phocis? Let us first examine the possibility of regarding the Nurse as ἀγγέλω, and carry through to the end an interpretation based on this identification, which I believe to be the correct one.<sup>2</sup> Then we shall return and deal with the alternative of considering ἀγγέλω to be Orestes.<sup>3</sup>

We should take into account the force of γάρ, which most naturally suggests that 773 is meant to explain the immediately preceding γαθούση φρενί.<sup>4</sup> Wecklein appears to be entirely right in understanding 773 as explaining how feigned joy on the part of the Nurse will give Aegisthus confidence in his false message. His note on 773 is: "Begründung zu γαθούση φρενί: 'denn es liegt am Boten, wenn versteckte Rede Glauben findet,' d.h. 'denn es kommt auf die Art wie man den

<sup>1</sup> ABP. τὰ κοινὰ παντὶ δ' ἀκκιοῦμαι τῷ λόγῳ  
τοῦ μὴ διαμαρτεῖν "ὥς ἀναιδὴς ἦσθα καὶ  
ἱταμός τις."

ON. εὖ γε.

ABP. "κατέβαλες δέ μ' ὥς σφόδρα,  
ἱμάτια δ' οἱ ἀπώλεσ' ἢ τάλαιν' ἐγώ."

It is interesting to note here an anticipatory direct quotation.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. pp. 376–81, 387–89.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. pp. 382–87, 388–89.

<sup>4</sup> For other possibilities regarding this γάρ cf. pp. 386–87.



Auftrag meldet an, wenn die Hinterlist gelingen soll.' " This is giving to ὑπόκρισις, as it is to be used by the Nurse in delivering her message to Aegisthus, no more than its due recognition as a means of persuasive deceit. The only objection to Wecklein's rendering is that it is based on κρυπτός instead of κυπτός. As applied directly to λόγος, the adjective κρυπτός, strictly speaking, hardly fits: the story itself is not hidden (κρυπτός), although to be sure it is told with a hidden motive. It is better to read κυπτός and translate: "For it rests with a messenger<sup>1</sup> to make straight a crooked tale." That is to say, a messenger can take a lying, specious story, and make it seem plausible and straightforward by his method of delivery, by ὑπόκρισις, if you will. Wecklein's interpretation of 773 fits admirably with the context, and is, I believe, the correct one.<sup>2</sup>

Incidentally we have already given our answer to question 7 by regarding the Nurse's summons to Aegisthus as the λόγος. Other possible answers to question 7 can be discussed more intelligently after questions 8 and 9 have been considered. On this point cf. pages 382-89.

Next we must see how 774 may best be related to our present interpretation of the context. To question 8, that of the meaning of φρονεῖς εὖ, four answers have been suggested: (1) "Are you sane?" (2) "Are you happy?" (3) "Are you right-minded?" (4) "Are you wise?" Of these four alternatives, the first is much to be preferred. The Nurse has heard from the Chorus the words γαθούση φρενί. She has not understood that her joy is to be specious, and assumed for the purpose of deceiving Aegisthus. Interpreting the words γαθούση φρενί as a genuinely encouraging hint,<sup>3</sup> she exclaims in amazement, ἀλλ' ἦ φρονεῖς εὖ; τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγελμένοις; "What! Are you in your right mind? Rejoicing, at the present news?"<sup>4</sup> The dative τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγελμένοις

<sup>1</sup> For this use of ἐν cf. Kühner-Gerth, *op. cit.*, § 431, 1, 3a, and Miss Emily H. Dutton, *Studies in Greek Prepositional Phrases*, pp. 201-2.

<sup>2</sup> Morshead, *The House of Atreus*, p. 117, n. 1, understands 773 in very much the same way: "I, the Chorus, have twisted, perverted, the order which was given to you the nurse; do you, as messenger, deliver it *as straight*, i.e. unhesitatingly, as if it were in its original form." This puts only a slightly different emphasis on κυπτός, and is by no means an unacceptable interpretation.

<sup>3</sup> The possibility that the Chorus intends γαθούση φρενί as a genuine command to rejoice has already been considered and will be further discussed below (cf. p. 369, n. 1).

<sup>4</sup> For ἀλλ' ἦ introducing a surprised, incredulous question, cf. Soph. *El.* 879, where ἀλλ' ἦ μέμνης; "What! Are you mad?" is Electra's reply to Chrysothemis who has just announced the return of Orestes; cf. also *Cho.* 220, Eur. *Alc.* 58, 816; these examples

should be regarded as causal. With this punctuation (which is Verrall's) and interpretation, verse 774 seems much more in the manner of the ὑποκριτικὴ λέξις than it does when regarded as a single question. Verrall wishes to delete 773 as seeming to "break the sense so inconveniently."<sup>1</sup> This deletion is by no means necessary. The Nurse can indicate by her acting that she picks up γαθοῦση from 772, even with 773 intervening. For φρονεῖς εὔ meaning "Are you in your right mind?" cf. Ar. *Thesm.* 533-34, οὐ . . . εὔ φρονεῖτε, | ἀλλ' ἡ πεφάρμαχθ', "You are not in your right minds, why you've been drugged"; Eur. *El.* 568, μὴ . . . εὔ φρονῆς, and 569, οὐκ εὔ φρονῶ 'γώ; Soph. *Al.* 1330, οὐκ ἂν εὔ φρονῶν; OR 552, 626, and many more instances.

Most editors take φρονεῖς εὔ here as meaning "Do you rejoice?" and read 774 as a single question, thus: ἀλλ' ἡ φρονεῖς εὔ τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγεγμένοις; "What! Do you rejoice at the present news?" This seems to have been the interpretation of the scholiast, whose note, presumably on φρονεῖς εὔ, reads χαίρεις.<sup>2</sup> The expression εὔ φρονέω is very frequently found in the sense of "to be loyal," or "to be well disposed." For examples, see *Ag.* 1436, εὔ φρονῶν ἐμοί, "loyal to me"; Soph. *OR* 1066, φρονούσα γ' εὔ . . . σοι, "wishing you well"; *OC* 1635; *Ant.* 1031, etc. "To rejoice" is no inconsiderable extension of this meaning, and is certainly open to suspicion.<sup>3</sup> A possible but very doubtful example of εὔ φρονέω in the sense of "to rejoice" is *Ag.* 271:

ΧΟ. χαρά μ' ὑφέρπει δάκρυον ἐκκαλουμένη.  
ΚΑΤΤ. εὔ γὰρ φρονούντος ὄμμα σου κατηγορεῖ.

are cited by Kühner-Gerth, *op. cit.*, § 504, 2; § 589, 9. ἀλλ' ἡ is discussed by Hartung, *Lehre von den Partikeln der griechischen Sprache*, II, 38-39, who cites further Eur. *Heracl.* 425, *Hel.* 490, in addition to 774, which he takes as a single question. To these examples we may add Eur. *Hipp.* 858, *Bacch.* 922, *HF* 1128, Ar. *Vesp.* 8, frag. 125.

<sup>1</sup> Verrall questions the explanation which accounts for the corrupt ὁρθόνη φρενί (773) of M as a mistaken copying from the end of 772. His ingenious but fanciful theory is that 773 as given by M is a marginal note on the preceding. Cf. *The Choephori of Aeschylus*, App. I, § 21, for an exposition of this.

<sup>2</sup> This scholion χαίρεις appears in the margin of Codex M beside 773. Almost certainly the note has been misplaced, and is intended as an interpretation of φρονεῖς εὔ. A connection with 773, however, might possibly be made thus. The scholiast feared lest there be some uncertainty as to what 773 was supposed to explain (cf. γάρ). With χαίρεις he supplies (paraphrasing γαθοῦση φρενί) that of which 773 is the intended explanation, "You [i.e., the Nurse] rejoice [χαίρεις], for it rests with a messenger to make straight a crooked tale." The second person (χαίρεις) makes this very unlikely. It is better to suppose that χαίρεις is out of place in the manuscript.

<sup>3</sup> A still further extension of this is made by Mazon, who translates (774): "Mais peux-tu espérer après cette nouvelle?" The Greek surely will not allow this.

Smyth translates:

CHO.: Joy steals over me, giving challenge to my tears.

CLYT.: Aye, for 'tis of a loyal heart that thine eye argues thee.

The rendering "of a loyal heart" is in accordance with an ordinary usage of εὖ φρονέω. Smyth is probably right in so translating and, despite χαρά (270), in refusing to understand εὖ φρονοῦντος (271) in the sense of "rejoicing." With the possible exception of this example, and of 774, there are no instances of εὖ φρονέω used as the equivalent of χαίρω in Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides, Xenophon, or Plato, if the lexicons of Ebeling, Dindorf, Ellendt, Beck, Dunbar, Essen, Thieme-Sturz, and Ast can be relied on to cite all the occurrences of εὖ φρονέω. Blaydes renders, "For your eye convicts you of being glad." As parallels for εὖ φρονοῦντος he cites *Ag.* 263, which is not a parallel since the form here is the adjective εὐφρων; *Ag.* 1436, where εὖ φρονῶν, followed by a dative, is in the sense of "loyal"; and finally *Cho.* 774. If anyone accepts the scholiast's interpretation of φρονεῖς εὖ (774), insisting that χαρά (*Ag.* 270) proves that εὖ φρονοῦντος (*Ag.* 271) has the exceptional meaning of "joyful," he should punctuate 774 as two questions (cf. p. 377); for in order to be consistent he should understand φρονεῖς εὖ (774) to be used absolutely (and not with the dative), in accordance with the usage of εὖ φρονοῦτος (as understood by him) in *Ag.* 271. The fact remains, however, that Verrall in understanding φρονεῖς εὖ (774) to mean "Are you in your right mind?" gives an interpretation which is beyond question. This, I think, should be adopted.

Paley suggests as a possible interpretation, "Are you right-minded in regard to the news?" i.e., "Do you speak as a friend to the cause?" As far as φρονεῖς εὖ itself is concerned, the phrase will certainly bear this meaning, for examples cf. page 378,<sup>1</sup> but "in regard to the news" seems impossible. On the analogy of the foregoing examples ἀλλ' ἢ φρονεῖς εὖ τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγελέμενοις will not mean "Are you right-minded [i.e., toward our side] in regard to the news?" but "Are you right-minded toward the news?"—which is nonsense.

The possibility of translating φρονεῖς εὖ "Are you wise?" must now be considered. For illustrations cf. *Prom.* 387, κέρδιστον εὖ φρονοῦντα μὴ φρονεῖν δοκεῖν, "It advantageth most, when truly wise, to be

<sup>1</sup> I.e., *Ag.* 1436, *Soph. OR* 1066, *OC* 1635, *Ant.* 1031, etc.

deemed a fool" (Smyth); *Soph. Ant.* 755; *Ai.* 371, 1252; *El.* 1038; and many other examples. Klausen, punctuating 774 as a single question, takes *φρονεῖς εὖ* in this way, and understands by *τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγελμένοις* the Nurse's summons to Aegisthus, rendering, "an prudenti consilio haec mandas?" In this he is followed by Peile. Tucker is entirely right in saying that this "cannot be got from the Greek." There is trouble with *ἡγγελμένοις*. The perfect tense presents no difficulty; cf. *τάπεσταλμένα* (779). The meaning of the word causes the difficulty. When followed by the dative and the infinitive, *ἡγγέλλω* may have virtually the meaning "to command," as in 770 and in the examples cited in connection with this verse (cf. p. 364). As used here absolutely, however, *ἡγγέλλω* can hardly mean anything more than "to announce." It does not seem possible that *τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγελμένοις* can mean "your present instructions."<sup>1</sup> Wecklein, who agrees with Klausen's explanation of 774, emends to *τοῖσιν ἐντεταλμένοις*. There is no justification for this change, since the traditional text shows no evidences of perturbation and is perfectly translatable as it stands. The meaning "Are you wise?" for this *φρονεῖς εὖ* and the understanding of *τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγελμένοις* as the Nurse's summons to Aegisthus are therefore not to be tolerated.

The whole passage, then, should be translated as follows:

CHORUS: No, let not *that* be your message to our hated lord, but tell him to come by himself. In order that he may hear<sup>2</sup> your summons without alarm, urge him thus, "Come as quickly as you can!" and do so with rejoicing. For it rests with a messenger to make straight a crooked tale.

NURSE: What! Are you in your right mind? *Rejoicing*, at the present news?<sup>3</sup>

(*It is clear from these questions that the Nurse has failed to understand the reason given in 773 for her assumption of joy.*<sup>4</sup> *Perceiving that she will have to be given a little real encouragement, the CHORUS proceeds.*)

CHO.: Well, if Zeus perchance will cause the wind of our ill fortune to change . . .

(*This is at once seized upon by the NURSE, who interrupts:*)

NUR.: How is that possible? With Orestes, the hope of the house is gone.

<sup>1</sup> It might perhaps be a slight improvement over this to make *τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγελμένοις* (construed as a sort of dative of respect) refer to Clytaemnestra's original instructions, thus, "But are you well advised with reference to these recent orders of mine?" Even this seems very dubious.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 363, n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. p. 369, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. p. 369, n. 1.

CHO.: No, not yet. He is a poor prophet who would give that interpretation.<sup>1</sup>

NUR.: What's that you say? Have you any knowledge beyond what has been told?

CHO.: Go, give your message, do what has been bidden you. The gods care for what is their concern.

NUR.: Well, I shall go and obey your commands in this. May it turn out for the best, by the grace of the gods.

Aeschylus has managed this scene very skilfully. Without giving the whole secret away, the Chorus has hinted pretty broadly to the Nurse that the situation is not as bad as it appears. Consequently, if the Nurse has not been acute enough to realize fully that she must play a part in delivering her message to Aegisthus, she will be an unconscious actor in showing joy which is not altogether assumed, but is partly spontaneous and natural, having been produced by the encouraging hints that the Chorus has given her. And so for all her dulness of wit she will be an effective agent in furthering the machinations of the Chorus.

We can now point out the additional similarity between Soph. *El.* 1296 ff. and *Cho.* 770 ff. which was referred to above (cf. p. 373, n. 1). Aeschylus makes the Nurse act a part which, as we have just seen, is to some degree a natural expression of her feelings. Sophocles brings out still more strongly the fact that Electra's natural feelings will make it easy for her to play her part. Thanks to her hatred of Clytaemnestra and to her tears of joy produced by the return of Orestes, she will not find it hard to avoid confronting her mother *φαιδρῷ προσώπῳ*; cf. 1309-13: "And do not fear that she will see my face bright with smiles. For my hatred is ancient and has deeply penetrated me; and now that I have seen you, I shall never cease to weep for joy." We see that Aeschylus and Sophocles had the same problem, that of quieting any suspicions on the part of Agamemnon's murderers. Their solutions of the problem are similar even in details. In each case an actor is made to play a deceiving part. And furthermore, in each case the actor's natural feelings will help in the playing of the part. The probability that Sophocles derived his *ὑπόκρισις* from

<sup>1</sup> Wilamowitz (1896) explains this well: "Nur ein schlechter seher [κακός γε μάντις] könnte diese deutung geben [ράδε ἂν γνῶιη], nämlich ἐλπὶδα δόμων οἰχεσθαι, so verlangt der zusammenhang."

Aeschylus has already been stated.<sup>1</sup> That we should assume the second common feature (i.e., the use made of the character's natural feelings) to have been a borrowing from Aeschylus seems possible, but less likely. For Aeschylus does not make explicit statement of his purpose of giving (in 775 and 777) genuine encouragement to the Nurse which will help her to deliver the message properly. Still, no great amount of critical acumen on the part of Sophocles would have been required to discover that this was the intention of Aeschylus. But it is quite possible that Sophocles came independently to the not unnatural conclusion that he could make advantageous use of Electra's sorrows to enhance the plausibility of the deception. Whether or not we see adaptation here, it is interesting to observe the similarity between the two scenes, and to contrast the less specific and more imaginative treatment of Aeschylus with the more obvious method of Sophocles.

Let us now take a general view of the situation. The interpretation of *Cho.* 770-74 which I believe to be correct has been given. It is our next task to deal with certain alternative explanations which we have not yet considered. Still referring *γαθούση φρενί* to the Nurse, we must investigate the possibility of answering question 6 by regarding *ἀγγέλω* as Orestes.<sup>2</sup> When this has been done we must go back still farther and re-examine question 5, seeing whether *γαθούση φρενί* can be referred to Aegisthus.<sup>3</sup> Incidentally we must complete our discussion of question 7, which was deferred from page 377.<sup>4</sup>

On the supposition that *γαθούση φρενί* refers to the Nurse and that *ἀγγέλω* is Orestes,<sup>5</sup> we might translate 773 thus: "For at the hands of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 371-74.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. pp. 382-84, 387-89.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. pp. 384-89.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. pp. 382-89.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Wilamowitz (1896): "... sie [i.e., the Nurse] soll gutes mutes sein. das sind rätsel, die in ihr an dem verstande des chors zweifel wecken müssen. zur aufklärung wird ihr nur ein allgemeiner spruch gegeben, wahrscheinlich ein spruchwort 'es hängt von dem boten ab . . . , ob eine verborgene absicht erfolg hat' (*ὀρθοῦν* Hik. 915). das kann sie sowohl auf die botschaft der fremden wie auf die beziehen die sie bestellen soll. sie versteht das erste, wie das perfect *ἡγγελέμεναι* zeigt. . . ." Wilamowitz implies, but does not state, that *γαθούση φρενί* is intended as a genuinely encouraging hint to the Nurse. Just how her perplexity at being told this will be cleared away by 773 as Wilamowitz translates it, I am at a loss to see. It may also be questioned whether the perfect *ἡγγελέμεναι* is any indication that the Nurse understands by *λόγος* (773) the strangers' message; the perfect *τάπεινα λυμένα* (779), for example, points to the injunctions of the Chorus.

the messenger his crooked [i.e., unfavorable and false] story is going to be made straight." De Jongh (reading *κρυπτός*, however) seems to have had about this understanding of the verse. His note is: "Significatur ille de morte Orestae nuncius occultum habere eventum meliorem."<sup>1</sup> This is a direct hint to the Nurse that the Phocian's report will be altered, and so she really will have grounds for the joy which is to be assumed in order to deceive Aegisthus. Thus 773 explains (as *γάρ* indicates) *γαθοῦση φρενί*, as applied to the Nurse. The lack of definite articles in 773 is no hindrance to our understanding *ἀγγέλω* as a specific messenger (Orestes) and *λόγος* as his particular message. We do not have to look beyond *δεσπότην στύγει* (770) to find a similar omission of the article. Additional instances can be found by the hundred in the plays of Aeschylus. This use of the present (*ὀρβοῦται*) for the future is perhaps questionable. The "prophetic present" is used not infrequently by Aeschylus. But it is chiefly employed in formal prophecies, is generally uttered by a character, like Nestor or Prometheus, gifted to a high degree with prophetic power, and it usually serves to lay emphasis on the fact that the occurrence is decreed by fate to come to pass; cf. *Ag.* 126; *Cho.* 550; *Eum.* 950 (text not certain); *Prom.* 172, 213, 513, 525, 764, 767, 848, 948; *Pers.* 799; *Sept.* 749.<sup>2</sup> With this interpretation of *ἀγγέλω*, verses 774 ff. are to be taken just as before.<sup>3</sup> We see from *τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγεμένοις* (774) that, according to our present hypothetical interpretation, the Nurse has not understood the reason given in 773 for her rejoicing.<sup>4</sup> For she would not in 774 express amazement at the idea of there being anything joyful in the *present news* (*τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγεμένοις*) if she had grasped the statement in 773 that the present news is not the last word. Not until 778, *τί φής; ἔχεις τι τῶν λελεγεμένων δίχα*; does she suspect that the Phocian's story may be untrue.

<sup>1</sup> Heath (*ap.* Schütz) reading *ἐν ἀγγέλω γάρ κρυπτός ὀρθώσει φρένα* gives a rendering to about the same effect: "Is enim qui sub persona nuntii occultus est, animum tibi eriget."

<sup>2</sup> However, an exception to this general tendency seems to be found in *Suppl.* 462, *τί σοι περαινέ μηχανή συζωμάτων*; "What is the contrivance of the sashes to effect for thee?" (Smyth.) *εἰ . . . ὑποστήσεις* (461) makes it almost certain that the present *περαινέ* must be understood as having future force.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. pp. 377, 380-81.

<sup>4</sup> It will be remembered that the Nurse fails to understand 773 when this verse is interpreted as a hint to motivate her *ὑπόκρισις* in delivering her message to Aegisthus. Her surprise in 774 proves this (cf. pp. 377, 380-81).



One can hardly insist that this interpretation of 773 is impossible but it is much less appealing than Wecklein's, which identifies the Nurse as ἀγγέλω and her summons to Aegisthus as λόγος. Whether or not the lack of definite articles and the use of the present (ὀρθοῦται) for the future can be paralleled in support of this second interpretation, 773 naturally strikes the reader as a generalization.

Now we are ready to consider the alternative of referring γαθούση φρενί to Aegisthus. As possible support for this one might call attention to ἡ δὲ κλύων ἐκεῖνος εὐφρανεῖ νόον (742) and to θέλων δὲ τόνδε πεύσεται λόγον (765). In view of the tendency of the Chorus to take over into its speech (770-73) material from the Nurse's monologue,<sup>1</sup> it might seem a reasonable inference from 742 and 765 that γαθούση φρενί should be referred to Aegisthus. This, however, is not a compelling consideration, and we shall soon see that if γαθούση φρενί is referred to Aegisthus, great difficulties arise in connection with the context. As we have already remarked, γάρ in 773 naturally suggests that this verse is intended as an explanation of the immediately preceding γαθούση φρενί.<sup>2</sup> If this is the case, we must suppose the Nurse to say ἐν ἀγγέλω γὰρ κυπτὸς ὀρθοῦται λόγος to Aegisthus by way of explaining to him why he should rejoice. In this event there seems to be no alternative to regarding ἀγγέλω as the Phocian. The not altogether satisfactory translation which we gave before on the strength of this identification was, "For at the hands of the messenger his crooked story is going to be made straight." It is very hard to see how this could make it clear to Aegisthus that he should rejoice. These words, if understood by the Nurse,<sup>3</sup> would explain joy on her part (were γαθούση φρενί referred to her), since she has for some time been familiar with the "crooked" story (that of Orestes' death), the straightening of which would of course cause her to rejoice. But far from giving Aegisthus any reason for gladness, this statement would be an absolute riddle to him. Unlike the Nurse, who has known about the Phocian's story all along, he is just going to learn for the first time that there is a message. If 773 as now understood is to explain his joy, he must grasp all at once the following ideas: (1) a messenger has come, (2)

<sup>1</sup> Such material as ὅπως τάχιστ' (735), and possibly the ὑπόκρισις in 737 ff. (cf. p. 375).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 376.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. p. 382, n. 4.

he has already given a "crooked" version of his story, (3) he is going to straighten this out, (4) therefore I must come rejoicing. This is too much to read into *ἐν ἀγγέλῳ γὰρ κυπτὸς ὀρθοῦται λόγος*. Furthermore, if we ignore this difficulty, trouble with 774 awaits us; for if *γαθούση φρενί* refers to Aegisthus and if 773 is an attempt to explain *his* joy, the surprise of the Nurse in 774 at the thought that there is any cause for *her* side to rejoice is absolutely inexplicable.<sup>1</sup> We cannot satisfactorily avoid this difficulty by imagining that the Chorus intends *γαθούση φρενί* to refer to Aegisthus, but that the Nurse incorrectly supposes these words to refer to herself, and that this is the explanation of her surprise in 774. For in this case we should have to believe that the Chorus, instead of correcting the Nurse, submits weakly to the misunderstanding, and proceeds to give the Nurse the encouragement of 775 and 777, just as though the intention has been to refer *γαθούση φρενί* to her all the time.

This attempt to understand 773 as an explanation of *γαθούση φρενί* as referred to Aegisthus has proved unsatisfactory. One objection is that the Nurse's astonishment in 774 is unmotivated. In an attempt to remove this objection let us see whether 773 can be taken as the clue to the Nurse's surprise in 774. If, as we are now supposing, *γαθούση φρενί* refers to Aegisthus, there is nothing left to account for her astonishment save 773. Regarding *ἀγγέλῳ* as the Phocian and *λόγος* as his message, let us translate 773: "At the hands of the messenger his crooked story will be made straight." This does not tell the Nurse outright that she is to rejoice. It merely gives her a hint that the Phocian's story will be changed. Her rejoicing will follow as an implication of this hint. Now, as we have already pointed out, the words *τοῖσι νῦν ἡγγελέμενοις* indicate that her amazement comes from the idea of there being anything to cause joy in the *present form of the news*; not until 778 does she suspect that this version may not be the last word. Therefore she cannot have understood the hint of 773 at all, for if she realized from 773 that the Phocian would change his

<sup>1</sup> This difficulty would be overcome if it were possible to accept either Klausen's or Paley's suggested interpretation of 774. Klausen, it will be remembered, regards the verse as a query on the part of the Nurse as to the wisdom of altering Clytaemnestra's original message, as follows: "An prudenti consilio haec mandas?" Paley supposes that the Nurse is here questioning the loyalty of the Chorus to her side, thus: "Are you right-minded in regard to the news?" Neither of these interpretations can be accepted (cf. pp. 379-80).

story, she would not in 774 continue to worry over the present version. But if she has failed to understand the hint of 773, she can hardly be supposed to have comprehended that she should rejoice, for the command to rejoice has not been expressed, but is merely an implication from a hint that she has not understood. Thus her amazement in 774 is completely unmotivated. The ineptitude of the interpretation which is here presented is apparent on the face of it. The Chorus says, by implication, in 773, "The Phocian will change his story [therefore rejoice]." The Nurse replies, in 774, "What! Do you rejoice<sup>1</sup> at this present story?" The absurdity of this is obvious.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, there is a point to be made in connection with γάρ (773). On our present hypothesis this γάρ is much less satisfactorily explained than it is when γαθοῦση φρενί is referred to the Nurse. Our present supposition is that γαθοῦση φρενί refers to *Aegisthus* and that 773 is an attempted explanation of *the Nurse's* surprise in 774. Can it be maintained that we have here a case of γάρ in its common usage as introductory to a narrative? Miss Geneva Misener, in *The Meaning of GAP*, p. 17, says of γάρ introducing a narrative:

It was first used to expand, and explain, some general phrase, announcing the speech to follow: e.g. . . . Soph. El. 681 . . . καὶ τὸ πᾶν φράσω. | κείνος γὰρ ἔλθων εἰς τὸ κλεινὸν Ἑλλάδος. . . . Frequent occurrence of such colorless phrases . . . made it possible for a speech or an argument to be introduced by narrative γάρ, where only a bare declaration of intention to speak, or a phrase arresting the hearer's attention had preceded.

In every one of the forty or fifty examples of narrative γάρ cited by Miss Misener there is some announcement, previous to the γάρ clause, indicating that a narrative is to come.<sup>3</sup> In the case of 773 there is not

<sup>1</sup> Now, as before, I question this rendering of φρονεῖς εἰ (cf. pp. 378-79).

<sup>2</sup> When this rendering of 773 was discussed before (cf. pp. 382-84), we could not object to it on the ground that the Nurse's failure to understand 773 left her amazement in 774 unmotivated, for at that time we were referring γαθοῦση φρενί to her, and these words, not fully understood by her (cf. p. 369, n. 1) were enough to explain her surprise in 774.

<sup>3</sup> There is no such announcement in one of her examples, Thuc. i. 2. 1, but here we seem to have explicative, not narrative, γάρ.

We may cite from among her examples that one in which the preliminary announcement seems the least direct and prominent, i.e., Soph. *OR* 993-94:

ΑΓΓ. ἢ ρητόν; ἢ οὐχὶ θεμιτὸν ἄλλον εἰδέναι;  
ΟΙΔ. μάλιστα γὰρ· εἶπε γάρ με Λοξίας ποτέ. . . .

MESS.: Lawful, or unlawful, for another to know?  
OED.: Lawful surely. Loxias once said, etc. (Jebb).

the slightest preliminary indication of the narration which (in 773) will follow. Miss Misener's study, therefore, indicates that γάρ (773) cannot be explained as narrative γάρ. On our present supposition that γαθούση φρενί refers to *Aegisthus*, and that 774 is an attempted motivation of the *Nurse's* joy, the only explanation that I can see for γάρ lies in supposing 773 to be a "motivating γάρ clause"; cf. Miss Misener, *op. cit.*, page 18:

The motivating γάρ clause . . . does not give the reason for, nor explain the thought contained in a previous statement, question, or command, but justifies the utterance of these sentences; it interrupts the objective discourse, and gives in parenthesis, as it were, the inner motive for the words just spoken. . . . It is most frequent in the dramatists and writers of prose dialogue. . . . The exact reference of the particle is not always easily discerned, since the speaker may, under stress of feeling, pass over the intermediate stages of reasoning, to a thought or emotion, remotely or vaguely connected with the preceding utterance.

Wecklein's interpretation of γαθούση φρενί, since it gives γάρ a simple and direct reference, is for this reason (among others) a distinct improvement over the explanation we are at present considering.

We have seen that serious difficulties arise if the phrase γαθούση φρενί is referred to *Aegisthus*. In the first place, it is hard to see how the *Nurse's* astonishment in 774 can be accounted for; in the second place, γάρ is not so well explained. These difficulties vanish if the phrase is referred to the *Nurse*, for then γαθούση φρενί accounts for her surprise, and γάρ has the function of introducing 773 as the explanation of γαθούση φρενί.

There are other interpretations of 773 which should be considered for the sake of completeness. According to some editors the meaning of 773 is that "a confidential message can only be rightly explained by a personal interview." This is Paley's note.<sup>1</sup> He goes on to say, "The *Nurse* is instructed to say this to *Aegisthus*, to induce him to come in person." Sidgwick and Blaydes also have this understanding of 773. This seems scarcely to the point. It is not a question merely of inducing *Aegisthus* to come *in person*; he must be persuaded to

<sup>1</sup> I.e., in his fourth edition. The note in his sixth edition (where *κυπρός* is read) is much less definite, "The verse . . . means that the true version of a mistold story lies with the messenger."

come with *no bodyguard*.<sup>1</sup> Some editors suppose that the Chorus speaks 773 in order to justify the Nurse in altering Clytaemnestra's message. Peile's note illustrates this point of view, "Translate: 'for in the hand of the messenger a crooked story is made straight'—i.e. 'it rests with the bearer of the message to give it what turn he pleases: therefore dry up your tears, and deliver your message as we suggest.'" Tucker and Smyth also understand 773 in this way. This is to be contrasted with Wecklein's interpretation of 773, which we are advocating. We are supposing 773 to be said, not with the intention of *justifying* the Nurse in changing Clytaemnestra's message (this would surely be a surprising, not to say a dangerous, principle to enunciate, that on general grounds anyone intrusted with a message is *entitled* to change the message at will), but rather with the purpose of *motivating* the show of joy that is to accompany the delivery of the message, on the ground that one is *able* to conceal the treachery behind a deceitful message by communicating it with a smile. Certain general considerations can be urged against Paley's and Peile's interpretations. If *γαθούση φρενί* is referred to Aegisthus, the Nurse's surprise in 774 becomes unexplained. Again, no matter whether *γαθούση φρενί* is taken with Aegisthus or with the Nurse, the reference of *γάρ* becomes remote and obscure. These interpretations of 773 have nothing to recommend themselves against Wecklein's.

The notes of Blass should now be examined. He accepts Hartung's *ἀδειμάντων*; he takes *ῥσον τάχιστα* and *γηθούση φρενί* with *ἐλθεῖν*, referring to Aegisthus; he renders and explains 773 thus, "Es kommt auf den Boten an, wenn ein geheimer Auftrag glücklich ausgeführt werden soll; also muss auch der phokische Bote von Furcht frei sein, um das zu können." This interpretation of 773 is designed to suit *ἀδειμάντων*, an emendation which, as we have seen, is not to be accepted. Blass continues, "Die Worte sind aber dunkel und sollen es (für die Amme) sein; sie lassen sich auch auf die Amme selbst deuten, die doch jetzt

<sup>1</sup> In justice to Paley it must be pointed out that he realizes how important it is for the elimination of the bodyguard to be made plausible to Aegisthus. His unsuccessful attempt to explain that this is done merely by means of the words *ἀλλ' αὐτόν ἐλθεῖν* has been discussed already (cf. p. 363). Now, as Paley holds, *αὐτόν*, to be sure, does imply that Aegisthus is to come *in person*. But in so far as it implies *by himself* (and for the purposes of the plot it must contain this implication), it is likely to be, for Aegisthus, a suspicious word. On Paley's interpretation we are given merely the word *αὐτόν* to explain away the suspicions aroused in Aegisthus by the word *αὐτόν* itself.



messenger is a good thing, for he himself, personally, independently of his message (*καὶ αὐτός*) puts many things straight. So here Iris by her own good counsel has averted a quarrel between Zeus and Poseidon.

Pindar *Pyth.* iv,<sup>1</sup> contains the poet's appeal to Arcesilas, king of Cyrene, for the recall of the banished Damophilus. Verses 277-79 run as follows: "Of all the sayings of Homer take to heart and cherish even this, 'A good messenger,' he said, 'brings honor to every undertaking'; even the Muse is honored by the straightforwardness of her message." By *ἄγγελον ἐσλόν* (278) Pindar refers to himself, interceding in this ode for Damophilus. His straightforward message (*ἀγγελίας ὀρθῆς*, in 279) is this intercession. This message is well intentioned, being sent for the good of Cyrene, whose interests Damophilus, thanks to his admirable character, can serve (cf. 279-84). Pindar may properly term himself *ἐσλός* and the Muse may well count herself honored (*αὔξεται*) in delivering such a message.<sup>2</sup>

The most interesting point involved here is the question whether we should expect these passages from Homer and Pindar to be of any help in determining the meaning of *Cho.* 773. This question, I believe, must be answered in the negative. The Homeric scholia are too brief to be of much assistance, but Eustathius, whose note is evidently based on the scholia, is more explicit. As we have seen, he paraphrases and explains *Il.* xv. 207 thus: *ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ συνετὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄγγελον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς κατορθοῖ.* This idea, according to Eustathius, is illustrated by *ἐν ἄγγέλῳ γὰρ κρυπτὸς ὀρθοῦται λόγος.* Now in assigning these words to Euripides instead of Aeschylus, the scholiast may simply have made a mistake, which was not corrected by Eustathius. It is, however, a pure supposition to assume that this is the case. It may very well be that the scholiast and Eustathius are

<sup>1</sup> The victory of Arcesilas commemorated by this ode took place at the thirty-first Pythiad, i.e., 462, according to the scholiast.

<sup>2</sup> Schroeder's interpretation of 279 is: "Hier wird sie [i.e., *Μοῖσα*] geadelt [*αὔξεται*] durch die Lauterkeit des Gehalts ihrer Botschaft." Paley, in his translation, and Fennell give an entirely different interpretation. They believe that Pindar did not commit an ode to writing, but transmitted it orally through a messenger who taught it to the Chorus. Accuracy on the part of this messenger was of course essential. These editors take *ἀγγελίας* (279) as a reference to this messenger's oral delivery of this ode. Schroeder's interpretation is much happier, and depends on no hypothesis regarding Pindar's use of the art of writing.



right, and that the verse was to be found in Euripides as well as in Aeschylus.<sup>1</sup> In this case, we must reckon with the possibility that a Euripidean context, different from the Aeschylean, gave to these words a coloring which brought them into close connection with the passages from Homer and Pindar—a connection not observable in the Aeschylean context. For this reason it is unsafe to try to force 773 into conformity with the other two passages, or to criticize any interpretation of 773 for lack of harmony with the others. The proper method of procedure in interpreting 773 is to consider the verse solely on its own merits and in its own context. After this has been done, however, it is interesting to see whether 773 does illustrate *Il.* xv. 207 as interpreted by Eustathius. Tucker, whose understanding of 773 we have seen to be questionable, makes, however, the following observation, to which exception cannot be taken: "The obvious sense . . . is that a shrewd messenger can often do better than simply repeat his message verbatim." In view of this idea, which is undoubtedly common both to *Il.* xv. 207 and to *ἐν ἀγγέλῳ γὰρ κυπτός ὀρθοῦται λόγος*, we must admit that 773 is not a bad illustration of *Il.* xv. 207.

We have been keeping the passage from Pindar in the background. Editors of Pindar are by no means agreed that *Il.* xv. 207 is the passage from Homer which their poet has in mind; cf. Gildersleeve, *ad loc.*: "There is nothing exactly like it in our Homer, but we must remember that Homer was a wide term, and P. may have had a bad memory. The nearest, and that not near, approach is *Il.* 15, 207." Paley is of the opinion that "there is hardly the faintest resemblance between the two passages." As a matter of fact, there seems to be a good deal of similarity between the two passages. In addition to the word *ἄγγελος* they have in common the adjective *ἑσθλός*, not an unusual but on the other hand hardly a commonplace or obvious epithet. Pindar, to be sure, applies it directly to the messenger, and Homer to the results of the messenger's labors. Moreover, we must remember that Pindar, writing in the dactylo-epitritic meter, cannot be expected to give an

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Sept.* 62, σὺ δ' ὥστε ναὸς κενὸς οἰκοστρόφος, and *Eur. Med.* 523, ἀλλ' ὥστε ναὸς κενὸν οἰκοστρόφον; also *Arist. Poet.* 1458b: οἷον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσαντος λαμβεῖον Αἰσχύλου καὶ Εὐριπίδου, ἐν δὲ μόνον ὄνομα μετατιθέντος, ἀντὶ κυρίου εἰωθὸς γλῶτταν, τὸ μὲν φαίνεται καλὸν τὸ δ' εὐτελές. Αἰσχύλος μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτῆτῃ ἐποίησε "φαγίδαυ" αἶ μου σάρκας ἑσθλῆι ποδός." (*frag.* 253 N. So Nauck for φαγάδευα ἢ, φαγίδαυα ἢ of the MSS). ὁ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ "ἑσθλῆι" τὸ "θουᾶται" μετέθηκεν. (Probably, as Nauck states, Euripides changed *σάρκας*, which would have been unmetrical, to *σάρκα*.)

exact quotation of a Homeric hexameter. These considerations seem to indicate that Pindar is here quoting loosely *Il.* xv. 207. Heyne, Schneidewin, Donaldson, Christ, and Schroeder accept this view without question. Furthermore, the Pindaric scholiast *ad loc.* quotes *Il.* xv. 207.

It seems unlikely that Aeschylus actually had the passages from Homer and Pindar in mind when he wrote *Cho.* 773. The adjective *ἑσθλός* of Homer and Pindar does not appear in 773, and the striking metaphor of Aeschylus, *κνιπτός ὀρθοῦται λόγος*, is found in neither of the other passages. Pindar's *ὀρθᾶς* need be nothing more than a chance counterpart to Aeschylus' *ὀρθοῦται*. And Eustathius' *κατορθοῖ* has, despite Tucker, no bearing on the question whatever. Eustathius, having all three passages in mind, naturally enough used a word suggested by two of them in his interpretation of the third. A good many editors believe that 773 is a proverb. Undoubtedly it is a generalization, and it may very well be proverbial, but I do not believe, with some, that *Il.* xv. 207 and Pind. *Pyth.* iv. 278 give this proverb in alternative versions.

There was a proverb *μέγα τοι ἄγγελος ἑσθλός*. This is given in *App. Prov.* iii. 81, and is there explained thus: *ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγαθὰ ἐπαγγελλόντων*, "of those bringing a good message." Von Leutsch and Schneidewin, *ad loc.*, believe this maxim to have been derived from *Il.* xv. 207. It seems more likely that Pind. *Pyth.* iv. 278 was the source. The proverb was spoken of those bringing good news, as we have just seen. This is not the situation in *Il.* xv. 207 at all, as the context shows. Iris, to be sure, is a good messenger, in that her intelligence has averted trouble. However, she has not been a messenger of good tidings, but quite the reverse. Her message was the last thing Poseidon wanted to hear. As far as form goes, in both the proverb and in Pindar *ἑσθλός* qualifies *ἄγγελος* directly; not so in Homer. As to context, Pindar's messenger is termed *ἑσθλός* by virtue of the very fact that he is bringing a good message. This is precisely the point of the proverb. Therefore, if we are to assume that one of these passages is the origin of the proverb, Pindar seems a more probable source than Homer.

## DIS ALITER VISUM

BY P. S. AND E. B. S.

THIS is not the place to dwell upon the intolerable sense of bereavement and waste which the untimely death by drowning of Roger Jones brings to a small inner circle of intimate friends. But *Classical Philology* may fitly record the loss of so valued a contributor and the disappointment of the hopes for American scholarship which those who had observed his development drew from his seemingly slow but very sure growth.

He did not rush into print. But though he had not printed much, readers of his dissertation on *The Platonism of Plutarch*, his searching but courteous reviews, and his articles on Poseidonius and allied topics were aware that few scholars in America or in the world combined in equal measure accurate knowledge of the Greek language with wide and critical reading in the literature of Greek philosophy.

The recent recognition of this quality of his scholarship by Bursian's *Jahresbericht* and the appointment that made him heir presumptive to the chair of Gildersleeve and the editorship of the *American Journal of Philology* had greatly encouraged him and would have doubtless stimulated him to more rapid production and to the exercise for many decades of a well-earned and fruitful leadership in his chosen field. But it was not to be.

Roger Miller Jones was born in Newark, Ohio, June 21, 1886. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts at Denison University in 1905 and matriculated the same year at the University of Chicago, where he received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1913. He was instructor at Grinnell College from 1913 to 1918, and at the University of California from 1918 to 1931, where he attained the rank of associate professor. In 1931 he was called to Johns Hopkins University as professor of Greek. He married Fern L. Reeves on May 21, 1921, in Salt Lake City. His tragic death took place on July 23, 1932, at Pyramid Lake, Nevada, where he was drowned while swimming. His bibliography includes his dissertation, *The Platonism of Plutarch*, published in 1914, and the following articles and reviews: "Chalcidius and Neo-Platonism," *Classical Philology*, XIII (1918), 194-208; "Posidonius and Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* i. 17-81," *ibid.*, XVIII (1923), 202-28; "Posidonius

and the Flight of the Mind through the Universe," *ibid.*, XXI (1926), 97-113; "The Idea as the Thoughts of God," *ibid.*, pp. 317-26; "Notes on Porphyry's Life of Plotinus" and "Notes on Plotinus' *Enneads* I-III," *ibid.*, XXIII (1928), 371-76; "Posidonius and Solar Eschatology," *ibid.*, XXVII (1932), 113-35; "Incommensurable Numbers and the *Epinomis*," *American Journal of Philology*, LIII (1932), 61-66; "Note on Plutarch's *Moralia* 720 C," *Classical Philology*, VII (1912), 76 f.; "Notes on Plato's *Laws* 886 E-887 A," *Philological Quarterly*, V (1926), 274-76; reviews of the following: Shear, *Influence of Plato on Saint Basil*, *Classical Philology*, IV (1909), 456-57; Perrin, *Plutarch's Lives* (LCL), *ibid.*, XI (1916), 76 f.; XII (1917), 312-14; XIII (1918), 415-16; XV (1920), 399-401; XVI (1921), 298-300; XXI (1926), 394; Gronau, *Poseidonios und die jüdisch-christliche Genesisexegese*, *ibid.*, XII (1917), 107-10; Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre, etc.*, *ibid.*, XIII (1918), 414-15; Gunmere, *Seneca, ad Lucilium epistulae morales* (LCL), *ibid.*, pp. 416-18; XVI (1921), 300-302; XXI (1926), 380-81; Billings, *Platonism of Philo Judaeus*, *ibid.*, XVII (1922), 179-84; Paton and Wegehaupt, *Plutarch's "Moralia"*, Vol. I (Teubner), *ibid.*, XXI (1926), 271-73; Babbitt, *Plutarch's "Moralia"* (LCL), *ibid.*, XXIII (1928), 76-79; XXV (1930), 191-93; XXVII (1932), 298-99; Bréhier, *Plotin, Ennéades* (Budé), *ibid.*, XXIII (1928), 196-200.

## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

### A NOTE ON *IG*, IV<sup>2</sup>, 1, 68

An attempt is made below to suggest a possible reading for that clause of the Epidaurus inscription connected with the Hellenic League of 303 or 302 B.C. which deals with the future amending of the treaty. For the sake of clarity the first words of the following clause are also given. Lines 130 ff. of the inscription correspond to lines 14 ff. of section III of *SEG*, I, 75 and the same lines of section V in Wilcken's edition in the Berlin *Sitzungsberichte*, *phil.-hist. Klasse* (1927), pages 277 ff. The number of letters to a line in the reading suggested is 54 in line 131, 56 in line 132, and 55 letters and a line used as a mark of punctuation in line 133. The number of letters to the line in this part of the inscription is somewhat less than in the other parts. On this point cf. Wilcken, *op. cit.*, page 296. Whatever I may be able to contribute is, of course, dependent on the work of the many scholars that have discussed the inscription, to all of whom I wish to express my thanks. For convenience, however, I shall not refer to their work in detail but merely take the version of the inscription in *IG* as my starting-point.<sup>1</sup>

130

—καὶ

131 ἀν τι βούλωντα[ι οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐπανορθῶσαι τῶνδε τῶν συνθηκῶν περὶ]

132 τῶν συμφερόντων, προτιθέτωσαν δ' οἱ πρόεδροι εἰς τοὺς συνέδρους καὶ]

133 οὗτοι ἐπανορθώσ[ατωσαν, καὶ τοῦτο κύριον ἔστω.—ἀναγράψαι δὲ τὰς ὁμο-]

134 λογίας καὶ τοὺς [ἄρκους. . . .

In my attempt to restore the passage I have drawn upon the language and contents of the inscription itself and upon similar formulas found in other extant treaties. There is a considerable variety in the wording of these formulas, so that there is no single combination of words that we are certain must have been used. An additional difficulty is that the available examples are not connected with leagues but with treaties between two states or groups of states. Thus, it is obvious that the reconstruction suggested cannot claim to be exact in all particulars. I do believe, however, that the procedure suggested for the making of amendments is correct in the main and hope that it at least may contain suggestions of value to those interested in the subject.

Before discussing in detail the restoration suggested, I shall state the line of reasoning by means of which the general plan followed was adopted. At the

<sup>1</sup> The most ambitious earlier effort to restore the passage is that of Kougeas, *Arch. eph.* (1921), p. 46. His emendation, which has not won acceptance, is cited in the commentary of *SEG*, I, 75. It seems that he has not taken into consideration sufficiently the language of similar clauses in other treaties. There are also other weaknesses, particularly the failure to indicate who it is that is to perform the action described in the sentence as he has restored it.

outset, the restoration ἀναγράψαι κ.τ.λ. at the end of line 133 was considered correct. That means that the action referred to in ἐπανορθωσ - - must be the final step in the process of amending. There is no room for a statement that the corrections made are to be referred to some other authority for final approval. Now it seems that the only body that possibly can have had a share in the final shaping of the amendment without submitting it to anyone else for approval must have been the *synedrion*. If the amendment had been drawn up by the kings and the *proēdroi* or by a special commission, it would have been necessary to submit it to the members of the League for approval. The *synedroi*, on the other hand, represented the constituent states and might well give final approval to the amendment on their behalf. This would be in accordance with the statement in lines 73-74 concerning the finality of decrees passed by the *synedroi*. Thus οἱ τοι at the beginning of line 133 must refer to the *synedroi*. This means that in the preceding line there must have been a statement about bringing the question before the *synedroi*. This act must have been performed by the *proēdroi*. Now to go back to line 131, the subject of βούλωνται may either have preceded ἄν or have followed the verb. The rest of the line might well have been taken up by expressions referring to the amending of the treaty. If that was the case, and if the subject of βούλωνται preceded ἄν, it would also have to be the subject of the verb supplied in line 132 (προτιθέτωσαν). Since the action designated by the latter verb is due to the *proēdroi*, it would thus be necessary to have πρόεδροι as subject both of the clause and of the main sentence. This is impossible, for it would mean that the *proēdroi* and the *synedroi* could amend the treaty without consulting the kings. Thus it is necessary to find room for πρόεδροι in line 132. It is also necessary to conclude that the subject of βούλωνται followed the verb. This subject must have included the kings, for it is unthinkable that the treaty can have been amended without their approval.

Some notes on the details of the proposed readings are given below:

καὶ is supplied at the end of line 130 because there must have been some connective at the beginning of the new clause of the treaty. δέ is more common, but καὶ ἄν is used also in line 95 and καί has been suggested at the end of line 90.

The reasons for restoring οἱ βασιλεῖς as the subject of βούλωνται have already been given. It might seem natural to expect also some such expression as καὶ αἱ πόλεις, καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες, or καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι referring to members of the League. I found, however, that no matter how short the expression indicating the amending of the constitution was made, there was no room for such an expression without making the line too long. Thus it seems necessary to conclude that all initiative in connection with the amending of the treaty belonged to the kings.

ἐπανορθῶσαι is suggested by ἐπανορθωσ - - of the following line. It has been accepted, though with a query, in *IG* and has been placed immediately after βούλωνται. In the reading given above the word has been retained but placed

in a different position. It is almost certainly correct. This verb was used in Athens in connection with corrections made in *psephismata*, as in *Syll.* 107.49, 204.83.<sup>1</sup> I have not come upon it in treaties, though the related word, *διορθοῦν*, was common a century later. For illustrations see *Syll.* 581.85, 633.120; *SGDI* 5040.75. In *SGDI* 5039.9 *ἐπιδιορθοῦν* is used. In the case of *διορθοῦν* the middle seems to be preferred, but the Liddell-Scott-Jones lexicon gives examples from fourth-century authors of the active of *ἐπανορθοῦν* with such objects as *νόμους* and *διαθήκας*. Thus it is likely that also in our inscription it was used in the active.

τι . . . τῶνδε τῶν συνθηκῶν was suggested by τι . . . τῆσδε τῆς συνθήκης in *Syll.* 633.120 f. In our inscription it is more likely that the plural was used, for any amendment would apply to all the treaties by means of which the various states had been admitted into the League. Cf. lines 92 and 145. In *Syll.* 107.49 *ἐς δὲ τὸ φσέφισμα* is used in connection with *ἐπανορθῶσαι*. This suggests *εἰς τὰς συνθήκας* as another alternative. This, however, seems less likely. In *Syll.* 107.49 the reference is to a specific change in an older *psephisma*.

περὶ accepted for the end of the line in *IG* seems logical and necessary.

For *προτιθέτωσαν κ.τ.λ.* in line 132 cf. line 87. It is to be noticed that if the proposed restoration is correct, the description of the procedure followed has been abbreviated. The first step must have been that the kings sent a written statement to the *proëdroi*. The next step would be that the latter introduced the subject before the *symedroi*. There obviously is not room for a full statement of this procedure, nor is it surprising that when this once has been described in lines 83 ff., it should seem unnecessary to repeat all details.

In line 133 the form *ἐπανορθώσάτωσαν* accepted in *IG* is almost certainly correct. The presence of *ω* on the stone, though *σ* is uncertain, shows that the word was in the aorist.

Line 133 must have contained also some statement to the effect that amendments adopted in the manner described are valid. Such a statement was normal in clauses of this kind in Greek treaties. For illustrations see *SEG*, III, 14.16; Thuc. v. 23.6, 47.12; *IG*, II<sup>3</sup>, 15; *Syll.* 123.10, 181.36 f., 581.86; *SGDI* 5039.10 f., 5040.75 f., 5041.6 f., 5075.45 ff. In some cases this statement is part of the general statement concerning the making of amendments; in others, it is added after the general statement already seems complete. Almost always an expression of the validity of the changes forms the last part of those sections of treaties that deal with amendments.<sup>2</sup> The first expression that suggested itself to me was *κύριον ἔστω τὸ ἐπανορθωθέν*, which was suggested by *κύριον ἔστω τὸ διορθωθέν* in *SGDI* 5040.75 f. But this is a little too long, and the expression is somewhat unusual. *καὶ τοῦτο κύριον ἔστω* is of about the right length and might find some justification in lines 73-74.

<sup>1</sup> All references to Dittenberger's *Sylloge* are to the third edition.

<sup>2</sup> *Syll.* 633.120 ff. forms an exception, but this is not enough to invalidate the general rule or make it unlikely that our inscription contained some expression of the kind.



I do not think that any close approximation to the latter passage, as τὰ δὲ δόξαντα κύρια ἔστω, would be possible. The use of δόξαντα or any related form would imply that anything decided in this matter by the *synedrion* would be valid, while the purpose must be to state that if any amendment proposed by the kings is passed by the *synedrion*, it is valid and binding on all. The one thing of which I feel certain is that the expression used contained κύριον or some other form of this word.

With the expression just discussed the section of the inscription dealing with the amending of the treaty comes to an end. It must have been followed by a line marking the division between it and the following section.

If the foregoing restoration is even approximately correct, the information to be deduced from the passage is of great historical importance. It is the only example we have of a clause of the kind in a treaty embodying the constitution of a league. The procedure described, to be sure, cannot be transferred as it stands to such a league as the Peloponnesian League which lacked *proēdroi*, and in which the meetings of the assembly were presided over by Spartan magistrates, but it suggests that also earlier *symmachies* may have made provision for the future amendment of their constitutions.

In the present case, the amendment of the treaties is equivalent to the amending of the constitution of the League. All formal initiative in such matters, as it now appears, must come from the kings. This is not as surprising as it may seem at first glance. The kings were one of the parties to the treaties, and they obviously must have a share in making amendments. The formal initiative granted them meant that an amendment must have the approval of the kings before it was submitted formally to the *synedrion* instead of that an amendment first passed by the *synedrion* was subject to the veto of the kings. The case might almost be said to be this: that the kings had probouleutic powers in the case of constitutional amendments. This would not exclude the possibility that pressure might be brought to bear upon the kings by public opinion, representatives of the constituent states of the League, or even the *synedrion* itself. Though there is no direct statement to this effect, it is likely that the deputies of the kings could act for them in these matters as well as in others.

When the kings had once given their approval to a proposed amendment, nothing was needed besides the action of the *synedrion*. There is no indication of any special procedure at the meetings acting on constitutional amendments. Thus, all that was needed was a majority vote in a meeting at which at least one-half of the members were present (cf. II. 73 ff.). The only manner in which the procedure differed from that employed in passing ordinary decrees of the assembly was that in the case of amendments the initiative of the king was essential. This, of course, means that the constitution of the League could be changed without submitting the question directly to the constituent states and without the consent of all the states. This, in turn, indicates that the *synedrion* was authorized to make the final decision on behalf of the members

in all matters pertaining to the League. The same was probably normally true of all *symmachies* as far back as the Peloponnesian League, but this is a point that cannot be discussed here. In all likelihood the procedure in the case of amendments was the same in the Hellenic League of Philip II as in that of Antigonos and Demetrius.

The ease with which the constitution could be amended deserves to be considered in connection with the problem frequently discussed of the potentialities, particularly of the League of Philip II, for developing into a federal state. It has now been seen that if the king approved, it was as easy to pass a constitutional amendment as an ordinary decree of the *synedrion*. Naturally the passing of amendments would depend upon what public opinion would demand or tolerate, but there were no technical obstacles in the way. It is generally recognized that the League was more nearly a federal state than earlier *symmachies*. It now appears that, granted a longer lease on life, the constitution might well have been changed bit by bit until the League became more and more a real state instead of a mere *symmachy*.

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#### SOME NOTES ON "THE VALUE OF THE MEDICEAN CODEX OF VERGIL"

That portion of the title of this paper which is placed within quotation marks has already been used by Professor R. S. Conway for an article which he published in the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester* (XV [1931], 336-57). This article, as we are informed in a footnote, is expanded from a lecture delivered at the Library in March, 1931.

And first let me point out certain mistakes, some of which, though not all, may be merely printers' errors. On page 342, "Georg. IV. 73" should be "Georg. IV. 473"; on page 346, "Book X" (of the *Aeneid*) should be "Book XI," and "Book I" of the *Georgics* should be "Book II." On the same page (346) it is stated that "the first hundred and thirty-nine lines of the Second Book of the Georgics are completely lost in P and R, and all but twenty-seven of them lost in V." These numbers should be 138 and 26, respectively.

In *Aeneid* xi. 657, "*M* alone," we are told, "gives us what Vergil wrote, *dia Camilla*, 'goddess-like Camilla'; Romanus has sadly corrupted it into *dura*, and the others into *diua*." As a matter of fact, the original reading in M also is *diua*, the form *dia* being an early correction. In none of the major codices of Virgil is the form *dia* the original reading here. It is, however, original in the Gudianus (γ), and in one of the Berne MSS (b), while it has the support of Servius.

Still another apparent error as to facts. Professor Conway assures us that, like the *Polatinus*, "the Veronese" (i.e., the *Schedae Veronenses*, commonly designated as V) reads *crescentem* in *Ecl.* vii. 25. But Sabbadini gives up the

word as illegible, and after noting the readings of M, P,  $\alpha$ ,  $\gamma$ , and Servius, remarks, "evanuit in V." Ribbeck, however, goes so far as to record "—NTEM V." All that we can infer from this testimony is that V preserves an accusative form, but whether it is *crescentem*, as Professor Conway asserts, or *nascentem*, as is equally possible, we cannot say. I should add, however, that I have not consulted the Verona palimpsest myself, though I have quite recently devoted much study to most of the great Virgilian codices, including the Medicean in Florence and the Palatine in the Vatican Library.

To many Virgilian students the most remarkable feature of this article is the extremely early date which Professor Conway assigns to M. He would refer it "to a period, and not at all a late period, in the second century," whereas palaeographers generally place it in the fifth century. (See, e.g., E. A. Lowe, "Some Facts about Our Oldest Latin Manuscripts," *Class. Quart.*, XIX [1925], 198.) In view of his verdict, it was hardly necessary for Professor Conway to make the gentle confession that he is "rather in love with this" beautiful codex, whose age he is so ready to exaggerate.

To illustrate the peculiar value of M, Professor Conway introduces us to a few of its unique readings, and in connection with one of these indulges in some critical exegesis. I have already had occasion to refer to the passage in question, viz., *Ecl.* vii. 25. Here the reading of the *Palatinus* (but not of "the Veronese") is "pastores, hedera crescentem ornate poetam." Instead of *crescentem*, M has the original reading *nascente*, with *crescentem* as a later correction. Editors have been divided between the two accusative forms, but Professor Conway now exalts with enthusiasm the hitherto-neglected lection, the apparent ablative, which he construes as agreeing with *hedera*. This, he maintains, is not only superior to *nascentem* (*poetam*), but furnishes additional evidence of Virgil's love of nature. Virgil, it seems, could not have written *nascentem*, for "the composer at his birth," as he says, "of course is nonsense. Thyrsis has been born long ago." But *nascente*, in agreement with *hedera*, is quite a different thing. We all know how lovely the young shoots of ivy are when the leaves are just unfolding, how different from the dank and dusty leaves of the full-grown plant. Of course the meaning in prose would be the same. The infant ivy would be a symbol of the budding, but immature, genius of the poet, and it would prepare the way, just as well as *crescentem* does, for the later lines, but prepare it with a pretty image, instead of a straightforward, ordinary epithet. Here I have very little doubt that M is right. The ordinary scribe, not seeing the playful suggestion of the image, would alter *nascente* into *nascentem* to agree with *poetam*; and then a correction to the more truthful *crescentem* would be easy.

But let us look at the passage a little more closely. Is *hedera nascente* a natural expression here? Is not *nascentem poetam* far more probable as well as logical? The verb *nascor*, an inceptive, means properly "to come to birth," and if we keep *nascentem*, the meaning is: "Shepherds, crown with ivy the bard coming to his birth," i.e., "the bard to be," the *vates futurus*, as Virgil himself calls him a moment later. Thyrsis, it is true, is already born, but the

poet in Thyrsis is not yet born, though he will shortly come to light and win recognition from the shepherds of Arcady.

But what if we read *hedera nascente*? In that case the shepherds are to crown the poet with ivy that is coming to its birth—ivy not yet born; ivy, therefore, nonexistent! Could Virgil have ever indulged in "nonsense" such as this? Certainly not.

The *crescentem* which is given as a correction in M, and which is the original reading of P and γ, seems to have arisen as a gloss in explanation of the less obvious *nascentem*. This accusative is preserved in one of the Berne MSS (viz., b), and by Servius in his comment on *Ecl.* iv. 19. It is highly probable that the scribe who originally copied the Medicean codex from an earlier manuscript failed to note that above the final *E* of *NASCENTE* was a cross-stroke (—), which represented the letter *M*, and completed an accusative form.

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#### A GROUP OF SPANISH MILESTONES

In *CIL*, Volume II, there are a number of milestone inscriptions, connected with the Via Nova<sup>1</sup> from Asturica (*Astorga*) to Bracara (*Braga*). These have recently been supplemented by one published in the *Année épigraphique* (1928), No. 178. In the case of II, 4854 and 6224 (wrongly marked in the *CIL* 6124), a careful comparison of their readings and places of origin would seem to indicate that we have two versions of the same inscription.

##### II, 4854

MP. TITO CAE LEG VI  
VESP PII VESPASIANO  
AVG. PONT. MAX. IRIE  
POT. VIII. IMP. . . . P.P.  
COS VIII  
CAES. DIVI. VESPASI . . . SIANO  
C. . . . C. . . .  
VIA NOVA. . . . . TVRICA  
C. CALP. RA. . . . . ALE  
.....  
.....

##### II, 6224

IMP TITO CAES  
ESP. FIL. VESPASIANO  
AVG. PONTT. MAX. TRIB  
POT. VIII. IMP. XVI. P.P.  
COS VIII  
CAES DIVI VESP NO  
COS  
VIA NOVA. . . . ASTVRICA  
C. CALP . . . . . NALE

II, 4854 is said to be "in some cottages adjoining the Navéa bridge, nine leagues from Orense, on the Valdeorres highroad, half a league from the Puebla de Tribes, acting as a support of the *tinglado*." II, 6224 is said to be "acting as a post for the *cobertizo* of the ancient inn of the Navéa bridge in the Tribes district close to the remains of the ancient Roman road." *Tinglado*

<sup>1</sup> This Via Nova seems to be the Antonine itinerary's second route from Bracara to Asturica, viz., p. 427, l. 4 to p. 429, l. 4. An itinerary published in *Ann. épig.* (1921), No. 9. gives the first route, viz., p. 422, l. 2 to p. 433, l. 5.

and *cobertizo* seem to be approximately synonymous in Spanish and to mean "a jutting roof, a hovel, a covered passage." The conclusion seems unescapable that we have here two versions of one and the same inscription, which will be referred to herein as the Puente Navéa inscription.

A comparison of these two versions with the *Ann. épig.* inscription makes it possible to restore the text as follows:

*Ann. épig.* (1928), NO. 178

IMP. TITO. CAES. DIVI. VESPAS  
F. VESPAS. AVG. P. M. TR. POT  
VIII. IMP. XV. P. P. COS. VIII  
CAES. DIVI. VESPAS. F. DOMI  
TIANO COS VII VIA NOVA  
FACTA AB ASTVRICA BRACAR  
C. CALP. RANT. QUIR. VALERIO  
festo. leg. aug. pro. pr  
M.P. XXIII

RESTORED TEXT OF THE  
PUENTE NAVÉA IN-  
SCRIPTION

IMP TITO CAES DIVI  
VESP. FIL. VESPASIANO  
AVG. PONT. MAX. TRIB.  
POT. VIII. IMP. XVI. P. P.  
COS VIII  
CAES. DIVI. VESPAS. F. DOMITIANO  
COS VII  
VIA NOVA FACTA AB ASTVRICA  
C. CALP. RANT. QUIRINALE  
valerio festo leg. aug. pro. pr.  
m.p. . . . .

It will be noted that II, 6224, line 3, gives a very unexpected abbreviation for Pontifex while line 4 attributes "Trib. Pot. VIII" to Titus, which does not harmonize with "Cos VIII," a title which Titus enjoyed during A.D. 80. Until the first of July of that year he was "Trib. Pot. VIIII." It seems possible that the stonecarver cut "VIII" in error and then endeavored to correct it by means of an additional stroke above the line which has been misread as an extra *T* for "PONT." Both inscriptions, then (the one from the *Ann. épig.* and the one represented by the two *CIL* versions), belong to A.D. 80, when Titus, "Cos VIII," shared the consulship with Domitian, "Cos VII." Gomez-Moreno,<sup>1</sup> who reports finding *Ann. épig.* (1928), No. 178, broken in two and acting as supports for the doorway of the church of San Juan de Cabanillas, states that the letters with dots beneath them have been partially obliterated and cites the *Damnatio Memoriae* voted against Domitian after his death. Similar attempts at erasure probably account for the illegible state of line 9 in both versions of the Puente Navéa inscription.

In the Puente Navéa inscription, "Imp. XVI," if correctly deciphered, is of considerable interest. In *CIL*, III, 318, Titus appears as "Trib. Pot. X" in conjunction with "Imp. XV," which would indicate that after July 1, A.D. 80, he was still "Imp. XV." Now the Puente Navéa inscription seems to show him as already "Imp. XVI" while still "Trib. Pot. VIIII," i.e., before July 1, A.D. 80. Moreover, the statement in Pauly-Wissowa, VI, 2721, that "Imp. XVI" is not attested would seem to require revision.

<sup>1</sup> *Catálogo monumental de España, provincia de León* (1906-8), p. 87.

C. Calpetanus Rantius Quirinalis Valerius Festus, part of whose name and title was, according to Gomez-Moreno, rendered illegible by the splitting of the San Juan de Cabanillas inscription into two, is known to have been "Legatus Augusti pro Praetore" of Spain both from a Trieste inscription (*CIL*, V, 531) which gives his whole career and ends *LEG. AVG. PRO. PR. PROVINC [iae Pan] NONIAE ET PROVINC [iae] HISPANIAE* and from II, 2477,<sup>1</sup> of A.D. 79. He also appears in the following group of milestones from the Via Nova belonging like the two above to A.D. 80 but with the distances reckoned from the Bracara end. II, 4803 and II, 4838 are the nineteenth and thirty-fourth milestones, respectively. In both Domitian's name has been obliterated, but they are otherwise complete and read very like the two inscriptions above. II, 4802 and II, 4847 have lost the main body of their inscriptions and read as follows:

II, 4802

VII

C. CALPETANO RANTIO  
QUIRINALE VALERIO FESTO  
LEG. AVG. PRO. PR. VIA  
NOVA. M. P. XVIII

II, 4847

c.calpetano rantio  
quirinale valerio festo  
leg. aug. pro pr via  
nova m.p. . . . xvi

Milestones seem to have been in great demand for use as structural material, even in churches. Gomez-Moreno states that he found two more in use for various purposes in a church in the same district in which he found *Ann. épig.*, 28, 178 but in an undecipherable condition.

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APULEIUS, *METAMORPHOSES* 5, 6 (P. 108.2 HELM)

F read originally: *ingerens membra cōgentia*, but added in the margin *cōnhibentia* (taken by  $\Phi A$ ). It were useless to rehearse the various emendations that have been proposed and argue their inadequacy. The corruption lies quite clearly in the second and third letters of the last word. For this I suggest *ceuentia* as (a) being fairly close to the present reading (assuming an original *cou-*, with an *e* mistaken for an *o*, and *b* written for *u*, as so very frequently in this manuscript, the meaningless *cobentia* having then been emended to *cogentia*); and (b) fitting the context perfectly, as anyone can convince himself by looking up *ceveo* in the *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, and especially the glosses and scholia there cited, 2,982,27 ff.

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<sup>1</sup> References are to *CIL* unless otherwise indicated.

NOTE ON ARISTOTLE *DE CAELO* 289 B 26

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς φύσει τὸ ὡς ἔτυχεν, οὐδὲ τὸ πανταχοῦ καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης.

The text τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης can be construed with the Oxford translator "is no matter of chance." But this is very harsh. Simplicius' lemma at 289 b 1 gives τῆς τύχης, which is more plausible and idiomatic. On page 447, line 5, he cites Alexander as reading ἀπὸ τύχης, which also is possible. But surely the most natural and reasonable reading would be ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τύχης, balancing ἐν τοῖς φύσει. Cf. 87 b 19, 197 a 37, 197 b 1, 1096 b 27, and 1367 b 24 for other cases of τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης.

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## ON ARISTOTLE'S EXPLANATION OF AESTHETIC PLEASURE

τὸ τε μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτ' διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μίμησης τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μίμησιν πάντας. σημείον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρώμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἡκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμωτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντες μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκείνος· ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχη προεωρακώς, οὐχ ἡ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν χροιάν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν.

—Aristotle *Poetics* c. 4.

On the basis of this passage Aristotle has been often accused of holding the view that the pleasure felt in works of art is simply the enjoyment of performing the intellectual act of recognizing the object. In his recent essay, "Principles of Literary Criticism" (*Outline of Modern Knowledge*), Mr. Lascelles Abercrombie drops the passage out as hopelessly inconsistent with the theory of imitation implied in the rest of the treatise.

It would be hard to find plainer contradiction than that between "imitation" everywhere else in the book, and "imitation" in this quite superfluous discussion. If we wish to understand Aristotle's theory, there is only one thing to be done: This passage must be ignored. We may regard it either as an interpolation, or as a queer aberration.

Mr. Sikes (*Greek View of Poetry*, p. 95) comments thus:

As to the nature of aesthetic satisfaction, Aristotle brings it heavily to earth from the heaven in which Plato had placed his archetypal Beauty. The pleasure lies simply in observing the likeness—"that is he." This explanation at least accounted for the fact that objects (such as corpses), which we see with pain, give pleasure when represented by art. The cause of the pleasure is purely intellectual, depending on the recognition of the likeness, although Aristotle seems dimly to feel that this philosophic satisfaction is not quite adequate, so that he is forced to add that, if you have not seen the original, the pleasure will be due to the execution or the colour, or some such cause. But this is merely a passing suggestion; as far as possible, aesthetic pleasure must be rooted in the intellect.



What seems to have been overlooked in both these criticisms, as in the many like them, is that Aristotle is not here speaking specifically of that very limited group of τέχναι which he calls μιμητικαὶ τέχναι. He is illustrating his assertion that men do take pleasure in imitation just because it is imitation, in order to show how much a part of human nature is the instinct for imitation. Therefore he goes for his example outside the range of the μιμητικαὶ τέχναι specifically so called, the natural origin of which, or of one of which, he is seeking. The misunderstanding has arisen, I think, because we tend, unconsciously, to equate Aristotle's μιμητικαὶ τέχναι with our wider term "art," whereas it is clear that for Aristotle there are τέχναι that imitate and yet are not included among those he distinguishes as μιμητικαὶ τέχναι. The term has a conventional limitation, denoting the τέχναι that imitate ἀνθρώπους πράττοντας—the farings of men.<sup>1</sup> Thus the pleasure to which he here refers is not the pleasure distinctive of the μιμητικαὶ τέχναι, but one which their products share with the imitations wrought by other τέχναι, just as, in common with τέχναι which do not imitate at all, they may share also in the pleasure produced by the contemplation of sheer skill in craftsmanship.

Every work of art (in Aristotle's limited sense) does produce this pleasure, i.e., the pleasure that comes from the recognition of an imitation. And that is all he is talking about in this passage, because he is here concerned wholly with the originating impulse to imitate. But hereafter, in every reference to the pleasure produced by tragedy, the pleasure he speaks of is not this one; it is that which arises from its effect on the emotions. But there is no contradiction with this passage; the distinctive pleasure of tragedy, he asserts, is ἡ ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως ἡδονή (c. 14)—the pleasure arising from pity and fear *through imitation*. The specific work of art aims at exciting a specific emotion, but the natural delight in an imitation as imitation, in the recognition, e.g., that a play is a play, a picture a picture, is the essential preliminary condition that transforms the emotional excitement experienced into aesthetic pleasure.

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TACITUS *AGRICOLA* xv. 5.

Tacitus *Agricola* xv. 5 is generally written and punctuated thus: "Recessuros, ut divus Iulius recessisset, modo virtutem maiorum suorum aemularentur. Neve proelii unius aut alterius eventu pavescerent: plus impetus . . .," with a period after *aemularentur* and a colon after *pavescerent*. Apparently this rests upon a misinterpretation of the passage, or at least is likely to give rise to misinterpretation. I suggest that instead the passage be punctuated with a comma after *aemularentur*, and a period or preferably a semicolon after *pavescerent*. As our texts are now printed, the sentence *plus impetus, maiorem con-*

<sup>1</sup> I think he simply means those that "tell" a story.

*stantiam penes miseros esse* is merely an appendage to *neve proelii unius aut alterius eventu pavescerent*, which in turn is made an independent imperative. I doubt whether this is true. The *neve* clause is certainly the continuation of the clause *modo . . . aemularentur* above, and should be treated as such. Both the context and grammatical usage in general commend this view. The grammar states: "*-ve* rarely connects main sentences, usually only the less important parts of the sentence, or, oftener still, subordinate sentences" (Lane, *Lat. Gram.*, § 1674; cf. also 1581 and 1586). Caesar *BG* ii. 21 and Vergil *Aen.* vii. 263 are sentences very similar to the one under discussion.

The context, again, is decidedly in favor of combining both clauses into one sentence, for the Britons are represented as calling to mind the experience of their forebears with Caesar as encouragement for the hope of the ultimate departure of the Romans now from their country. The whole point of the sentence lies in the fact that as the Britons formerly, though defeated, finally forced Caesar to withdraw because of their rugged perseverance, so too the Britons now by the same method will force the withdrawal of the Romans. The sentence then will read: "*Recessuros, ut divus Iulius recessisset, modo virtutem maiorum suorum aemularentur, neve proelii unius aut alterius eventu pavescerent; plus impetus. . . .*" ("They would withdraw just as the deified Julius had withdrawn, provided they emulate the valor of their ancestors and not become dismayed, . . . etc.")

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## BOOK REVIEWS

*Sophokles.* Von HEINRICH WEINSTOCK. Leipzig: Teubner, 1931. Pp. 297.

The author presents this book as a general account of Sophoclean drama. He recognizes the preference of the Germans for Aeschylus and Euripides, and proposes by a more philosophical interpretation of Sophocles to help restore his work to that supreme position which it held in the estimation of Hölderlin, Goethe, Schiller, Hegel, and other great creators and critics of the nineteenth century. He intends, he says, to restore to the general reader the simple, direct pleasure which Sophocles can afford him, together with a "scientific analysis that attempts to deal with the underlying problems." The unifying principle of the entire treatment is to be one that is common to both science and art, "seeing the thing as it really is." The Greek poet does far more than provide for the distracted reader a "quiet island of exquisite art"; more fundamental than the furnishing of any such comfort to the buffeted soul is the greatness and depth of meaning lying beyond and beneath the outward form. So convinced is Weinstock of the prime importance attaching to the philosophic interpretation of the plays that he entirely discards the question of their chronological order. He considers the plays, therefore, in an order determined by their meaning. His great purpose, he avows, is to induce as many as possible to read Sophocles for themselves, assuming that the vast majority will have to read him in translation. Although believing that the best translations are tasteful paraphrases, Weinstock himself in his quotations uses a literal verse rendering because he is anxious that the reader know exactly what Sophocles says.

The Einleitung is followed by an analysis of each play, with special attention to characterization and motivation. Each play, according to the author, has an underlying principle which he represents by a single word. These words and the plays which they symbolize are as follows: *Gestalt*—*Elektra*, *Mass*—*Aias*, *Bildung*—*Philoktet*, *Staat*—*Antigone*, *Anspruch*—*Trachinierinnen*, *Schuld*—*König Oidipus*, *Tod*—*Oidipus auf Kolonos*.

Unlike many commentators, Weinstock does not talk about the "guilt" of Electra or the "unethical" method of the dramatist in exonerating her, but instead speaks of her as the only character in the play who finds herself and realizes the possibility of her nature, and this by reason of her implicit obedience to divine guidance. Herein Weinstock shows the sanity of the most representative Greek art instead of that modern sentimentality which has vitiated so much of our modern literature and literary criticism. Throughout he

is almost exclusively interested in characterization, and not even in that from a purely dramaturgical standpoint, but with the idea of revealing the fundamental nature of humanity. Much of the book belongs, therefore, to the region of philosophic speculation and throws very little new light on the principal questions which have engaged Greek scholars and literary critics.

Weinstock disagrees with Professor Wilamowitz concerning the question of who constitutes the hero in *Philoctetes*, and asserts that the famous German Hellenist has reversed the true situation in making Philoctetes instead of Neoptolemus the central hero. The great focal point of interest, according to Weinstock, is the development of Neoptolemus' character. Philoctetes must give his name to the play because he is the pain-bearer, but fundamentally he is only the occasion by which this development is fulfilled. For example, Philoctetes' refusal to yield to Neoptolemus sounds out the character of the young hero and tests completely his fidelity to his original promise to take Philoctetes home (p. 89). In this adoption of Neoptolemus as the real hero of the play, Weinstock agrees with Arthur Fairbanks (*International Journal of Ethics*, II [1892], 78).

Weinstock adopts Hegel's interpretation of the *Antigone* as symbolic of the conflict between the individual and the community, the family and the state, but thinks that in the hands of his imitators the play has been degraded from a great tragedy to a teacher of middle-class practical morality (p. 98). He accepts the authenticity of the disputed passage, lines 905 ff., and thinks that these lines are essential for the interpretation of the play.

Freilich darf man nicht mit unseren Gefühlen an sie herangehen, noch weniger ihrer Logik nachrechnen. Man muss nur, im griechischen Willen dieses Kunstmittels, aus dem Vergleich den springenden Punkt heraussehen, und das ist der unersetzliche und unvergleichliche Wert des Bruders und die einzigartige Heiligkeit der Bindung, die den Menschen dem Blut verpflichtet, aus dem er stammt [p. 102].

He could have said further that these lines are simply a bit of popular reasoning in folk literature which could be illustrated by an occurrence in his own country of Germany during the Middle Ages.

In his analysis of the *Oedipus Tyrannus* Weinstock goes too far, I think, in attempting to establish the absolute personal innocence of Oedipus. He says that according to Attic law the murder of Laius was a clear act of justifiable self-defense. "Nein, Oidipus hat keine Überschärfe des Denkens und kein Unmass des Handelns zu büßen. Der Dichter hat jedenfalls gezeigt, dass der scharfsinnige Tatmensch nicht der Ehrfurcht gegen Götter und Menschen entbehrt" (p. 158). Whatever one may think of Aristotle's dictum that the hero of a tragedy should have some moral defect, this interpretation does not recognize that Oedipus' weaknesses were his irascible temper and his intellectual pride, the former being especially illustrated in the murder at the crossroads, the latter in at least one passage of self-praise (vss. 395-98). Eighty-four years ago Thomas Dyer pointed out certain touches of hardness

and impiety in the character of Oedipus (*Classical Museum*, V [1848], 65 ff.), and in recent times Professor Goodell showed that the moral significance of the play is the lesson of humility and charity by which we may escape that slight deviation from perfection at the critical moment which will precipitate us into the deadly net of fate, believing that Sophocles' conception is revealed in Emerson's line, "Deep in the man sits fast his fate" (*Yale Review*, N.S., II, 540 ff.).

Weinstock entitles his chapter on *Oedipus at Colonus* "Tod." Better, I think, would have been "Versöhnung." He states that just as Oedipus' suffering was in no sense a punishment of any subjective guilt, so his "Heiligung" is in no sense a reward for his personal merit, but only a symbolic manner of saying that human suffering has its compensations (p. 199). This interpretation, however, sacrifices many of the finer psychological touches in the drama to a rigorous symbolism, and ignores Sophocles' religious principle that man learns by suffering to fit himself for his supreme end of reconciliation with divinity (vss. 1751-53). Here Weinstock would have done better if he had followed Hegel, who regarded the second *Oedipus* as the most perfect example in ancient literature of the idea of reconciliation within the human soul.

The remainder of the book treats of certain topics in philosophy, ethics, religion, and aesthetics under the headings "Drama," "Tragödie," "Mensch," "Dasein," "Sein," "Gott," "Erbe und Anteil," and "Sophokles." In discussing the topic "Sein," Weinstock gives his reasons for believing that Sophocles was no optimist, in spite of his faith in "being" which made him religious. The thoroughness of his symbolism is shown by his statement that when Tiresias in the *Antigone* implies, in opposition to Creon, that the gods (as well as men) can be contaminated (vss. 1016-22), he is expressing Sophocles' own belief, symbolic of the essential unity of the universe (pp. 261 ff.). His interpretation of Creon's words

εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὄρι

θεοὺς μαινεῖν οὐτις ἀνθρώπων σθένει vss. 1043-44

agrees with that of Jebb and Sheppard against that of Campbell and Gilbert Murray inasmuch as he does not take it to be an expression of skepticism. He does not, however, show that the utterance is prompted by the superstitious feeling that he has gone too far in his defiance of Zeus and must therefore "play safe" by "knocking on wood."

In asserting that in Sophocles' plays there is neither accusation nor justification of the divinity, that the ideal of human conduct is neither pride nor humility, but the knowledge of the danger of existence, and the necessity for maintaining its balance, Weinstock is slighting that feeling which Sophocles shared with Aeschylus, Pindar, and Herodotus that one ought to avoid pride and "walk humbly with one's God," the feeling which prompted such an expression of lofty religious idealism as *OT* 863-72, lines which caused Matthew Arnold to exclaim: "Let Saint Francis, nay, or Luther either, beat

that!" Rhode's view of Sophocles' religious feeling, that it is simply *ἡ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλάβεια*, is more nearly correct, and Weinstock could have found sound arguments against his interpretation as far back as Dronke's essay, *Die religiösen und sittlichen Vorstellungen des Aeschylos und Sophokles* (Leipzig, 1861), which shows that Sophocles' peculiar power as a dramatist did not consist so much in the keenness of his intellectual perception as in an inner sense which sees and feels the truth by immediate intuition.

In the closing chapter, entitled "Sophokles," Weinstock enlarges on such topics as the humanism of Sophocles, his power of characterization, and the philosophic symbolism underlying his characters. He shows how Sophocles' dramas illustrate Aristotle's "purgation" theory and also the maxim "know thyself." He reiterates his belief in the "anthropological, yes, ontological" nature of guilt as depicted by Sophocles, and states that the poet's great purpose was to make the spectator conscious of the seriousness of being and to present a poetic analysis of human existence. One cannot help but wonder whether Sophocles intended to do this any more than Shakespeare did, or whether both of these supremely great dramatists simply intended to produce stage plays that would charm their audiences, leaving all analysis to the philosophers and the literary critics. Weinstock praises Sophocles for his Homeric clearness and his Orphic depth, and shows that he was a realist in the philosophic, but not in the aesthetic, sense, because he demonstrated the possibility of believing in the sense of reality without illusions, of holding to a true belief in the spiritual world without sacrificing one's intellectual integrity.

Weinstock vigorously challenges the view that Sophocles was a care-free child of fortune because of his health, wealth, and fame, and says that he must have experienced in himself the mortality of existence. He wrote under a divine compulsion to fulfil his mission as a poet, and he was a great poet because first of all he was a great man. "Therefore his poetry is not an ornament nor an entertainment of life, but it is life itself." Hence it could exert a healing influence on our own times "threatened with mystical fanaticisms as well as by superficial self-satisfaction." It was Hölderlin, according to Weinstock, who saw this most clearly, because in his own personal need he found in Sophocles his spiritual consolation, and the book closes with the lines of the German Hellenist:

An das Göttliche glauben  
die allein, die es selber sind.

Weinstock offers many very suggestive interpretations of Sophoclean characters, and the book will interest any student or admirer of the Greek dramatist. The translation of passages quoted was, as far as I observed, quite satisfactory, but "durch deine Kindestreue" for *τῇ Ζηνὸς εὐσεβείᾳ* (*Electra* 1097), and "Auch ich bin Staat" for *κάμοι πόλεως μέτεστιν* (*OT* 630) are, I think, inadequate. There are a few typographical errors which I observed: 724 for

774 (p. 55), 1130 for 1320 (p. 56), 533 for 553 (p. 62), 955 for 925 (p. 64), 456 for 466 (p. 130), 175 for 1750 (p. 206), and 1324 for 1524 (p. 207). There are very few quotations, and no notes, appendixes, bibliography, or index.

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Πελασγική Ἑλλάς. Οἱ Προέλληνες. By Ν. Π. Ἐλευθεριάδης. Pp. 351. Athens, 1931.

This is a very original work. The truth of this fact cannot possibly escape us, for the author himself takes care to tell us so in the very first sentence of the book. We likewise learn that the present work is the first of a series of nine special studies on the question of the Pelasgic civilization in general which the author intends to publish in the near future. The thesis which Mr. Eleutheriades thinks it is incumbent upon him to defend and establish is that the earliest inhabitants of Greece, commonly called Pelasgians, were a branch of the Semitic races which at the dawn of history were occupying the entire Mediterranean basin and whose brilliant civilization influenced that of the Aryan invaders to such an extent that it can be safely said that the new civilization remained substantially Pelasgic with very slight, if any, contributions on the part of the conquerors, who likewise are denied any contribution to the formation of their own language which, as well as all the other Indo-European languages, the author considers not as belonging to a group of independently developed languages but as simply resulting from the corruption of the Semitic dialects.

The main proof of the theory is linguistic. The author speaks of the old Pelasgic language as a Semitic dialect, adjudging it richer and more beautiful than any of the old dialects, just as if it were a very well-known and exhaustively studied idiom. Drawing for the most part upon modern Arabic, which he considers as having preserved unchanged the characteristics of the original speech, he proceeds to show that almost every place, mountain, river, and city in Greece has a Semitic name, and that even the words for the first necessities of life and the closest relationships are Semitic in origin.

The chief weakness of this theory is that it explains everything too easily, and with the magic spell of an open sesame unlocks every secret of Greek prehistory. Moreover, Mr. Eleutheriades not unfrequently seems inclined to ignore or take lightly the rules of linguistic science and peremptorily to dismiss or underestimate the findings of modern historians who look askance at any emphatic suggestion of oriental influences. Therefore, several of the author's opinions will fail to carry conviction, e.g., his contention that modern Greek *νερόν* is a Pelasgic word and is not derived from *νεαρόν* (*ἔδωρ*); that the word *σπῆτι* goes back to a Pelasgic root meaning "to rest" and does not come from Latin *hospitium*; that *κάμηλος* was first known in Greece, in Cadmus' time, as *γκαμήλα*, which is also the word used in popular speech today; that the Homeric



poems were translated from Pelasgic into Aeolic and then into Ionic, etc. To be sure, no one will question the fact that the original inhabitants of Greece, whoever they were, exercised some influence and left their imprint upon the civilization of the historical Greeks, but it is impossible to accept *in toto* a theory that discovers everywhere vestiges of oriental—i.e., Semitic—influence.

The book, however, is not without merits. Mr. Eleutheriades musters up an astonishing amount of erudition, and argues with the fervor and enthusiasm of a pioneer in a language that is both smooth and vigorous, marred only by occasional typographical inadvertencies. The presentation of his thesis is ably and systematically conducted, yet one feels that at times a certain measure of overconfidence and *parti pris* pervades his argumentation. Although all theories purporting to solve the perpetually baffling problem of the original inhabitants of Greece must, in the present state of linguistics and archaeology, be consigned to the realm of conjecture and be treated with a certain degree of charitableness and leniency, it would not be rash to predict that that of Mr. Eleutheriades will not meet with a very favorable reception on the part of the majority of modern scholars. It is probable, however, that his work will at least have an indirect influence, for owing to the controversial nature of the thesis which it propounds, it is not unlikely that it will enlist additional interest in, and give a new impetus to, the study of the earliest periods of prehistoric Greek civilization.

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*Neugriechische Rückwanderer aus den romanischen Sprachen unter Einschluss des Lateinischen.* VON AD. MAIDHOF. ("Texte und Forschungen zur byzantinisch-neugriechischen Philologie," hrsg. von PROF. DR. NIKOS A. BEES, No. 10.) Athens, 1931.

The detailed examination of the history of a group of words which, borrowed from one language, return, after a long period during which they often undergo considerable changes, as loanwords to the language from which they were borrowed constitutes a very interesting study of the cultural relations of the two people between whom these linguistic transactions take place and affords a clear insight into, and a better understanding of, the relative state of civilization of the countries concerned.

Mr. Maidhof has performed a service for which all students of late Greek will be thankful. After a short Introduction in which he gives a concise historical account of the cultural and political relations of Greece and Rome, he presents us, in the comparatively brief compass of eighty-two pages, with an almost complete list of words which, borrowed from Greek by either Latin or one of the Romance languages, reappear in the modern language sometimes in

such an altered form that their connection with the ancient language is hardly recognizable. In addition, under each word the author has collected a sufficient number of references to the etymological explanations of various scholars, many of which, however, must either be treated as pure conjectures or be rejected outright since they fail to account satisfactorily for many of the changes which the words undergo in the course of their long history; e.g., G. Meyer's derivation of the word *πίττα* from *πηκτή* = *picta* = *pitta* = *πίττα* though plausible is not entirely unobjectionable. Cf. the doubts raised by G. Rohlfs, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der unteritalienischen Gräzität*, page 201. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten, as the author himself is careful to remark, that a good number of these loanwords instead of being spoken of as *Rückwanderer* can very well be explained as derived directly from ancient Greek words surviving to the present day through an unbroken chain of tradition.

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*Lysias with an English Translation.* By W. R. M. LAMB. "Loeb Classical Library Series." London: William Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1930.

After demonstrating his ability as a translator of Plato in the three or four volumes of the *Dialogues* which he prepared for the Loeb Library, Mr. Lamb now turns his talents to the translation of Lysias. Here, as in his previous work, he shows a ready command of English, a felicity of phrase, and many neat turns of expression. His translations though not always close are nevertheless adequate, and reflect fairly well the ease and simplicity of Lysias' "plain" style. Of the rhetorical figures he gives a good rendering for the most part; it is only rarely that the balanced structure of an antithesis is not retained. Notwithstanding his announced intention of showing something of the *ἡθοποιία* of Lysias in his translation, he does little to bring out the breathless haste of the short, hurriedly spoken sentences with which Lysias begs Dam-nippus for help (xii. 14).

As he tells us in the Preface, his text is based on that of Thalheim (1901). Yet he exercises independence of judgment in his choice of readings and is not always in agreement with the German editor, being more apt to keep the reading of the manuscripts than Thalheim is. *λεγόμενος* of the manuscripts in xii. 71, which he retains while the German and American editors adopt Westermann's emendation *ὡμολογημένος*, can be defended only on the ground that the durative tense here carries the notion of repetition—"the time that was repeatedly mentioned by them"—but of this his translation gives no hint. On the other hand, in a nearby passage (xii. 76) he adopts a conjecture whereas Thalheim and others keep the manuscript reading *παρηγγέλλετο*. The imperfect here is picturesque—"orders were passed around among them,"

"were circulated among them"—but Mr. Lamb, rejecting it, gives his preference to Cobet's conjecture *παρήγγελτο*. In neither instance does he show any great sensitiveness to the meaning of the tenses. And the same is true of his translation of the following imperfects: *ἐνγυχάνομεν* in xii. 20 should be translated "could get"; *ἐποίουν* (§ 25) means "had to do"; *ἐλάμβανον* (§ 27) is "would take"; *ἔφενγεν* (§ 42) is "had to flee"; *ἀπέφαινε* (§ 73) is "was about to present."

A notable oversight in Mr. Lamb's book is his failure to mention in his Bibliography and to use in his translation the excellent editions of selected speeches of Lysias by two American scholars, Morgan (1895) and Adams (1905), which would have improved his work in many places. This oversight is made all the more conspicuous when in his Preface he singles out for special mention the editions of Jebb (1876, the first edition) and Shuckburgh (1892), books that are certainly much less helpful. In xii. 7, *ὥσπερ τι τῶν ἄλλων εὐλόγως πεποιηκότες* is not "just as if they had taken some ordinary reasonable action," as Mr. Lamb translates it, but "as though they had done any one of all their other deeds on good grounds," as Adams has it. The subject of *ἦλθεν* in § 19 *fin.* is Melobius, not Polemarchus' wife, and the punctuation mark should come after, not before, *Μηλόβιος*. In § 58, *δι' ἡμᾶς* is "through your means," "thanks to you" (Morgan, Adams), rather than "on your account" (Lamb). The translation of *κελεύοιεν* in § 76 by "should demand" is plainly wrong. The optative here in a dependent clause in *oratio obliqua* represents *κελεύουσι* of the direct statement: "Vote for ten whom the Ephors *command* you to vote for." This becomes in indirect discourse, "Orders were circulated among them to vote for ten whom Theramenes had nominated and ten whom the Ephors *commanded* them to vote for." But *ἀπέδειξε*, a past tense of the indicative, could not be changed to the optative here.

These criticisms, however, should not be allowed to detract from our high opinion of the general excellence of Mr. Lamb's work.

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*Humanitas Erasmiana.* By RUDOLPH PFEIFFER. "Studien der Bibliothek Warburg, Vol. XXII. Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1931. Pp. vii+24.

In his short monograph, which was first presented as a lecture in 1926, and again in 1928 and 1929, and in its present form was intended as the introduction to an elaborate edition of the *Antibarbari* of Erasmus, Pfeiffer concludes that Erasmus "neither was an original genius nor wished to be one," and that

we have in him one who carries on the principle of Europe's *Geistgeschichte*, the principle which was based on the preservation of the spirit of Greco-roman civilization. . . . His *humanitas* is entirely free of any reflection of the past of one

definite people; it is broad, it is universal, it is internal and eternal, it is wholly of the spirit. . . . This can be realized only in the atmosphere of *tranquillitas*, of peaceful quiet [pp. 23-24].

In support of this conclusion Pfeiffer first briefly defines *humanitas*, and reviews the conceptions of it in antiquity and the Renaissance (pp. 1-5), where the early Italians, the Florentine Platonists, and the English and French developed rather divergent ideas (p. 6). After pointing out the futility of attempting to search out the various sources of influence exerted upon the cosmopolitan Erasmus (who added to the difficulty of this task by frequently changing parts of his works as he prepared them for republication), we are shown the development of Erasmus' conception of *humanitas* which progressed from *philanthropia* to *mores hominis natura digni*, to *litterae humaniores*, i.e., the study and appreciation in the broadest sense of the best that classical antiquity could offer (p. 6). This is essential to the appreciation of Christian doctrine, for that can only be understood when good texts are established and understood (pp. 9-11). Therefore, since man can control the amount and type of his knowledge, he must assume the full responsibility for his shortcomings (pp. 11-14). This obviously conflicted with Luther's *Dogma*. Pfeiffer believes that the reason for the violent split between Luther and Erasmus was due not to the difference of opinion upon free will per se, but rather upon the attendant circumstances which Erasmus postulated as essential; namely, peace of surroundings and calmness of spirit (both of which Luther lacked) in which to study the subjects necessary to attain the ability to decide and assume responsibility (pp. 17-20).

The essay is readable, succinct, and suggestive. It is carefully documented and well printed.

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*Half-Lines and Repetitions in Virgil.* By JOHN SPARROW. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931. Pp. 156. \$3.50.

In the Introduction (p. 1) Mr. Sparrow tells us that as a result of this inquiry two conclusions have been reached: first, that interpolation has had a greater effect on the text of Virgil than is generally supposed, and its effect has been to decrease the original number of hemistiches and swell the original number of repetitions; second, that it is impossible to confirm the accounts that most previous scholars have given of the hemistiches and repetitions in the received text—viz. that the half-lines are all beyond doubt literally unfinished lines, and that most repetitions are to be explained by being called "epic" or "Homeric."

These conclusions are first arrived at by a fresh examination and sane discussion of the evidence of incompleteness of the *Aeneid* deduced from the

*Vitae Vergilianae* (pp. 7-19), from which it is concluded (pp. 9, 17) that by *imperfecti* are meant the half-lines, and by *tibicines* complete lines.

In the next main section (pp. 23-52) in which the hemistiches are examined from the standpoint of scansion, distribution, context, finished and unfinished lines, after a résumé of the main ancient and modern views on the subject, the author decides that "Virgil may not have intended to complete all the hemistiches" (p. 45). The repetitions are studied (pp. 55-154) under several heads: unconscious repetition, effective and inevitable repetition, and a miscellaneous group in which passages of the *Eclogues* and *Georgics* are also discussed. While, in the reviewer's opinion, the sanity and calm reasonableness of the whole study seem outstanding, as evidenced by such observations as "the notes appended to the following hemistiches point out their particular effects; that [*sic*] are not meant to imply that Virgil intended those effects" (p. 42), and (p. 111) "nor is there any certain means of knowing how many unconscious repetitions [Virgil] would have recognized in revising the *Aeneid* and what would have been his attitude towards them when he did so," there are points here and there upon which one might differ.

On page 32 the author in discussing lines iii. 463-72 (which set forth the gifts of Helenus to Aeneas [463-70] and refer to Anchises only in 470: . . . *sunt et sua dona parenti*) feels that the latter reference is merely a *tibicen*. Since Aeneas always takes center stage beyond his father, is there need to suppose that Vergil would feel it necessary here to say more than he did in the case of Anchises? "A fair number of hemistiches . . . occur in contexts where their effectiveness, in conveying broken or disjointed utterance or a pause in speech, is a plausible explanation of their presence" (p. 42). Would not the same pause be possible in a thought group, of the nature described, especially as one could hardly conceive of such a pause not in coincidence with the main caesura? And in the discussion of repetitions (p. 57) we find "it is difficult to see how the same line could be used to describe objects or situations which were not 'the same or similar.'" In the light of the strange effects produced by the agglutination of lines (dissociated in the original context) in the *Centones Vergiliani*, with which Mr. Sparrow seems acquainted, is this generalization justified, however true it may be in many cases?

While the author anticipates the reviewer's feeling that the physical composition of the book is not the most felicitous by his statement in the Preface that the book "was composed intermittently . . . [and] has suffered in several ways from being thus put together," it still seems that errors of spelling: "Georgii's" (p. 137); of punctuation: "and would have concluded the line . . . , cf. the eight examples" (p. 41), the printing of a series of quotations without punctuation between them in some places (e.g., pp. 96, 106), and in others (e.g., pp. 99, 106) with a semicolon after each; the use of italics for a variety of purposes which in close proximity (e.g., p. 13) causes confusion, and the rather strange omission of them elsewhere (e.g., pp. 37, 41, 99, 108, etc.); the non-paragraphing of certain introductory sentences (e.g., pp. 7, 10, 46,

.60, 71); the frequent insertion of long bibliographical data within the text (e.g., pp. 19, 24, 35, 57, 64, 80, 137, 141, 153) where such material is usually relegated to a note; such phrases as "the narrative proceeds without a hitch" (p. 34), "from earlier books or from earlier in this book" (p. 99); and the presence of several misprints: 'considered' (p. 107), 'used' (p. 108), on p. 110 the use of a single parenthesis not balanced by a following one, "pectore R corpore R" (p. 127), and "that" for "they" (p. 42) are unfortunate detractors and distractions.

The work is interesting, copiously documented with the evidence referred to, and refreshing as a new examination of an old problem. As its author realizes, such a study can hardly hope to be readable, but it is informative.

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WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

*Greek Byways.* By T. R. GLOVER. New York: Macmillan Co., 1932. Pp. 319. \$2.50.

Mr. Glover, orator of Cambridge University and friend of many Americans, has a long list of interesting books to his credit. He does not ask or care whether they are "research" in any except the Herodotean sense, but just flows on with Herodotean limpidity, zest, and abundance of fact, anecdote, and lightly held hypothesis. He does not mind repeating himself or others or familiar quotations and commonplaces. No matter how familiar a fact, an idea, a quotation, a story, he states it fully, explicitly, clearly. From the beginning his discourse, like that of Herodotus, affects digressions, and we are grateful that he does not habitually practice the "stern relevancy" to which he once exhorts himself. His one object is to get the good things in. And he does. He quotes other writers freely and generously, but whether it be retaliation or self-determination or "buy British" or a tacit Anglo-American entente, in all his wealth of citation of recent literature there is not one mention of a German book, unless the reference to the English edition of Michaelis' *A Century of Archaeological Discovery* be taken as an exception.

The separate chapters seem to be mostly what some of them are avowedly, popular or popularizing lectures. "Metallurgy and Democracy" is an ingenious attempt to correlate the succession of metals with the sequence of governments from the bronze-clad Achaeans and the smithy of Hesiod to the gold mines of the Nubian border and Spain and the bankruptcy of the Roman Empire by the exportation of precious metals to the Far East to buy silks for the great ladies of Rome.

"The Manners of a Gentleman" tells us what the Romans and the Persians thought of the hungry Greekling and collects with many digressions Greek observations on manners from Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle's *Ethics*, and the *Characters* of Theophrastus to Clement of Alexandria. Incidentally we are told that "Nausicaa is one of the most charming girls in literature." She is.

"The Boy and the Theorist" is a miscellany of reflections on education in general and Greek education in particular, based largely on Aristophanes' *Clouds*, Xenophon, Plato, and Isocrates.

"Diet in History" tells with many modern illustrations how and what the Greeks ate and how the procuring of it affected their history.

The more serious "Strabo: The Greek in the World of Caesar" does on a lesser scale for Strabo what Mr. Glover's Sather Lectures on Herodotus did for the father of history.<sup>1</sup>

"Foreign Gods" contains some shrewd general reflections on Greek religion with a good deal about Celsus and Plato.

"The Greek on the Sea" was read to The Hellenic Travellers off Naples, and the eloquent "Vitality of Greece" was read to another shipload of the same association off Sunium.

It is a breezy and enjoyable book. Mr. Glover is not one of those who fear the American infection. He tells us that Nicias made "big money" from the mines of Laureion and (after Mark Twain) that "bacon would improve the flavor of an angel." He is aware that there were Americans "who did not like to see W. J. Bryan when Secretary of State eating radishes from a bag on the street." He observes as truly as wittily that men have been more drunk than Alcibiades in Plato's *Symposium*. And, like the maids who shrieked to see the heads yet shrieking pressed more nigh, he quotes with hideous relish "the dreadful chorus 'Yes, we have no bananas.'"

PAUL SHOREY

*Lukrez: Seine Gestalt in seinem Gedicht.* Interpretationen von OTTO REGENBOGEN. "Neue Wege zur Antike," II. Reihe: Interpretationen, Heft 1. Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1932. Pp. 87.

This treatise opens a second series of "Neue Wege zur Antike," which is to substitute specimen interpretations for the more general themes of the first series. Precisely what is meant by interpretation is left *ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν*. Dr. Regenbogen takes it as an opportunity to combine with a critical study of the proemia of Lucretius a conjectural theory of their origin, occasional remarks on their text, and digressions on many commonplaces of Lucretian criticism which have been touched upon by the French and English interpreters whom he cites, but which he elaborates with philological rigor and abundant reference to the latest German monographs.

His theory is that after I, II, and V were composed with proems, the composition of IV led on reflection to the insertion of III before IV, and that then a different type of proem emphasizing the praises of Epicurus was developed. After the composition of VI, the work fell into three groups of two books each, and the relation between the proems of I and II and of V and VI required a similar adjustment of the relations between the proems of III and IV. There

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Class. Phil.*, XIX (1924), 383.



were then various changes of plan and shiftings of lines from one proem to another. In some cases such passages were worked into their new context, in others not. The final revision of the proem of I was still incomplete at the poet's death. Lines 44-49 were not, as has been supposed, interpolated from II, 646-51, by a critic who wished to call attention to the inconsistency of a virtual atheist beginning with a prayer to Venus, but were transferred by the poet himself, though they were not by him adjusted to their new place. This uncanny insight into the poet's intentions recalls Professor Jaeger's assurance that a certain sentence incompatible with his view of the eleventh book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* was marked in the manuscript for deletion by Aristotle and mistakenly restored by the editors. Γ. Regenbogen himself admits, "Das ist nichts als eine Hypothese." But he thinks it better to present his material in the framework of this hypothesis than "Mich bei der trägen Ausflucht es sei doch alles unsicher zu beruhigen." The answer to that frequent justification of the abuse of conjectural philology is that there is a third way: namely, to describe vividly and analyze accurately the work as we have it and touch lightly on fancies, happy thoughts, possibilities, and probabilities by the way, without pyramiding them into a system which you will be tempted to say "erklärt endgültig," "ist ganz sicher," "wird zur Evidenz erhoben," "ist nun unwiderleglich erwiesen."

But instead of quarreling with the author's method, it is fairer to express appreciation of the wealth of material and suggestions that he has collected and of his commendable acquaintance not only with the German but with the French, English, and American literature on Lucretius. It is hardly necessary, however, to dwell on his elaboration of topics already sufficiently treated in Munro, Sellar, Masson, Patin, Giussani, Merrill, etc. Most of the obvious criticisms on Lucretius were made long ago. But, as in the case of Plato, everybody likes to repeat them and quote again the great characteristic passages with a sense of possession. I may note, however, Dr. Regenbogen's introductory description of the agitated and agitating historical background of Lucretius' generation, his argument that we cannot accept Cicero's sneer or the skepticism of a few of the Roman nobility as proof that Lucretius exaggerated the terrors of superstition in his own day, his contrast between the exuberance and the occasional Plautine coarseness of Lucretius' rhetoric with the smooth classical moderation of Horace and Virgil, his illustrations of the topics of encomium in the proemia by the precepts of Menander on epideictic discourse, his digressions on the history of interesting words, ideas, or images that occur in the proemia, his discussion of the precise Greek terms that Lucretius had in mind in some of his recapitulations of Epicurean or polemics against Stoic doctrine. The student of Lucretius will find the book useful and suggestive in many ways, and will be interested in the numerous comparisons and illustrations even if he may be allowed to doubt whether Posidonius was necessarily the *Schöpfer des Gedankencomplexes* in Sallust's reflections on the luxury and avarice of the flaming youth of Catiline's generation.

Dr. Regenbogen thinks that the suitable inscription for a statue of Lucretius would be Wordsworth's

The marble index of a mind forever  
Voyaging through strong seas of thought alone.

I presume that the typesetter is responsible for "strong."

PAUL SHOREY

*Karanis: Topographical and Architectural Report of Excavations during the Seasons 1924-28.* By ARTHUR E. R. BOAK and ENOCH E. PETERSON. ("University of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series," Vol. XXV.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1931. Pp. vii+69, 42 plates, 1 map, and 6 plans. \$2.00.

The present work will serve primarily as a preliminary orientation. Various kinds of finds are to be treated later in special studies. This, to some extent, is true even of architecture, for fuller studies of several houses have been promised. Nevertheless, there are enough descriptions of buildings, enough information concerning building material, architecture, and topography, and also concerning the other finds to introduce the reader to the work done and its results. The illustrations as a whole are good. Since each plate contains two pictures, there are eighty-four in all. Some of the plans appear in several sections, so that the equipment in this respect is fuller than the words "six plans" indicate. Unfortunately, in some cases the letters and numbers on the plans are difficult to distinguish.

A number of misprints and inaccuracies have slipped into the text. On the top of page 8, Plan I and Plan II should be changed to II and III. On pages 10 and 11 there seems to be some confusion in the references to Figures 12 and 13. On page 15 two references to Figure 16 should be changed to 17. After a statement on page 17 to the effect that a certain room had two niches, one in the east and one in the north wall, there follows on the next page a reference to the niche in the west wall. On the same page a sentence begins: "Near the north end of this north wall." Another unhappy expression, "In the north-west corner of the west wall," is found on page 22. On page 25 there is a reference to Figure 33 instead of 32. On pages 25 and 26 a house with a specially protected entrance is referred to as B53. Below Figure 34 it is described as B3. On page 42, Insulae XII and XIII are described as situated west instead of east of streets 156 and 153. On page 41, houses 241 and 242 are assigned to Insula III; at the bottom of page 43, to Insula II. On page 56 a description of the representation of Harpocrates in a painting contains an obvious mistake when it refers to "the dark red sash-like garment crossing over his right shoulder and under his right arm." To be sure, in a work that is one long series of details such slips are easily made and readily pardoned, but they do tend to confuse the reader.

JAKOB A. O. LARSEN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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